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ABSTRACT

Understanding Design Requirements for Building Reliable, Space-Based FPGA MGT
Systems Based on Radiation Test Results

Kevin Michael Ellsworth
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Master of Science
Space-based computing applications often demand reliable, high-bandwidth communication systems. FPGAs with Mulit-Gigabit Transceivers (MGTs) provide an effective
platform for such systems, but it is important that system designers understand the possible
susceptibilities MGTs present to the system. Previous work has provided a foundation for
understanding the susceptibility of raw FPGA MGTs but has fallen short of testing MGTs
as part of a larger system.
This work focuses on answering the questions MGT system designers need to know
in order to build a reliable space-based MGT system. Two radiation tests were performed
with a test architecture built on the Aurora protocol. These tests were specifically designed
to discover system susceptibilities, and effective mechanisms for upset detection, recovery,
and recovery detection.
Test results reveal that the Aurora protocol serves as an effective basis for simple
point-to-point communication for space-based systems but that some additional logic is necessary for high reliability. Particularly, additional upset detection and recovery mechanisms
are necessary as well as additional status indicators. These additions are minimal, however,
and not all are necessary depending on system requirements. The most susceptible part
of the MGT system is the MGT tile components on the RX data path. Upsets to these
components most often results in data corruption only and do not affect system operation or
disrupt the communication link. Most other upsets which do disrupt normal system operation can be recovered automatically by the Aurora protocol with built-in mechanisms. Only
1% of oberserved events in testing required additional recovery mechanisms not supplied by
Aurora.
In addition to test data results, this work also provides suggestions for system designers based on various system requirements and a proposed MGT system design based on the
Aurora protocol. The proposed system serves as an example to illustrate how test data can
be used to guide the system design and determine system availability. With this knowledge
designers are able to build reliable MGT systems for a variety of space-based systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Many space-based computing applications, such as processing sensor data or chip
to chip communication, require high-bandwidth point-to-point connectivity.

Field pro-

grammable gate arrays (FPGAs) provide an effective platform for space-based applications
due to their flexibility, reprogrammability, and low development cost. Increased availability
of Multi-Gigabit Transceivers (MGTs) on FPGAs is providing the high speed communication
links necessary to meet the demands of many of these high-bandwidth applications.
System designers, however, should be aware of the susceptibility of MGTs to Single
Event Upsets (SEUs) in a space environment. Effects from SEUs can cause an increase in bit
error rates and disruptions in the communication link. This work focuses on investigating
the effects of SEUs on MGTs and particularly how the addition of a protocol layer above
the MGT can help mitigate known issues.
1.1

Motivations
Previous work [1] has focused on characterizing raw MGT SEU failure mechanisms.

Such characterization leads to a greater understanding of how MGTs in isolation can fail
and provides insight into error rates that can be expected in a space environment. However,
system designers need to have a better understanding of how MGTs in a larger system are
affected by SEUs.
This work thus focuses on testing FPGA MGTs as part of a larger system design in
a radiation environment. By adding a protocol layer on top of the raw MGTs in the test
this work provides greater insight into how the system will respond to SEU effects. The
focus of this work is to provide MGT system designers with the information they need to
make informed design decisions. In particular this work seeks to provide insights into 1)

1

which areas of an MGT system are most susceptible to upsets, 2) effective upset detection
mechanisms, 3) how to recover the system from the effects of upsets, and 4) how to effectively
determine the system is recovered.
1.2

Contributions
The primary contributions of this thesis are:

1. Development of a methodology for testing an MGT and protocol system
2. Support for previous raw MGT SEU effect characterization
3. Characterization of SEU effects for MGTs with a protocol layer
4. Test data which provides MGT system designers with information on
System susceptibilities
Effective upset detection mechanisms
Effective recovery mechanisms
Effective recovery detection
5. Suggestions for implementing an MGT and protocol system suitable for space-based
applications
6. A proposed implementation of such a system and how to perform availability analysis
on such a system
1.3

Thesis Organization
The Thesis is organized as follows: Background information on FPGA MGTs neces-

sary to understand the nature and purpose of the testing performed is provided in Chapter 2.
This chapter also includes a discussion of related work and the motivation for additional testing of MGTS. Information pertaining to the Xilinx (San Jose, Calif.) Aurora protocol used
in testing is given in Chapter 3. The motivation and goals for testing will be set forth in
Chapter 4. Details on the test setup will be presented in Chapter 5 while detailed results will

2

be presented in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 provides high level conclusions drawn from the test
results which are used in Chapter 8 to provide suggestions for implementing a protocol-MGT
system for space-based applications. Finally, Chapter 9 will present future work that could
be done in this research area.

3

Chapter 2
Background
The number of electronic components being used in space is growing. Space environments introduce unique constraints for electronic components due to the presence of
radiation. Radiation can cause a variety of problems for electrical devices such as custom
integrated circuits (ICs) and FPGAs. Both of these types of devices suffer from possible operational errors due to radiation effects, but historically the mechanisms that allow FPGAs
to be reconfigured have been particularly concerning. As FPGAs increasingly incorporate
more complex components such as MGTs there is an increased need for understanding how
radiation can affect FPGAs. This chapter provides background for understanding the potential effects radiation can have on FPGAs and particularly on MGTs.
2.1

FPGAs and MGTs in Space Environments
Modern FPGAs are composed of a variety of components. Each component may

be susceptible to radiation in different ways, or impact the system in different ways. For
instance, an SEU in a Block RAM (BRAM) may cause a data value to be corrupted in
memory. This value stays corrupted until overwritten and presents incorrect data to the
system every time it is accessed. A Flip-Flop (FF) inside user logic could be similarly
corrupted, but the value in the FF is much more likely to be overwritten in a short period of
time, perhaps on the next clock cycle. Depending on when the corruption occurs, or where
in the design the FF is located, the temporary, incorrect value may not affect the system
at all. The component that has the most potential to affect the system, however, is the
configuration logic.
The configuration logic holds all information about the function of various system
components as well as the routing of information between them. Any changes to that in-
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formation can cause unpredictable effects on system operation until the configuration logic
is repaired. An upset to configuration logic may not only introduce a temporarily incorrect
data value into the system, but could completely change the functionality of some part of
the system. In addition to having the largest possible impact on system operation, the configuration logic also occupies the largest amount of space on the FPGA and thus is the most
likely component to be exposed to radiation [2]. These facts have led to increased efforts to
protect the configuration logic against radiation induced upsets.
Recently, Xilinx introduced a radiation hardened FPGA to help mitigate radiation
effects to the configuration logic [3]. Sometimes referred to as a Single-Event Immune Reconfigurable FPGA (SIRF), this new FPGA design utilizes a special hardware layout to provide
redundancy at the cell layer to provide configuration logic that is more resistant to SEUs
than previous FPGAs. SIRF FPGAs have greatly reduced the susceptibility of configuration logic which has shifted research efforts toward understanding radiation effects on other
FPGA components [2]. This work utilizes a radiation hardened Xilinx FPGA to help isolate
upsets to the MGTs by reducing the probability of upsetting the configuration logic. Using
this chip also allows us to more realistically model potential space based systems that are
likely to use this new technology.
2.2

MGT Tile Architecture
Since upsets to configuration logic are less of a concern for radiation hardened FP-

GAs, researchers must focus their efforts toward identifying the susceptibility of other FPGA
components such as MGTs. In order to better understand the way in which MGTs could
be affected by radiation induced upsets, we must first understand some of the architectural
details of MGTs and how they fit into a larger system. This work utilizes a Xilinx Virtex
5 FPGA, thus the following discussion focuses on the architecture of Xilinx MGTs found in
these chips, though the principles are similar for MGTs in other chips and from other vendors [4]. Furthermore, the discussion primarily references Xilinx High Speed (GTX) MGTs,
though the architectural details are nearly the same for the Low Power (GTP) MGTs [5].
This section focuses on introducing various components of the MGTs and illustrating potential ways in which upsets to them could cause system disruption. Most of this information
5

is available in more detail in [5], but I will present here that which is most relevant to this
work as well as implications to radiation environments not given in the documentation.
2.2.1

MGT Tiles
MGTs in Xilinx FPGAs are grouped into blocks called tiles as shown in Figure 2.0.

Each tile contains two MGTs as well as some resources that are shared between the two.
A connection between two MGTs is referred to as a lane while a collection of one or more
lanes forms a channel. In a link between MGTs where more than one lane is used to form a
channel the lanes are said to be channel bonded. For a link that only uses one lane there is no
significant difference between the channel and the lane, though some protocol specifications
may treat the terms differently. In this work’s test design only single lane channels were
used, so the two terms are essentially interchangeable in this work.

Figure 2.1: MGT Architecture on Xilnx FPGAs. MGTs are grouped two to a tile while two
MGTs connect to form a lane and one or more lanes form a channel.
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Figure 2.1 provides a more detailed view of the Xilinx MGT tile. Each MGT in the
tile is composed of mostly independent TX and RX regions. Each region contains many
components, each of which may contribute to system errors in different ways when upset in
a radiation environment. Additional details on the TX and RX portions of the MGTs are
provided in Section 2.2.3 and Section 2.2.4 respectively.
The center region of Figure 2.1 illustrates the significant resources (labeled 1-5) that
are shared between the two MGTs. The Phased-Locked Loop (PLL) (label 1) is used to
generate the high speed clock used for both tiles from a reference clock via the clocking
block (label 3). More detail on clocking considerations for MGTs is given in Section 2.2.2.
The Reset Control and Power Control (labeled 2 and 4 respectively) affect both MGTs in
the tile. The reset to the tile (referred to as GTX Reset) resets all components of the tile
and the shared resources including the PLL. Lower impact resets can be applied to each
MGT separately as described in Section 2.2.5. Powering down the tile is not used explicitly
in our test design, however, the Power Control block and its associated inputs should be
remembered as a possible source of upsets that can affect the system. The Dynamic Reconfiguration Port (DRP) (label 5) allows the user logic to change certain MGT configuration
settings. The DRP is discussed more fully in Section 2.2.6.
2.2.2

Clocking
Proper clocking is an important consideration for MGTs. Correct operation of the

MGT serialization components at high data rates is dependant on a high-quality, low-jitter
clock [5]. This clock is generally generated outside of the FPGA by a dedicated oscillator.
The MGT tile takes the clock as a reference clock input and uses a PLL to generate other
clocks needed throughout the tile. There are multiple clock regions in the tile bridging the
frequency gap from the user logic clock which presents parallel data to the high speed clock
used to transmit serial data. The rate of these clocks is a function of the data transmission
rate as well as the data interface width selected by the user logic. The data interface width
determines how many bytes are presented to the tile each clock cycle. Thus to transmit serial
data at the same data rate, a 2-byte interface requires a clock rate twice as fast as a 4-byte
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Figure 2.2: Detail of Xilinx MGT Tiles from [5]. MGTs in a tile share a number of resources
including a PLL, reset logic, and a DRP.

interface because it is presenting half as much data per clock cycle. This clock is also used
by the user logic that interfaces with the tile in order to maintain proper synchronization.
The clocking for the RX component of the MGTs adds additional complexity because
the clock used to sample the incoming data is derived from the incoming data stream itself,
8

with the help of a reference clock generated from the PLL. Additional considerations with
respect to this are discussed in Section 2.2.4.
This clocking arrangement forms a common point of failure among the two MGTs
in a given tile as well as any logic that directly interfaces with the MGTs. Furthermore, a
reference clock can be shared among tiles, meaning that any disruption to the reference clock
can cause problems on multiple MGT tiles and their associated logic. Another important
consideration of the tile PLL is that a tile level reset, such as used in this work’s test
architecture, will reset the PLL and thus disrupt operation on both MGTs within a tile.
2.2.3

MGT TX Components
Details of the TX components of a Xilinx GTX MGT are shown in Figure 2.2. A

deep understanding of all the individual components that make up an MGT is not necessary
for understanding the results of this work. As such, I only mention those pieces which are
most relevant to the discussion.
The basic flow of data through the TX side of the MGT is composed of an optional
encoding, serialization and transmission. One option for the encoding is the 8B/10B encoding
scheme (label 2 in Figure 2.2) which aids in clock recovery on the RX side and provides
some simple error checking. The TX flow also provides more complex mechanisms with the
64B/66B and 64B/67B encoding schemes through the gearbox (label 5 in Figure 2.2). In

Figure 2.3: Detail of Xilinx MGT TX Components from [5].
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general, the choice of encoding is dictated by the protocol. It is also possible to bypass
encoding completely, but most protocols use some encoding to ensure sufficient transitions
on the transmission line for clock recovery on the RX side (see Section 2.2.2 for more details
on clocking). The serialization of the data is performed with the use of a low-jitter, high
frequency clock. The performance of the data transmission is highly dependant on the quality
of this clock at the fastest data rates. Though the TX side of the MGT is non-trivial, it has
fewer components than the RX side and its operation is less complex. As such, the TX side
has fewer ways in which radiation upsets can contribute to system errors.
2.2.4

MGT RX Components
The RX side of the MGT has many components as shown in Figure 2.3. The job of the

MGT receiver is much more difficult than that of the transmitter. While the transmitter is
in complete control of its transmission frequency and alignment of data words, the receiver
must detect both these elements simply from the incoming serial data. One of the first
components in the RX side data flow is the Clock Data Recovery (CDR) block (label 4).
This block uses the incoming data stream to extract a clock that can be used to sample the
incoming data values. This is why the TX flow generally includes some form of encoding to
ensure that there are sufficient transitions in the data stream to allow the CDR to determine
the correct frequency. The CDR also uses a high speed clock generated from the tile PLL
as a reference clock in order to extract the data sampling frequency.
In order for the RX MGT to process the incoming data, the data sampling frequency
must be extremely close to the receiving system clock frequency. In other words, the clock
used by the TX MGT must be very close in frequency to that used by the RX MGT. The
RX system expects a specific amount of data each clock cycle. Thus if the RX clock is slower
than the TX clock then the RX system will not be able to process the data fast enough. If
the RX clock is faster than the TX clock then the RX system will try to process data before
it is there. Since it cannot be expected that the clock frequencies will be exactly the same1
there is a mechanism in place to resolve any discrepancy between them. The RX Elastic
1

Unless both the TX and RX components in a given link are in fact being driven from the same reference
clock.
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Buffer (label 12) is used to bridge the crossing between the data derived clock frequency
and receiving system clock frequency in conjunction with a mechanism referred to as clock
correction. The TX side of a link uses clock correction to transmit a block of special control
characters at regular intervals. The RX side of the link can then choose to discard the data
words or insert extra words into the buffer depending on whether the RX system clock is
too slow or too fast. This ensures that the RX elastic buffer will not overflow or underflow.
If the RX system clock is slower than the TX clock, the discarded words will allow the RX
side to catch up. Similarly, if the RX clock is faster than the TX clock then the RX MGT
will insert extra clock correction words into the buffer so that the buffer will not underflow.
The attached protocol will then ignore the extra control words, but this allows the protocol
to expect a word from the buffer on every cycle.

Figure 2.4: Detail of Xilinx MGT RX Components from [5].

2.2.5

Reset
The MGT tile has a hierarchy of resets that can be used to reset different parts of

the system as shown in Figure 2.4. The TX side only has a single reset whereas the RX side
has three, and a single reset covers the entire tile (both MGTs and shared resources). The
TX reset will reset all TX components for one MGT only. The lowest order RX reset is the
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RX Buffer Reset which resets the RX elastic buffer. The RX Reset resets the components in
the PCS region of the RX side (refer to Figure 2.3), including the elastic buffer. The highest
order RX reset, the CDR Reset, will cause the CDR to resynchronize with the incoming data
stream clock as well as reset the PCS components. The Tile level reset (GTX Reset) resets
all the components of both MGTS in a tile as well as the shared resources such as the PLL.

Figure 2.5: MGT Tile Reset Hierarchy from [5].

2.2.6

Dynamic Reconfiguration Port
The DRP provides a mechanism for dynamic changes to the configuration of the

MGT tile. The DRP is a shared resource since changes can be made which affect the entire
tile, but some changes made through the DRP affect only a single MGT. The DRP allows
user logic to make changes to the configuration of many tile parameters. The parameters
range from those which affect everything in the tile such as PLL settings to those which only
affect a single portion of a single MGT such as data encoding or control character detection
settings. Without the DRP these settings would be static for a given design, having been
established in the configuration logic of the FPGA.
The DRP makes it possible for a design to utilize greater flexibility, changing the
configuration of the MGTs at run time. However, this also poses problems for reliability
when MGTs are placed into radiation environments. For SIRF parts with radiation hardened
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configuration logic, it is unlikely to get an upset which changes the configuration logic for the
MGTs. However, the DRP adds a layer of logic on top of the hardened configuration logic
which can be upset and thus change the configuration of the MGTs. Such an upset can not
be corrected by correcting the configuration logic, nor can it be corrected by resetting the
tile because the stored configuration data in the DRP is not affected by this reset. Instead
the correct value must be explicitly written into the DRP to overwrite a bad value or all
the memories on the chip must be reset to their original values which could corrupt other
components in the system.
2.3

Related Work
This work builds upon substantial work which has been performed in the area of

characterizing MGT radiation effects. Much of this previous work has been conducted by
members of the Xilinx Radiation Test Consortium (XRTC). This group is sponsored by
Xilinx and performs a variety of radiation related testing on Xilinx parts. The work presented
here was made possible in large part due to contributions and advice from members of the
XRTC.
A great deal of research has been performed on the effects of radiation to FPGA logic
generally [3, 2]. Less research has been done specifically on MGTs alone, but significant
investigations have been performed. Earlier radiation testing focused on the characterization
of MGTs on Xilinx Virtex 2 Pro FPGAs [6]. This early research provides a good foundation
for understanding the susceptibility of MGT components but there are significant changes
to the MGT architecture from the Virtex 2 Pro devices to Virtex 5 devices.
Monreal has performed significant testing on Virtex 5 MGTs which provides valuable
characterization of these newer architecture parts [1]. His testing used radiation hardened
FPGAs and shielding to expose only the MGTs to radiation in order to better isolate upsets.
The results from this investigation suggest the robustness of the Virtex 5 MGTs and their
ability to recover from upsets given the proper stimulus. The isolation of the MGTs in
this testing allowed for more accurate characterization of the MGT components alone and
provided a solid foundation for investigations into characterizing the MGTs as part of a
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larger system. For a more details on the relation between Monreal’s work and this work see
Appendix D.
Morgan, et al. performed some initial testing of Virtex 5 MGTs with the Aurora
protocol using commercial (not radiation hardened) Virtex 5 FPGAs [7]. Their research
suggests that additional logic is needed for the Aurora protocol to be used in space environments, but also directs that more research is needed. Thus this work builds upon that work
which has been done to provide greater insights into characterizing Virtex 5 MGTs as part
of a larger system and offer suggestions on what logic additions may be necessary to form a
more robust space-based system.
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Chapter 3
Aurora Protocol
In order to investigate the ways in which an MGT and protocol system respond to
radiation induced upsets it was necessary to select a protocol for the test architecture. I chose
the Aurora protocol primarily due to its relative simplicity compared to other available MGT
protocols and the availability of its source code. This chapter provides a brief overview of the
aspects of the protocol most relevant to this work. Full details on the protocol are available
in [8] and [9].
3.1

Protocol Introduction
The Aurora protocol is an open IP core available from Xilinx which is designed to

provide a minimal amount of logic and protocol overhead to interface with the physical
layer of the MGT serial links on Xilinx FPGAs. It is a lightweight, link-layer protocol used
to connect two MGT end points. The protocol is an open standard and is available for
implementation without restriction, which is why it is so valuable for this work [9].
3.2

Main Features
The Aurora protocol, which is primarily designed for point-to-point connections, pro-

vides a mechanism for the streaming or framing of data across a serial link. 8B/10B encoding
is used on the transmitted data for proper clock recovery as well as basic error checking.
The framing interface of Aurora also provides a means of error checking on data frames
sent through the protocol. The basic role of the protocol is to ensure a connected link
between MGTs through a synchronization procedure, framing of data through appending
Start-Of-Frame and End-Of-Frame characters, and resetting the link upon error detection.
The protocol also allows for Flow Control which makes it possible to send commands, such
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as a request to retransmit, back to the sending side of the link (though this feature is not
utilized in this work). To compensate for frequency differences between the sending and
receiving logic’s clock, the protocol also provides for clock compensation to occur at regular intervals. This mechanism prevents underflow or overflow from occurring in the MGT
buffers.
3.3

Aurora’s Contribution to Reliability
The addition of the Aurora protocol provides an extra layer of error checking and

recovery to the raw MGTs which is useful for mitigating radiation induced upsets. The
additional error checking is minimal, however, compared to some other protocols such as
Rapid Serial I/O. Aurora provides three signals to indicate the occurrence of errors, Soft
Error, Hard Error, and Frame Error. Soft Errors occur as a result of 8B/10B decoding
errors detected by the MGT tile. Hard Errors are the result of either component errors
detected by the MGT tile (buffer errors and RX Realign) or the presence of too many Soft
Errors in a specified period. Thus with the exception of counting Soft Errors to cause a Hard
Error these signals represent only the transmission of errors detected directly by the tile. The
Frame Error signal, however, is purely the result of checking in the Aurora logic itself. A
Frame Error occurs when a framing character is seen out of order such as a Start-Of-Frame
followed by another Start-Of-Frame without and End-Of-Frame.
Aurora also provides a status signal for identifying when a given MGT lane is active,
labeled Lane Up. Aurora has a specific initialization procedure it follows to establish that a
valid connection exists between two MGTs. This procedure consists of sending and receiving
a specific set of control characters in the proper order. Once this initialization is completed
the Lane Up signal is asserted to indicate that the lane is ready to transmit user data. The
protocol also continues to check for special control characters transmitted between user data
bytes to ensure that the lane is still up. If the protocol fails to see the appropriate control
characters in the data stream the Lane Up signal will drop and the initialization procedure
will begin again. In this way the Lane Up signal can also be used as an additional way to
identify errors in data transmission.
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When a Hard Error occurs, or when the Lane Up signal drops, Aurora also asserts
the RX Reset and TX Reset signals into the MGT tile. These reset signals are used to
reset various tile level components in order to ensure controlled conditions for beginning the
initialization sequence again. A reset on one side of the lane will ultimately result in a reset
on the other side of the lane because that side will fail to receive the proper control characters
and thus will issue its own resets and begin the initialization sequence. As a result, any data
that was in transmission in either direction will be lost up until the next Start-Of-Frame
character. These resets, however, are beneficial for systems experiencing radiation induced
upsets because often resetting the tile level components removes errors cased by the upsets.
These protocol level additions to the MGT tile should allow for a system better able
to tolerate effects from upsets than the raw MGTs by themselves. Thus this work seeks to
determine how effective these protocol level additions are at making the system more robust
and what else is needed for a system to be more completely tolerant to upsets.
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Chapter 4
Test Introduction
The ultimate purpose of this work is to provide suggestions for MGT system designers
building systems that will operate in radiation environments. In these environments radiation
induced upsets to the MGTs are expected and must be planned for. To make a robust system
the designer must make decisions based on knowledge of the MGTs and the protocol being
used in the system. Table 4.0 describes some important design decisions and the knowledge
needed to make intelligent choices for them. The primary motivation for this work is the
realization that most of the needed information detailed in Table 4.0 is not currently available
to system designers.

Table 4.1: Design Choices and the Information Necessary to Make Them.

Design Choice
Needed Information
How to prevent or minimalize the - What areas of the system are most susceptible
impact of upsets to the system
- How severe is the impact from upsets to
these areas
- What can be done to make these areas
less susceptible
How to detect that
- What error detection mechanisms are built in
an upset has occurred
and what needs to be added
- How effective are these error detection mechanisms
The appropriate steps to take
- What recovery techniques are available
in order to recover from an upset and what needs to be added
- How effective are these recovery techniques
- How much time is necessary to recover from upsets
How to know the system is
- What system status indicators are available
recovered
and what needs to be added
- How effective are these status indicators
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In order to gather the information needed by MGT system designers, radiation testing
is needed with a test architecture specifically designed to extract this information. This
chapter will first introduce some terms to aid in describing the test architecture used in this
work and then briefly describe how the test architecture is designed to gather the desired
information. Details of the test architecture are given in Chapter 5.
4.1
4.1.1

Terms
Event and Recovery
A radiation induced upset to the FPGA may not cause any noticeable system impact.

For instance, an upset to a Flip Flop that is not being actively read by the system likely
will have no effect on the system because the incorrect value will be overwritten by the
correct value before it is read. Upsets that do affect the system range from extremely minor
effects such as the corruption of a single data value to major effects such as complete system
failure. The noticeable effects may last for only a single cycle or ripple through the system
for thousands of cycles. Thus to distinguish an upset from its effects on the system I will
define any upset that produces a noticeable effect on the system as causing an event.
The first detection of such an upset is said to be the start of the event.1 The end of
the event is defined to be when the system has returned to normal operation, or in other
words the system has recovered from any effects of that upset. Thus an event has a duration
which encompasses any system effects from a given upset.
4.1.2

Recovery Step and Self Recovery
Once the system is in an event, the system either recovers on its own or some external

mechanism is necessary for recovery. A recovery step is defined as any action which is taken
in an effort to bring the system back to normal operation. When the system does recover
without any external action this is still considered a recovery step and is termed self recovery.
1

Due to the nature of the detection mechanism it is possible that an event may also be triggered by some
non-radiation related error such as bit errors common to communication links in non-radiation environments. However, the experiment is designed such that should any such errors occur they will be statistically
insignificant in comparison to the radiation-related events.
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4.1.3

Failure Signature
If a system is to respond to events it must have a mechanism for detecting when an

event occurs. In a complex system it is likely that more than one mechanism can signal that
an event has occurred. Each of these different mechanisms, or possibly the combination of
multiple mechanisms that signal simultaneously, is referred to as a failure signature. A time
line for a sample event and the associated terms is shown in Figure 4.0.

Figure 4.1: Sample Event Time Line.

4.2

Architecture Overview
This section provides an overview of how the test architecture and associated data

analysis gathers the information necessary to make informed design decisions as outlined
in Table 4.0. For this discussion the system of interest is composed of the MGTs and
their associated protocol logic as shown in Figure 4.1. The protocol logic is assumed to be
implemented in a radiation hardened FPGA and thus it is assumed that the MGT is the
piece of the system primarily vulnerable to radiation induced upsets.
4.2.1

System Susceptibility
The first questions a designer is likely to have about the reliability of a system relate

to what areas of the system are most susceptible to upsets and what can be done to make
these areas less susceptible. To know what areas of the design deserve the most attention
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Figure 4.2: System of Interest. MGTs are assumed to be the primarily vulnerable area.

two important pieces of information are required - the susceptibility of different areas, or in
other words the frequency at which they are likely to be upset, and how severely the upset
affects the system. Once the critical areas have been identified effort can be given first to
mitigating against upsets to these critical areas.
Since the MGTs are custom silicon blocks in the FPGA little can be done to directly
observe which areas of the MGTs are upset. As a result, this information must be obtained
by observing the effects of upsets and then proposing possible sources of those effects. The
test architecture makes it possible to track all events that occur and categorize them into
at least two categories that are useful for this analysis - 1) successful recovery step and 2)
failure signature as shown in Figure 4.2. Additionally, a breakdown of the duration of events
for either categorization can be observed to provide further insight.
Categorizing events by the recovery step that successfully recovered the system provides insights into what part of the MGT may have been upset because each recovery step
targets different sets of components. A recovery step that only resets the MGT’s RX buffers,
for instance, helps to indicate if the RX buffers were possibly upset by observing whether applying that recovery step is effective in recovering the system. Similarly, categorizing events
by their failure signatures indicate possible areas of the MGT that have been upset because
different failure signatures derive from, and may be independent from, different parts of the
system.
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Figure 4.3: Classification of Events. These classifications can be useful for identifying areas
of the system most vulnerable to upsets.

The frequency of each category of events can be analyzed both as a number relative
to all other classes of events and as a predicted rate of occurrence for a given radiation
environment. The test architecture provides both numbers - the first from simply comparing
the number of events observed in each category, and the second from more thorough analysis
of the event count along with other test parameters.
The severity of a given event type is more difficult to define as it may vary between
events that have been put in the same category. The primary mechanism to aid in this
analysis is observing the severity of the recovery step necessary to recover the system. The
portion of the system that has to be reset in order to recover indicates how much of the
system was affected by the upset, or at least how much of the system is affected as part
of the recovery. For instance, an upset may only affect one portion of the system but if
that portion can only be reset by applying a system-wide reset then the entire system will
ultimately be affected. When events are classified by successful recovery step this metric of
severity is common to all events in a given class. Events classified by failure mechanism,
however, may have different successful recovery steps and thus this metric of severity will have
some distribution across the events as demonstrated in Figure 4.3. Another metric of severity
provided by the test architecture is the duration of events. Examining the distribution of
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event durations for a given category of events provides some insight into how much a given
event type is likely to impact the system in terms of system availability.

Figure 4.4: Classifying Failure Signature Groups by Recovery Step. This classification can
be used for the development of more advanced recovery mechanisms that respond differently
based on the failure signature.

Once the designer understands the critical areas of the system, attention can be given
to mitigating against the effects of upsets to those areas. Again noting that the MGTs are
custom silicon blocks in the FPGA, there is little a designer can do in the design to prevent
upsets from occurring there. Thus the focus of the designer’s effort must be on how to lessen
the impact of these upsets on the rest of the system. For systems where data loss cannot be
tolerated, some form of duplicate transmission or resend technique is necessary. For systems
less concerned about 100% data integrity and more concerned about area and time costs,
the focus may instead be on quickly recovering from upsets rather than completely avoiding
their effects. The test architecture is designed to provide information for this type of design
as outlined below.
4.2.2

Upset Detection
The first step in attempting to recover from an upset is to detect that an upset has

occurred and has affected the system. The MGTs have some error detection logic built in, as
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do most protocols, but this error detection may not be sufficient for detecting SEU related
events. In order to determine if the existing mechanisms are sufficient, the test architecture
utilizes existing error detection signals from the Xilinx MGT tiles and Aurora logic as well as
additional mechanisms. Examining the events categorized by failure signature will provide
insights into the number and types of events that can be detected by existing mechanisms
versus those which required additional logic. This will provide the designer with insights
into which additional error detection mechanisms are necessary in order to meet system
requirements.
4.2.3

Recovery Steps
Once an upset has been detected and the system is determined to be in an event, it

is necessary to determine which steps, if any, should be taken to recover the system. Again,
the MGTs and the protocol logic have some built in recovery mechanisms, but these are
possibly insufficient to recover from SEU related events. Additionally, though the MGT has
recovery mechanisms in place, the protocol may not be designed to exercise all of them.
To identify which recovery steps are most useful, the test architecture first allows
the system to attempt to recover on its own, then utilizes existing MGT and protocol level
mechanisms not used automatically as well as additional techniques not provided by the
MGTs or protocol. By examining events categorized by successful recovery step I can provide
information on the effectiveness of certain recovery steps as well has how often specific
recovery steps are necessary. More detailed information can be obtained by looking at events
classified by both failure signature and successful recovery step. These results can provide
the designer with information for implementing a more complex recovery system where the
recovery steps implemented are dependent on the failure signature.
Another important piece of information for designing a recovery systems is knowing
how much time to wait for the system to recover before attempting additional recovery. The
test architecture provides information on all event durations. Thus this information can be
obtained by looking at the distribution of event durations classified by successful recovery
step.

24

4.2.4

Recovery Detection
It is important to know when the system has recovered. If the system reports recovery

too early and the system is actually still suffering from the effects of an upset then corrupt
data may be accepted as valid, or the recovery mechanism may never advance sufficiently to
truly recover the system. On the other hand, if the system is declared recovered later than
is necessary, valid data may be ignored, or unnecessary recovery steps may be taken that
result in increased system down time. As with the other system mechanisms, the MGTs and
protocol have existing status indicators that provide information on system recovery, but
these mechanisms alone are likely inadequate for systems that must handle upsets.
In order for consistency in analyzing events the test architecture only implements a
single method for recovery detection. This limits the amount of information that can be
gained on the effectiveness of various recovery detection mechanisms. However, the architecture does provide some insights from an analysis of how many events could not have been
declared recovered with existing status indicators as well as any events which were declared
recovered when they should not have been.
4.3

Summary
The test architecture and data analysis are designed to answer the questions needed by

designers to make good system design choices. Chapter 5 provides more details on the exact
means by which the architecture is able to provide the needed information while Chapter 6
provides the test results along with an example of how the results can be applied to make
choices for a sample system.
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Chapter 5
Test Architecture
The test architecture of this work is designed to extract the information detailed in
Chapter 4 during radiation testing. Two radiation tests were performed using this architecture, with the second test using an improved version of the original architecture. These
tests were performed in March and July of 2011, and thus any reference to a specific test
architecture will be referred to by specifying either the March test or the July test architecture. A significant amount of data was gathered in the March test, but the test primarily
served as a learning experience whereby the improved July test architecture was developed.
The improved architecture made it easier to extract the most pertinent information from
the test data. As a result, the emphasis in describing the test architecture and reporting
of test results will be upon the July test and unless specifically mentioned as pertaining to
the March test, the discussion will refer to the July test exclusively. Additional information
pertaining to the March test is found in Appendix A.
This chapter will contain a brief overview of the test architecture followed by a more
detailed listing of architecture parameters and methodologies. Finally a review of how the
architecture is used to answer the question posed in the test introduction is presented in the
final section.
5.1

Overview
At the highest level, the test architecture is composed of three layers:
• Test Design
• Monitor / Control Logic
• Logging / User Interface (UI)
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The test design represents a potential space-based system and is the design that is
being evaluated in the test. The monitor/control logic layer monitors the activity of the test
design and asserts various control stimuli into the test design based on the observed activity
or user input. The logging/UI layer logs information received from the monitor/control layer
and also provides information to the user. The user can also provide commands at this layer
that are sent to the monitor/control layer and then into the test design. Each of these three
layers is composed of multiple components which will be described in the following sections.
A block diagram of the test architecture is provided in Figure 5.0 and more detail for each
layer is provided below.

Figure 5.1: Block Diagram of Full Test Architecture.

5.1.1

Test Design
The test design is composed of two FPGAs connected by multiple MGT links. Each

MGT link, referred to as a lane, is independent from all other links and serves as a separate
test structure that can be evaluated on its own. Thus the basic structure for all monitoring,
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Figure 5.2: Test Design Logic for Single Tile. The test design is composed of many such
independent MGT links between the two FPGAs.

control, logging, etc. is the lane. Each lane contains a full duplex link, meaning that on each
FPGA the TX and RX units of the MGT are active. One of the test design FPGAs, referred
to as the Device Under Test (DUT), is directly exposed to radiation. The second FPGA,
referred to as the service (SRV) FPGA, remains outside the beam of radiation. This setup
allows me to isolate the upsets to a single side of the MGT link and thus better identify
whether errors happen on the TX or RX side of the link.
The logic design for the DUT and SRV FPGAs is the same with each FPGA transmitting and receiving data. A tile on either FPGA provides two MGTs and thus serves
to form two independent lanes in the test design. Figure 5.1 represents the design for a
connection between two tiles and thus two lanes in the design. On each side, two Aurora
protocol blocks are connected to the tile, one to each MGT. Connected to each Aurora block
is a block that generates a fixed length data packet of pseudo-random data with a frame
number and CRC. Also connected to each Aurora block is a packet checking block which
checks the frame number, length, and CRC of all received packets. The different blocks in
the test design present and receive signals to/from the monitor/control layer. Details on the
parameters for each of these blocks as well as all signals to/from the monitor/control layer
is provided in Section 5.2.
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5.1.2

Monitor/Control Logic
The monitor/control logic layer is composed of two FPGAs for each side of the test

design (SRV and DUT) which are referred to as FuncMon and ConfigMon. There is also
software on a single central PC that is connected to both sides. Each component is described
below.
ConfigMon
The ConfigMon FPGA monitors the configuration of the test design FPGA (SRV
or DUT). It checks for errors in the configuration and corrects errors when commanded to
do so. These operations of reading configuration data and correcting configuration errors
are referred to as readback and scrubbing respectively and are described more fully in Section 5.2.4. The ConfigMon can also be used to help with initially configuring the test design
FPGA. The ConfigMon provides a limited amount of information directly to the FuncMon
which gets passed onto the PC software, but most of its information is sent to the logging/UI
layer via a separate logging device referred to as a Brain Box. The Brain Box is in turn
connected to a laptop which logs all the information received through the Brain Box and
sends commands from the user through the Brain Box to the ConfigMon.
FuncMon
The FuncMon FPGA, or Functional Monitor, is used to monitor all interesting activity
of its associated test design FPGA as well as send various control signals into the test design.
The primary monitoring job of the FuncMon for this test architecture is to monitor error
signals from each lane of the test design, package them into events as described in Section 4.1
and send them up to the PC software. The FuncMon also receives control instructions from
the PC software and sends them into the test design FPGA.
PC Software
The PC software serves as the central point that can observe and control both sides
of the test design. It receives event information on each lane from both sides and determines
when the test design system is in error (as opposed to each individual side being in error).
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Based on this information the software determines when the system is unable to recover on
its own and sends a hierarchy of control signals at a specified interval via the FuncMon until
the system recovers. This part of the software is referred to as the Recovery State Machine
(SM). Information on the status of the test design lanes as well as the recovery steps is also
passed to the logging/UI layer portion of the software.

Figure 5.3: Screen Shot of GUI for User Interaction With Test Architecture.

5.1.3

Logging/UI
The logging/UI layer is composed primarily of software on the central PC but also

includes the ConfigMon Brain Boxes and their associated laptops. The brain boxes and
laptops log all configuration information from each side of the test design while the PC
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software handles all other logging. The PC logs all information on events and status from
the test design as well as recovery step information and any commands issued by the user.
The user is able to interface with the software through a GUI which displays a variety of
status information and gives access to test setup parameters and run time commands. A
screen shot of the GUI is shown in Figure 5.2.
5.1.4

Information Flow

Figure 5.4: Information Flow Up Through Test Architecture.

Figure 5.3 shows a simplified flow of information from the Test Design layer up to
the Logging / UI layer. The flow of information is the same for both sides, but only one side
is labeled for simplicity. Error and Status signals are monitored directly by the FuncMon,
while the ConfigMon monitors readback and scrubbing information and passes it along to
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the FuncMon. The FuncMon then takes this information and passes it up to the central PC
in the form of Event Start, Event End, and Status packets.

Figure 5.5: Control Flow Down Through Test Architecture.

Figure 5.4 shows a simplified flow of control information from the UI level down to the
Test Design level. All User control signals are issued from the central PC to the FuncMon
along with reset signals from the Recovery SM. Configuration scrubs are issued by the user
from the ConfigMon Laptops through the Brain Box to the ConfigMon which then performs
the scrub.
5.2

Architecture Detail
This section provides more detailed information on various test parameters and

methodologies as well as some of the components introduced above.
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5.2.1

Hardware Setup
The test architecture is built around the hardware platform often used by members of

the XRTC. The hardware setup is represented in Figure 5.5. This platform centers around
the XRTC motherboard which houses the FuncMon and ConfigMon FPGAs. Both of these
FPGAs are Virtex 2 Pro FPGAs. The ConfigMon design is developed by the XRTC and
is used for many different test architectures. The FuncMon design is unique to this test
architecture and contains both VHDL modules and a Power PC running C code developed
specifically for the architecture. Most of the monitoring of the test design is done in the
VHDL modules while the Power PC is primarily responsible for packaging data and transmitting it via an RS-232 link to the central PC.

Figure 5.6: Hardware Setup for Test Architecture.
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Attached to the XRTC motherboard via two Teradyne connectors is a daughter card
which contains the test design FPGA1 . These two connectors provide a wide bus between
the FuncMon and the test design FPGA, as well as allow the ConfigMon to access the
configuration information for that FPGA. Since the bus between the FuncMon and test
design FPGA is sufficiently wide each signal that is monitored/controlled by the FuncMon
is brought out to a pin. This simplifies the design and removes the need for any additional
logic in the test design that could also be corrupted. However, it also limits the number of
lanes that can be monitored to the size of the bus divided by the number of signals per lane.
In the current architecture this limits the test to 6 lanes. Another card is attached to the
daughter card which allows access to the FPGA MGTs via CX4 connections2 .
The test design is implemented on two Virtex 5 FPGAs. The primary device being
tested (DUT) is a XQR5VFX130 radiation hardened FPGA while the service is a commercial
FX130T FPGA. All other parameters for the two chips are the same. The MGTs have a
line rate of 3.125 Gbs with a reference clock rate of 156.25 MHz. The test design logic
also runs at 156.25 MHz and thus there is no need for a PLL in the Aurora protocol logic.
Each FPGA instantiates 3 MGT tiles providing for 6 independent lanes each with its own
Aurora protocol block, packet generator, and packet checker. A summary of test parameters
is provided in Table 5.0 while more detail is provided in Appendix B.

Table 5.1: Test Design Parameters.

Parameter
Value
MGT Line Rate
3.125 Gbs
MGT Ref Clock Rate 156.25 MHz
Logic Clock Rate
156.25 MHz
PLL in Logic
No
MGT Tiles / FPGA
3
Lanes
6
1
2

For those familiar with the XRTC hardware, this daughter card is often referred to as the CPU Board
This card is referred to by the XRTC as the Sandia Mezzanine card
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The central PC runs windows XP and has two serial ports to connect to both FuncMons via RS-232 links. This link forms the bottleneck in the amount of data that can be
passed to the central PC. The PC runs a single Python program with two threads which
handles all RS-232 communication to/from the FuncMons, controls the recovery state machine for the entire test system, and displays information to the user via a GUI developed
specifically for this test architecture.
There are two additional laptops that are connected to the ConfigMons, one on each
side of the test architecture via the XRTC Brain Boxes. The user controls the ConfigMon
via the XRTC ConfigMon GUI. The main tasks of this interface are to configure the FPGAs
prior to a test run and request configuration scrubs during the test. These laptops also log
all configuration data reported from the ConfigMon via the Brain Box.
5.2.2

Aurora Protocol Blocks
The Aurora protocol blocks in the test design are Aurora 8B/10B Cores version

5.2 generated from Xilinx Coregen. In order to allow two Aurora protocol blocks to be
connected to a single MGT tile, as well gain greater visibility to the tile level signals, the
Coregen produced VHDL was modified slightly. This modification consists primarily of
VHDL hierarchy changes (to allow for proper signal routing to both Aurora blocks) and has
no effect on Aurora protocol logic. Also, the example design provided by Coregen creates a
PLL which may not be necessary depending on the settings chosen. For this test architecture
the settings (specifically the clock rates and the number of bytes in the tile TX interface) are
specifically chosen such that this PLL is not necessary and thus the PLL is also removed.
5.2.3

Packet Generation and Checking
The test design uses a fixed procedure for generating data packets to be transmitted

over each lane. The packets are generated outside of the Aurora protocol block and a CRC
is calculated and appended before being presented to the Aurora block. The packets contain
256 words of data with a word size of 2 bytes. The word size is set by the MGT tile
parameter TXDATAWIDTH which specifies how many bytes are presented to the tile for
transmission on each clock cycle. The CRC used is the 16 bit CRC-16-CCITT (polynomial
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x16 + x12 + x5 + 1) which is appended to the data packet resulting in a 257 word packet
(514 bytes). With some additional overhead introduced by Aurora this packet size will take
about 1.67 µs to transmit on average. There is a single cycle delay between packets in the
packet generator, but additional delays between packets can be introduced by the Aurora
block. Typically though, the space between packets is only one cycle.
The first word in each packet is a packet number which increments sequentially for
each packet. This packet number is used to identify missing packets in the RX packet
checking mechanism which expects to receive each packet number in order. Following the
packet number, subsequent data words are pseudo-random data values generated from a
custom Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) with the packet number as the seed. Thus
every time the packet number rolls over (every 216 packets, or roughly .11 seconds) the
pattern of pseudo-random data will repeat.
The Aurora protocol is configured to perform clock correction. This occurs at regular
intervals of about 32 µs and lasts for only 0.045 µs (7 cycles). Clock compensation can occur
at any time during or between packets. As such, the time to transmit a packet can vary
slightly if clock compensation occurs in the middle of transmission.
The packet checking block performs three checks on each received packet: 1) it has
the right packet number (i.e. one greater than the last seen packet number), 2) it is the right
length (i.e. has 256 data words), and 3) the CRC check passes. Failure to pass these checks
results in the error signals Length Mismatch, Missing Packet, and CRC Fail respectively, all
of which are reported on the same cycle at the end of the packet if present. If the CRC
check passes there is also a signal which indicates that a good packet was received. This is
used as a status signal in the FuncMon to indicate that the lane is still actively transmitting
data. If more than 8 µs (time for more than 4 packets) passes without the FuncMon seeing
either a good or bad packet, then a Watchdog error signal fires. This could indicate a failure
in the RX mechanism of this MGT, or a failure in the TX MGT that is connected to it. A
summary of packet generation/checking parameters is provided in 5.1.
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Table 5.2: Packet Generation/Checking Parameters.

Parameter
Word Size
Data Payload Size
CRC Size
Total Packet Size
CRC Used
Time to Transmit 1 Packet
Clock Compensation Interval
Clock Compensation Duration

5.2.4

Value
2 Bytes
256 Words
2 Bytes
257 Words
CRC-16-CCITT
1.67 µs
32 µs
0.045 µs

Configuration Monitoring
To monitor the configuration of the test design FPGA, the ConfigMon stores a golden

copy of the configuration file for the FPGA on start up. During a test the ConfigMon
continuously reads back the configuration on the device and compares it to the golden copy
to check for errors. If an error is found (readback error ) the correct value from the golden
copy can be written back into the device. This process of writing back the correct value
is referred to as a configuration scrub. Scrubbing can be done automatically whenever an
error is found, or it can be done on command only. When done on command, any incorrect
configuration values that have accumulated since the last scrub will be overwritten with the
correct values from the golden copy (i.e. all accumulated errors will be fixed at the same
time).
This test architecture uses the scrub on command method in order to better observe
the effect of configuration errors on the system. In order to be able to clearly see which reset
recovers the system, when an event occurs recovery steps are applied in a hierarchical order
with a wait interval between steps until the system recovers. If the system is continuously
scrubbing, it is difficult to isolate whether the system recovered as a result of the scrub
or some other recovery step that happened to occur at the same time. Thus configuration
scrubs stand as their own independent recovery step, rather than happening continuously.
The ConfigMon can perform two types of scrubs. When the golden configuration file
is stored on the ConfigMon it contains information on the values stored in system memories.
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Unlike other configuration information, memories are expected to change throughout the
run time of a device and thus can not be compared against the golden copy to find errors.
As a result, a standard scrub masks out the memory information with the GLUT Mask. It
is possible, however, to perform a scrub with the GLUT mask off which resets these memory
values back to the start up value, essentially returning the device to its start up condition.
In this work a scrub with the GLUT mask off is referred to as a GLUT scrub to distinguish
it from a standard scrub.
5.2.5

Data Logging
One of the most important aspects of this test architecture is how information is

captured such that the needed information can be extracted. For the March test the test
architecture captured each error signal from the test design along with a time stamp of when
it occurred. This proved to create an exorbitant amount of data that was interesting, but
difficult to sort through. Additionally, the amount of reporting could easily overwhelm the
system with a limited RS-232 connection speed. Thus the current test architecture does
some packaging of information in the FuncMon before ever being reported to the logging
layer. This is done primarily to reduce the bandwidth necessary for transmitting data to
the central PC, but also simplifies the post test data analysis because the most interesting
information is already extracted.
Capturing Events
The primary information of interest is centered around events - what starts them,
how long they last, and what ends them - but not necessarily all the details about what
happens during an event. Thus the FuncMon still monitors all error signals from the test
design but uses them primarily as a means to identify the start and end of events. Each lane
in the test has a signal (Channel Active) which indicates that the lane is up and that data
is being actively transmitted and received. If a lane is in this state and any error signal is
received the start of an event is triggered. The signal or signals which started the event are
logged along with a time stamp. These first signals are referred to as the Failure Signature
of the event and the time stamp is the start of the event (though the upset which triggered
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the error signals likely occurred some unknown time before). The FuncMon tracks any other
error signals that are seen throughout the event and reports those at the end of the event.
This reporting consists only of whether or not a particular error signal was seen during the
event and not any information about when in the event it was seen or how many times it
was seen.
Throughout an event it may be necessary to initiate various recovery steps in order to
restore the lane to an active state. The FuncMon records when each of these recovery steps
occurs with a time stamp and reports it to the central PC. The last recovery step which is
applied before the system recovers is then most likely the cause of that recovery. Additional
information on recovery steps is found in Section 5.2.6 below.
The primary metric for determining if a lane is recovered is whether or not it is
receiving correct data packets. However, it is possible for the lane to receive a good data
packet before the system has truly recovered from an upset. In the March test it was observed
that some system errors may allow many good packets to be received before crashing the
system again. As a result it is necessary for the FuncMon to have some interval of good
packets without any packets in error before being confident in declaring that an event has
recovered. Once a good packet is seen a counter begins which tracks the number of good
packets received. If any other error signal is observed before reaching the specified interval
the counter is reset. In this way the good packet interval represents the number of consecutive
good packets that must be received before declaring that the event has ended.
If the FuncMon reports that an event has recovered too early (i.e. the good packet
interval is too small) it is possible that one single event may instead get recorded as many
events. Furthermore, the test architecture may never assert a sufficiently strong reset because
it appears that only many small events are occurring rather than one large event which
requires more effort to recover. The opposite is true also, however, that if the interval is too
large, a second, truly independent event, may occur before the system is declared recovered
and it will not be recorded as a separate event. This may also cause the test architecture
to assert a reset stronger than is necessary because the two smaller events appear together
as a larger event. Thus it is important to choose this interval correctly (a point reviewed in
more detail in the test results section 6.8). It is safer to error on the side of having the good
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packet interval too large rather than too small because it is better to assert a stronger reset
and have the system recover later than necessary rather than to never assert a sufficiently
strong reset and not have the system recover at all.
Based on this theory and information learned from the March test, the good packet
interval for the test architecture was set initially at 4,000 packets. During the July test,
however, it was observed that for one class of events the FuncMon was declaring the events
recovered before they truly were. This class of events I refer to as Persistent CRC events
and they are discussed more fully in Section 6.3.1. In order to help properly record these
events this interval was changed to 16,000 packets for the later test runs. Thus some test
runs had an interval of 4,000 packets, while others had an interval of 16,000 packets. This
difference is considered in the evaluation of the test results.
Once the FuncMon has seen the specified number of consecutive good packets, the
event is declared recovered and this information is reported back to the PC. This reporting
contains a time stamp which represents the first good packet in the good packet interval.
Every time an error signal is observed during an event this time stamp is reset when the
next good packet is observed. Thus even though the FuncMon waits for many good packets
to be confident that the event has truly recovered, the end of the event is still reported as
the first time a good packet was seen after the last error signal was seen. This reporting is
also where any other error signals besides those in the Failure Signature are reported.
Signals Logged
In the test design there are three levels of error signals on each side that get observed
and recorded by the FuncMon - 1) Tile, 2) Aurora, and 3) Packet, with the Packet level
being composed of the signals generated from the packet checker and FuncMon. The level
represents where the error signal is generated, and thus where an error is detected. However,
some errors will propagate up the levels. For instance, a tile level 8B/10B error (RX Disparity
or RX Not In Table) will trigger an Aurora level Soft Error, and the packet level CRC Failure
is also likely to fire if the 8B/10B error was on a packet data byte. These different error
signals will not all appear at once but take some time for the error to be detected at each of
the different levels. The Aurora Soft Error will fire several cycles after the tile level signal is
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passed to it and the CRC Failure will not fire until the end of the packet is reached. In this
example the 8B/10B error signal will be the event’s failure signature and the Soft Error and
CRC Failure will be reported with the end of the event.
In addition to error signals, the FuncMon also monitors some status signals to aid
in knowing the design is running properly and two tile level reset signals (RX/TX Reset)
which are asserted automatically by the Aurora protocol block. A full list of all the signals
which the FuncMon monitors along with the associated level and type are listed in Table 5.2.
The Error type signals in the table are those which are primarily used to form the failure
signature for events. In addition to these signals, the results section will also include two
other failure signatures which are in reality actually distinct classes of events - persistent
CRC events and multi-lane events. These events will be discussed more fully in the results
chapter in sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 respectively.
Control Signals
In addition to monitoring error and status signals the FuncMon also has access to
some control signals that are driven into the test design as shown in Table 5.3. These signals
are primarily used in asserting recovery steps as described below in Section 5.2.6. Two other
signals are also used, however, to control the operation of the test design. The Enable Packet
Generation signal activates the packet generation block in the test design. Deasserting this
signal also pauses packet generation, but this feature is not used during testing (i.e. for a
given test, once the packet generation is enabled it is never disabled). The Loopback signal
causes a given MGT to go into a loopback mode3 . This is used only for debugging the
system.
ConfigMon Signals
In addition to signals monitored and controlled directly from the test design, the
FuncMon gathers information on the configuration of the test design from the ConfigMon.
Most of this information is stored by the ConfigMon log, but a few select signals are logged
by the FuncMon in order to attach a time stamp to them. This is accomplished via a bus
3

Near-End PCS loop back via asserting tile level signal LOOPBACK[0] - see [5] for more details.
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Table 5.3: Signals Monitored by FuncMon.

Level
Tile
Tile
Tile
Tile
Tile

Signal
PLL not locked
TX Buffer Error
RX Buffer Error
RX Byte Realign
RX Disparity Error

Type
Status
Error
Error
Error
Error

Tile

Error

Tile

RX Not In Table
(NIT) Error
TX K Error

Tile
Tile
Tile

RX reset
TX reset
DRP Signals

Aurora Soft Error
Aurora Hard Error
Aurora Frame Error
Aurora
Aurora
Packet
Packet

Lane Up
Channel Up
CRC Failure
Missing Packet

Packet
Packet
Packet

Length Error
Good Packet
Watchdog

Description
Status of MGT tile PLL
TX Buffer overflow/underflow
RX Buffer overflow/underflow
RX had to realign to byte boundary
Received byte not proper 8B/10B
disparity
Received byte not in 8B/10B table

Error

TX encoder was given invalid
control character
Recovery Step Aurora asserted RX Reset
Recovery Step Aurora asserted TX Reset
Status
Used by Funcmon to identify
DRP readback errors
Error
RX Disparity or RX NIT error
Error
RX Realign or RX/TX buffer error,
or too many soft errors
Error
Received invalid start/end of
frame character
Error / Status Lane is functional
Error / Status Channel is functional
Error
Packet failed CRC check
Error
Packet number was not the
expected number
Error
Packet was not expected length
Status
Packet passed all checks
Error
(In FuncMon) Timeout reached
without receiving good packet

Table 5.4: Signals Controlled by FuncMon.

Level
Tile

Signal
Loopback

Type
Control

Tile
Tile
Tile
Aurora

GTX Reset
RX CDR Reset
DRP signals
Aurora Reset

Recovery
Recovery
Recovery
Recovery

Step
Step
Step
Step
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Description
Enables/Disables near-end PCS
Loopback on a given MGT
Tile level reset
Resets RX CDR mechanism
Used by FuncMon for DRP scrubbing
Reset to Aurora protocol block

Table 5.5: ConfigMon Signals Monitored by FuncMon.

Signal
Type
Description
Readback
Status
ConfigMon is reading test design configuration
Readback Error Status
Configuration error has been detected
Scrub
Recovery Step ConfigMon is performing a configuration scrub
SEFI
Status
ConfigMon has detected a SEFI

directly connecting the FuncMon and ConfigMon referred to as the CI Bus. These signals
are detailed in Table 5.4. The Readback information is used only for status information but
having a time stamp associated with it is also helpful for correlating the main data log with
the ConfigMon logs. Having the scrub information time stamped allows for greater accuracy
in determining recovery times for scrub events. The ConfigMon also provides information on
the detection of Single Event Functional Interrupts (SEFIs). SEFIs represent a potentially
harmful corruption of the configuration which automatically triggers a reconfiguration of the
device. Thus, if a SEFI is detected the test run ends.
The initiation of a scrub or GLUT scrub is done by the user on a laptop connected
to the ConfigMon via an XRTC Brain Box. Throughout the test the ConfigMon is set
to continually read back configuration data and detect errors. When a scrub is required
readback is paused, the scrub is performed, and then readback resumes. This must all be
requested manually by the user via the ConfigMon GUI on the laptop.
Time Stamping
The FuncMon’s time stamp is a 40 bit counter running at 100 MHz. Thus the
resolution of the time stamp is 10 ns. The FuncMon hardware which monitors test system
signals runs at 160 MHz while the ConfigMon and DRP logic run at 33 MHz, and thus the
mechanism for attaching a time stamp to a specific event must cross a clock boundary. This
adds some variance to the resolution of the time stamp, but even so this resolution is more
than sufficient accuracy for the nature of this test.
The greatest difficulty and limitation of the time stamping mechanism is the correlation of the time stamps for each of the two FuncMons (SRV and DUT). The clocks on the
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two systems are not precisely the same and may actually change frequencies with respect to
each other throughout a test run. A mechanism is implemented in the architecture to aid
in synchronizing the time stamps between the two sides. The central PC is able to send a
request for a time stamp to both sides and thus receiving two time stamped packets that
should have been time stamped at roughly the same time. However, the time it takes for the
request to get executed in the FuncMon is dependant upon a software loop in the Power PC
and thus there is some variance in when the time stamp is applied. Thus this mechanism
helps to some degree, but still does not completely eliminate the problem.
As a result, it is difficult to accurately identify the relative timing of events on the
SRV FPGA to the DUT FPGA in the test design for events that are close together. This is
important primarily when trying to identify on which side a given event was first discovered.
Knowing this information aids in determining which mechanism may have been upset (i.e. if
the first error appears on the SRV side then the upset is likely to the DUT TX mechanism).
For many events, the timing between events that appear on the two sides is sufficiently
large to easily identify which event occurred first. For other events the failure signatures
on the events makes it possible to conclude with reasonable accuracy which event was first.
However, it is not possible with the current architecture to conclusively determine the relative
timing between the two sides for all events, so this should be remembered for any results
that rely on this information.
Status Reporting
To aid the user in knowing the current status of the system the FuncMon also transmits status packets at regular intervals and on request to the logging/UI layer for display
in the central PC GUI. This information includes the status of the tile PLL lock, whether
the lane is actively transmitting or in an event, and information on whether the FuncMon
is logging on that lane, the loopback mode (enabled or not), and whether packet generation
has been enabled for that lane.

44

Table 5.6: Data Logging Packets Recorded by Logging Layer of Test Architecture.

Packet Type
Status
Time stamp sync
Event Start
Recovery Step
Event End

Lane/
Global
Lane
Lane
Lane
Lane
Lane

Contents

Time
Time
Time
Time
Time
other
ConfigMon Event Global Time
DRP Event
Lane
Time
DRP Status
Lane
Time

Reporting Interval

stamp, status information
stamp
stamp, failure signature
stamp, recovery step
stamp, all event error signals
then failure signature
stamp, ConfigMon event type
stamp, DRP Scrub/Readback
stamp, number of DRP errors

1 Seconds
10 Seconds
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
10 seconds

Data Logging Packet Summary
Table 5.5 Provides a summary of all the data logging information that is passed to
the logging layer in the test architecture. Essentially each packet correlates to a line in the
log file.
5.2.6

Recovery Automation
One of the main mechanisms in the test architecture for determining the severity

and possible location of an upset is to systematically apply a hierarchy of recovery steps
(such as resets) to the system until the system recovers. By choosing to use lower-order
recovery steps first and progressing to recovery steps that affect an increasingly broad scope
of components, it is possible to more precisely pinpoint which components are in need of a
recovery in order for the system to recover. This then leads to a better understanding of
what system components were likely upset based on what needs to be reset.
One of the key elements of this test architecture is the mechanism for applying these
recovery steps automatically during the test. This was one of the primary improvements in
the architecture over the March test. The automated recovery controlled by a recovery state
machine in the central PC not only allows for a more efficient mechanism for testing (over
triggering recovery steps manually), but also provides for greater consistency in applying the
recovery steps and greater accuracy in analyzing results.
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Motivation
Recovery steps are applied in response to system events that do not recover on their
own. To apply these steps manually, sufficient data must be presented to the user for the user
to identify that a recovery step is necessary. Then the user must know the proper recovery
step to apply. This method presents a number of problems which are solved by having the
recovery process automated. First, the frequency of events for some test runs exceeds a
user’s ability to observe and respond to them, especially when dealing with more than one
test lane. This means that some events will be missed as the user takes the time necessary
to handle other events. Second, if the user attempts to handle all events as fast as possible
then he is likely to make mistakes in applying the recovery steps in a consistent fashion.
It is nearly impossible for the user to be consistent in the amount of time between event
detection and recovery step application and recovery steps may not always get applied in
the right order. This may cause problems when analyzing the test results because not every
case was handled in the same way. Thus having the recovery step application mechanism
automated can greatly improve the consistency of the recovery steps and help ensure events
aren’t missed.
Implementation
The automated recovery for this architecture is controlled in the central PC Python
software and will be referred to as the Recovery State Machine (SM). The recovery SM
receives information from both sides of the test design (SRV and DUT) on the start and
end of events on each lane. Each of these events is concerned only with a given side of the
test design but the recovery SM considers the state of both sides together referred to as
the system. Thus if one side reports it is in an operational state but the other side reports
being in an event, then the system is considered to be in an event. It is possible to have an
event only on one side of a lane because the lane is composed of two mostly independent
TX/RX pairs. Thus if the problem is only on the RX side of one pair the other TX/RX pair
is unaffected and only one side will report an event. If both sides report being operational
then the system is considered operational.
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When the recovery SM determines that a given system lane is in an event (i.e. it
receives a packet from one of the FuncMons which indicates the start of an event on that
lane), it begins the recovery step process. The steps of this process are governed by a file
which is imported via the GUI for each test run. For consistency the same set of steps
should be used across all test runs, but the GUI makes it possible to vary the set of steps if
necessary. The following discussion represents the set of steps that was used for all runs in
the July test.
The first step in the process is to wait for the system to recover on its own. The
wait time for this and all other wait periods in the process is 512 ms. During this time the
recovery SM is waiting to receive an end of event packet from one or both sides that have
sent a start of event packet. This packet indicates that the side is no longer in an event.
If both sides are determined not to be in an event then the system is declared recovered
and the recovery SM does not take any further action. However, if one or both of the sides
is still in an event when the 512 ms wait time is reached, then the recovery SM issues a
recovery step (Aurora Reset in this case). Each recovery step is issued first to the DUT side,
followed by a 512 ms wait time, then to the SRV side, followed by a wait time. Therefore,
after each recovery step is issued, time is allowed for the system to recover. If the system
recovers within that time it is most likely that the last issued recovery step was the cause
of the recovery. If the system does not recover then the next recovery step is issued to one
side and then the other. The full list of recovery steps is as follows (with an implied wait
between each item in the list after the first):
1. Wait
6. DUT GTX Reset
2. DUT Aurora Reset

7. SRV GTX Reset

3. SRV Aurora Reset

8. DUT DRP Scrub

4. DUT CDR Reset

9. DUT Scrub

5. SRV CDR Reset

10. DUT Scrub with GLUT off

The highest order recovery steps (DRP and configuration scrubs) are only applied to
the DUT side because it is assumed that only the DUT FPGA, which is exposed to radiation,
could suffer effects that could be solved by these recovery steps. In other words, since the
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SRV FPGA is not exposed to radiation, its DRP and configuration logic should never need
to be scrubbed. All other SRV side mechanisms have the potential to become corrupted as
a result of bad input from the DUT and thus other recovery steps are applied to both sides.
Events that are recovered during the first wait period before any recovery steps are
applied (i.e. self recovered) can fall into one of two categories. The first category will be
referred to as Data Corruption, which encompasses all events which potentially result in
corrupted data, but have no other effect on the system. The second category of events is
Aurora Recovered, which encompasses events which recover as a result of Aurora automatically asserting the RX Reset and TX Reset signals in response to its own error detection
mechanisms.
Limitations
Automated recovery greatly improves this test architecture, but the current implementation does suffer from some limitations. The recovery SM must base its decisions on
the state of both sides of the test design. However, there is a delay between when a given
event occurs and when the recovery SM receives that information. This delay comes from
the necessary steps of having the FuncMon observe the event, pack the information into
a packet, transmit the packet via RS-232 to the central PC, and have the software there
extract the information and present it to the recovery SM. The potential problem with this
delay is that the SM could be making decisions based on old information.
If the delay is always constant it would perhaps not be a very significant problem, but
there is a fair amount of variance in the delay based on the when the event occurs relative
to when it gets checked in the FuncMon software loop as well as the amount of data that is
being transmitted at any given time (i.e. how full the RS-232 buffer is when a new packet
gets put in). As a result, to say that the recovery SM waits 512 ms before applying a second
recovery step is slightly inaccurate because the actual time from when an event first occurs
to when the first recovery step is actually asserted is dependant on the 512 ms counter in
the recovery SM (which has a resolution of only 15 ms) as well as the delays associated with
seeing the first event and sending the command to issue a recovery step. These delays are
small, however, compared to 512 ms, and in most cases will extend the wait time rather
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than make it shorter. The accuracy of this wait time is not crucial to any of the test results,
however, so long as sufficient time has been given to the system in order to see if it has
recovered before applying the next recovery step.
Of greater concern than the fact that one side can experience an inconsistent delay
sending information to the recovery SM is the fact that the delay for both sides is not the
same. As a result, the recovery SM may not be presented an accurate view of the state
of the system. For example, suppose that events occur on both sides of the test design at
nearly the same time and both events end 10 µs later. Now suppose that on the SRV side
there is no other information being transmitted to the PC and the software loop happens
to observe the event right after it occurs resulting in a very small delay before the recovery
SM is notified the event has occurred. On the DUT side, however, suppose that the RS-232
buffer has some data in it and the software loop takes longer before it reaches the point to
check for new events resulting in a long delay to get the information to the recovery SM. If
the difference between the delays is longer than 10 µs the recovery SM will see the event on
the SRV side begin and end before seeing the start of the DUT event. The result will be
two system events rather than one from the point of view of the recovery SM. In practice
the difference in delays is rarely that large because both sides are likely to experience similar
loads in terms of data to transmit. Further more careful analysis in post processing of test
results can remove the effects of this particular example. However, this example is illustrative
of the fact that it is possible for the recovery SM to have an inconsistent view of the system
in rare circumstances.
5.2.7

DRP Scrubbing
Another improvement in the test architecture from the March to July test was the

implementation of DRP scrubbing. The DRP provides a mechanism to change many MGT
tile parameters at run time. This is a valuable feature for some designs, but it causes
potential problems for designs in radiation environments because corruptions to stored DRP
information can not be corrected through any existing reset (i.e. the tile reset does not restore
original DRP values). From the March test it seems that DRP corruptions are repairable
with a GLUT scrub, but this action essentially reconfigures the entire chip. Thus DRP
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scrubbing is implemented in this architecture as a way to repair DRP corruptions without
affecting the entire chip.
DRP scrubbing works in the same manner as a configuration scrub. When the test
design is initially configured the DRP scrubber on the FuncMon stores a copy of all DRP
values for each tile. During a test run the DRP scrubber is continually doing a readback of
the DRP values to detect errors. When the recovery SM requests a DRP scrub the DRP
scrubber will overwrite all values in the DRP with the stored golden copy.
This test architecture is the first such architecture known to the XRTC to implement
DRP scrubbing. The concept of scrubbing is well known and applied to configuration logic
but it has not previously been applied to the DRP for MGTs.
5.3

Architecture Review
With a more complete understanding of the test architecture now in place it is possible

to quickly review how the test architecture is able to supply insights into the questions
proposed in Chapter 4. Again the ultimate goal of this work is to provide the information
that system designers need to build a reliable MGT + protocol system. Below are the four
main areas the test area seeks to address.
5.3.1

System Susceptibility
System susceptibility cannot be observed directly with the limited visibility in the

MGT tiles. However, the test architecture can provide strong indications of susceptible
areas through an analysis of two aspects of the recorded events. First the failure signature
of the event provides an indication of what component in the system was most likely upset.
Second, the recovery step which successfully recovers an event provides insight into which
components were most affected by the event. Thus by classifying all events by these two
categories a great deal can be learned about the areas in the system that are most susceptible.
5.3.2

Upset Detection
Examining all events by failure signature also provides important insights into the

effectiveness of various upset detection mechanisms. Analyzing which failure signatures are
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effective at identifying upsets aids a designer in making choices as to which mechanisms
are necessary for a given system and which mechanisms may be left out. This is especially
useful when looking at the failure signature in conjunction with the recovery mechanism
which recovered that signature. For example, this information would be helpful in making
the decision to leave out a detection mechanism for a class of events that seem to have little
impact on the system.
5.3.3

Recovery Steps
Once upsets are detected in a system, the next important step is to recover the system

if necessary. To make decisions on the best method to do this a designer needs to understand
how effective a given recovery step is as well how much time to give the system to recover
for a given recovery step before trying another one. The test architecture provides both of
these pieces of information. The effectiveness of the recovery steps can be gathered primarily
from looking at the breakdown of events categorized by recovery step and identifying which
steps recover more events. Looking at the events by failure signature and recovery step could
provide information for developing a more complex system where the recovery step applied
is based on the failure signature.
The test architecture provides timing information through the time stamping of all
event ends and recovery steps. This allows for a listing of how long from the application
of a given recovery step did the events recover. A designer can then decide the appropriate
amount of time to wait in a system to see if the system is recovered.
5.3.4

Recovery Detection
Properly identifying when the system is recovered is important in the recovery pro-

cess. Declaring success before the system is actually recovered could result in a single event
persisting indefinitely because the correct recovery step is never applied, while waiting too
long to declare recovery can result in unnecessary down time for the system. The test architecture provides insight into an appropriate choice for recovery detection by comparing the
amount of time the test architecture waited for events to recover compared to the amount of
time that it actually took events to recover. Additionally analyzing the status signals used
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in the system can provide additional insights into what status information is necessary to
truly declare success.
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Chapter 6
Testing Results
This chapter provides the results from radiation testing with the described test architecture. This chapter focuses on results from the July test except where noted otherwise.
Additional details on the March test can be found in Appendix A and additional details on
the July test not provided in this chapter can be found in Appendix B.
6.1

Test Summary
The data for the results presented in this chapter was collected from testing done

at Texas A&M University’s Cyclotron Institute during the period of July 7th through the
13th. Testing was done with 6 different heavy ions and 8 energy levels over 59 runs resulting
in over 43,000 events observed. Additional details on all testing parameters are found in
Appendix B.
6.2

Metrics
The amount of data collected from testing provides many different ways to analyze

the system. The amount of detail possible to extract from the data far exceeds the amount
of time that is reasonable to report on the results from testing. As such, I am forced to focus
here on the most relevant information that can be extracted from the test data.
One way to analyze the test results is to look at the raw numbers of events in a
given category. This method provides a good indication of the relative frequency of a given
class of events against other classes. However, this number does not provide a good way
to know the frequency of such events in a given radiation environment. For this type of
understanding the geosynchronous orbit error rate (sometimes referred to as the GEO error
rate) is a better metric. The GEO error rate is commonly used in the space electronics
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industry and represents the expected frequency of a given type of event for a system that is
in a geosynchronous orbit. This error rate is calculated from data across all test runs and
energies. As a result, this error rate is a convenient way to compare events across runs in
the test data. Details on how the error rate is calculated as well as a full set of data on error
rates is provided in Appendix C.
Thus the raw number of events is useful in comparing different classes of events in the
test against each other while the GEO error rate is useful more generally to understand the
likelihood of a single class of events. Both metrics will be used in the discussion as different
insights can be gained from each.
6.3

Special Event Classes
Nearly all of the events reported here in the test results conform to the description

of events given earlier in Chapter 4, which is to say that they occur on a single lane and
are tagged during the test by the FuncMon as an event. However, there are two classes
of events, persistent CRC events and multi-lane events, which were created during the test
data analysis. These special classes are described below.
6.3.1

Persistent CRC Events
During the July test an unexpected class of events was discovered. With the current

test architecture these events appear as a series of smaller events (termed here as subevents) each with a failure signature of CRC Failure. Because these events are composed
of CRC Failure sub-events that continue to appear they are termed Persistent CRC events.
The frequency and consistency of these sub-events is such that they do not conform to the
normal rate for other events of the same failure signature. Furthermore, these events can be
recovered with resets, upon which the normal frequency of CRC Failure events is observed.
These two facts are what lead to the conclusion that these sub-events are actually part of a
single larger event.
The reason these events are not properly detected with the current test architecture
is that each sub-event appears as an independent self recovering event. Because the interval
between CRC failures exceeds the good-packet interval during which the FuncMon waits for
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events to recover, the event appears to end. If the good-packet interval is sufficiently long,
these events will be recorded as normal events, but other events that are truly independent
events will be recorded as single events. However, with the good-packet interval at an
appropriate size for normal events, the recovery SM will never apply a reset to recover this
class of events because following each sub-event the system seems to be fully operational
again and thus the recovery SM wait timer is reset. If another upset causes an event which
does cause the system to be down sufficiently long, eventually a reset will be applied to
recover that second event and the persistent CRC event will recover as well. This was
observed many times in the July test. The test architecture also makes it possible for a user
to assert a reset on command, bypassing the recovery SM. Thus if a user observes such a
persistent CRC event while testing, resets can be used to recover the event. This method
was also used several times during the July test.
Since these Persistent CRC Events were not expected in the July test, the test architecture is not built to gather sufficient information to determine the cause of this class
of events. However, it is possible to determine what the most likely cause of recovery is for
these class of events. From the July test it appears that most persistent CRC events can be
recovered when Aurora asserts the RX and TX resets. In some instances during the July
test a persistent CRC event was recovered with an Aurora reset, but in nearly all such cases
it was determined that the RX and TX resets had not been asserted before the reset was
given to the Aurora logic (which will in turn assert the RX and TX resets). Some events do
seem to recover only after higher order recovery steps, but this is likely caused by the fact
that a simultaneously occurring event requires this recovery step rather than the persistent
CRC event requiring it. This seems to indicate that persistent CRC events are primarily
recovered when the RX reset is asserted to the tile.
Based on the assumption that the RX reset will recover persistent CRC events, one
possible cause of this type of event is an upset to the 8B/10B encoding table or logic (which
is reset by the RX reset). Such an upset could cause a specific byte encoding to always
get decoded improperly and thus cause a CRC Failure only at irregular intervals when that
specific byte is encountered. Such an improper decoding would not cause a tile level error
because there is no error in the 8B/10B encoding of the received byte. However, the decoded
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byte would cause a CRC failure during the packet check. This would be consistent with the
failure signature given by persistent CRC sub-events, which is a CRC Failure with no tile
level errors. It is possible that a similar upset could occur to the TX side of the MGT
encoding block, but this would likely appear on the SRV side as an 8B/10B error due to
improper encoding and thus would have a different failure signature. This is also consistent
with the July test observation that only one persistent CRC event was observed on the SRV
side. Currently, however, insufficient data exists to provide evidence of a more definitive
cause to this class of events.
For the purpose of properly handling the counting of events from test data, special
consideration is needed with the current test architecture with respect to persistent CRC
events. To properly handle the data gathered during the July test, persistent CRC events
were carefully analyzed. Because each sub-event within a persistent CRC event is really
part of a larger event, all persistent CRC sub-events were removed from the event logs and
replaced with a single event marked as a persistent CRC event. Thus the initial count for
CRC Failure events was drastically reduced once all the events that were actually part of
persistent CRC events were removed. More than half of all the initial CRC events were
determined to have been part of persistent CRC events.
6.3.2

Multi-lane Events
Another unique class of events to consider in data analysis is Multi-lane Events. In

the test architecture the FuncMon monitors each lane independently for events. As a result
there is no mechanism to detect upsets which affect more than one lane. Thus detection of
these type of events must be done after the test data is collected. The primary means for
doing this is inspecting the event start timestamps of events that occur on different lanes
along with the failure signatures of those events. Events which start very close together and
with similar failure signatures and recovery types are likely to be the result of a single upset.
In processing the data collected from the July test, I ultimately used the metric of
100 cycles for determining if events were close enough to consider as multi-lane events. This
means that if two events on different lanes happened within 1 µs of each other they were
reviewed as potentially being a multi-lane event. Each of these events was reviewed to check
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for similarity of failure signatures or other features that would indicate they were likely
multi-lane events. I also looked at events with start time differences larger than 100 cycles
to ensure that I had selected an appropriate metric. Unlike the persistent CRC events, the
creation of the multi-lane event class did not result in any events being removed from data
logs. Thus two events considered as a single multi-lane event will be represented in the
results twice - once in the regular reporting for events per lane and once in the reporting of
multi-lane events. Thus multi-lane events should be considered separately from other events
(i.e. not added in to form a total number), but the results for these events are provided in
the same tables as other events for easy comparison.
6.4

Results Summary
The overall findings of the March and July tests is that the Aurora protocol can

be used to form a reliable space-based platform for MGT links, but some additional logic is
recommend. The Aurora protocol is able to recover normal system operation after the effects
of most radiation induced upsets automatically, but a small percentage of events do require
additional recovery stimulus in order to resume normal system operation. Tables 6.0, 6.1,
and 6.2 represent the primary findings of the July test and will be referenced throughout the
remainder of the discussion. The most frequent type of event was that which causes data
corruption, but otherwise has no other effect on the system nor does it require any external
recovery mechanism. A small percentage of all the events seen in the test, however, did
require some additional recovery mechanism in order to restore system operation, and these
are the events for which some logic additional to Aurora would be necessary.
Table 6.0 represents the observed test events classified by the recovery step which
recovered them. For each class of events the GEO error rate is given along with percentage
of that class of events considered by error rate. The number of observed events and the
percentage that number represents is also provided. The first count percentage represents
the percent of all observed events while the second represents the percentage of all events
which required recovery stimulus external to the Aurora protocol.
Table 6.1 shows the test events classified by failure signature signal as well as the two
special classes of events discussed above. For each failure signature signal class a GEO error
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Type
Self
Self
External
External
External
External
External
External
External
External
External
Total

Table 6.1: Events Categorized by Recovery Method.
GEO Error Rate
%
%
%
Recovery
Events/Day Yrs/Event
Rate Count
Total External
Data Corruption
9.0E-04
3.0 71.3% 26450 60.3%
–
Aurora Recovered
3.5E-04
7.8 27.7% 16661 38.0%
–
DUT Aurora Reset
1.1E-05
249.1
0.9%
533
1.2%
73.9%
SRV Aurora Reset
3.7E-07
7404.7
0.0%
41
0.1%
5.7%
DUT CDR Reset
9.0E-08
30441.4
0.0%
17
0.0%
2.4%
SRV CDR Reset
3.1E-07
8837.8
0.0%
14
0.0%
1.9%
DUT GTX Reset
7.9E-07
3468.0
0.1%
44
0.1%
6.1%
SRV GTX Reset
1.1E-07
24906.6
0.0%
13
0.0%
1.8%
DRP Scrub
1.7E-07
16116.0
0.0%
14
0.0%
1.9%
Scrub
1.0E-07
27397.3
0.0%
43
0.1%
6.0%
GLUT Scrub
2.2E-08
124533.0
0.0%
2
0.0%
0.3%
Total
1.3E-03
2.1 100.0% 43832 100.0% 100.0%

rate is given as well as the number of events observed. The number of events observed is
broken down into the two sides, DUT and SRV, which represents the side of the test design
on which the event was first observed. For instance, the count for RX Buffer Errors on the
DUT side represents the number of events which were first observed on the DUT side with a
failure signature containing the signal RX Buffer Error. The total for events in a given class
observed on both sides is also provided.
It is important to note that each line in this table does not represent a completely
independent set of events. Some events may have more than one failure signature signal
associated with them so they will appear in more than one place in the table. For instance,
an event with a failure signature composed of the signals CRC Failure and Length Error will
be represented in both the line for CRC Failure and Length Error. The reason for listing
events in this manner is to avoid having a line in the table for every possible combination
of error signals present in the test architecture. However, those signals which are listed are
mostly independent for the events observed in the July test with the most notable exception
being the three packet level signals CRC Failure, Length Error, and Missing Packet, which
are often combined in a failure signature. In order to provide additional details on these three
signals an additional row has been added to the table which represents events in which any
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of the three signals were part of the failure signature. The two tile level signals RX Disparity
Error and RX Not In Table Error are also often seen together, and provide essentially the
same information, so events with either of these signals in the failure signature were grouped
into a single class labeled 8B/10B Error. There is also some overlap in the failure signatures
of the two tile level signal lines RX Buffer Error and RX Realign and the 8B/10B Error line,
but not to the same extent as the packet level signals so an additional line was not provided.

Table 6.2: Events Categorized by Failure Signature Signal.
Failure Signature
GEO Error Rate
Event Count
Level
Signal
Events/Day Yrs/Event DUT SRV Total
Tile
RX 8B/10B Error
5.7E-04
4.8 15745 8679 24424
Tile
RX Buffer Error
7.8E-05
35.1
845 2644 3489
Tile
RX Realign
7.6E-06
360.5
382
0
382
Tile
TX Buffer Error
6.3E-06
434.9
361
0
361
Tile
TX K Error
6.4E-06
428.1
319
0
319
Aurora Soft/Hard Error
2.1E-05
130.5
374 260
634
Aurora Frame Error
1.6E-05
171.2
149
33
182
Aurora Lane Down
5.6E-06
489.2
110 232
342
Packet Watchdog
1.4E-05
195.7
488
70
558
Packet CRC Failure
4.2E-04
6.5 10339 2794 13133
Packet LENgth Error
6.0E-05
45.7
436 345
881
Packet MISSing Packet
5.7E-06
480.7
146 112
258
Packet CRC | LEN | MISS
3.6E-04
7.6 10506 2932 13548
Event Persistent CRC
2.8E-06
978.5
78
1
79
Event Multi-lane Events
3.1E-06
883.8
207 170
377

Table 6.2 provides a combination of the two previous tables with counts provided for
events classified first by failure signature signal and then by successful recovery step. The
primary purpose of this table is to discover if there is any correlation between an event with
a given failure signature and the recovery step that is necessary to recover from that event.
Additionally, insights can be gained from looking at the events in this manner as will be
utilized in the discussion below.
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Level
All
Tile
Tile
Tile
Tile
Tile
Aurora
Aurora
Aurora
Packet
Packet
Packet
Packet
Packet
Event
Event

Table 6.3: Event Counts by Failure Signature Signal and Recovery Step.
Recovery Step
Failure Signature
Total Data Aurora Aurora CDR GTX DRP Scrub GLUT
Signal
Crpt. Recov. Reset Reset Reset Scrub
Scrub
All Events
43832 26450 16661
574
31
57
14
43
2
RX 8B/10B Error 24424 12287 11927
141
29
19
13
8
0
RX Buffer Error
3489
2
3480
6
0
1
0
0
0
RX Realign
382
0
382
0
0
0
0
0
0
TX Buffer Error
361
1
358
1
0
0
0
1
0
TX K Error
319
253
20
44
0
0
0
2
0
Soft/Hard Error
634
608
24
2
0
0
0
0
0
Frame Error
182
173
7
0
0
0
0
2
0
Lane Down
342
0
342
0
0
0
0
0
0
Watchdog
558
23
160
348
2
23
0
2
0
CRC Failure
13133 12808 251
32
0
13
1
26
2
Length Error
881
836
35
3
0
5
0
2
0
Missing Packet
258
209
38
3
0
5
0
3
0
CRC | LEN | MISS 13548 13214 257
32
0
14
1
28
2
Persistent CRC
79
9
53
10
1
2
4
0
0
Multi-lane
377
132
243
1
0
0
0
1
0

The remainder of this chapter is focused on providing answers to the questions proposed in Chapter 4 and reviewed in Chapter 5. These questions focus on four areas that will
be addressed:
1. System susceptibility
2. Upset detection
3. Recovery steps
4. Recovery detection
6.5
6.5.1

System Susceptibility
Insights from Recovery Steps
To determine what areas of the MGT system are most susceptible to upsets I look

first at the observed test events classified by successful recovery step as given in Table 6.0.
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For convenience these numbers are provided again here in Table 6.3. Examining the recovery
step classification is useful because the fact that a specific recovery step restores the system
to a working condition provides a strong implication that the group of components affected
by that recovery step are those which were upset or at least those where were most affected
by the upset. The most useful metric for evaluating potential system susceptibility is the
GEO error rate because this number represents the expected frequency of a given class of
events. If a given recovery step class of events represents upsets to a certain group of system
components then comparing the error rates of the different classes provides insights into the
relative susceptibility of different system components.

Table 6.4: GEO Error Rates by Recovery Step.

Type
Self
Self
External
External
External
External
External
External
External
External
External

GEO Error Rate
Recovery
Events/Day Yrs/Event
Data Corruption
9.0E-04
3.0
Aurora Recovered
3.5E-04
7.8
DUT Aurora Reset
1.1E-05
249.1
SRV Aurora Reset
3.7E-07
7404.7
DUT CDR Reset
9.0E-08
30441.4
SRV CDR Reset
3.1E-07
8837.8
DUT GTX Reset
7.9E-07
3468.0
SRV GTX Reset
1.1E-07
24906.6
DRP Scrub
1.7E-07
16116.0
Scrub
1.0E-07
27397.3
GLUT Scrub
2.2E-08
124533.0

Looking at Table 6.3, the Data Corruption class of events is by far the most likely to
occur. This class of events requires no recovery, however, and these events have no lasting
effect on the system beyond the corruption of some amount of data (could be one or more
packets of data but in most cases is likely only a single byte). These events are most likely,
with few exceptions, the result of upsets to the data path logic in the MGT tiles. This can
include components such as the Serializer/Deserializers (SerDes), encoders, and the buffers.
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Based on the GEO rate for this class of events it seems these components are the most
susceptible in the system.
Aurora Recovered events are those which recover when Aurora automatically asserts
the RX Reset and TX Reset signals after detecting an error. These events likely encompass
two types of upsets that originate in the tile - those which cause the tile to malfunction
or those which cause Aurora to malfunction due to bad output from the tile. These could
include more severe upsets to the same tile level components listed above for Data Corruption
events as well as any other components which are reset by the tile level RX Reset or TX
Reset. These events are less frequent than data corruption events, but still much more
common than any other events. This class of events also does not require any additional
recovery effort beyond what Aurora supplies automatically.
The events recovered by an Aurora reset are likely the result of either Aurora not
handling corrupt output from the tile, upsets directly to the Aurora logic, or tile level errors
that are not reset until the Aurora reset triggers tile level resets. Table 6.3 reveals that in
some cases the system is recovered as a result of an Aurora Reset applied to the SRV side of
the test design. Given the assumption that the SRV FPGA is not upset directly by radiation,
this shows that Aurora can become corrupted due to bad output from the tile which must
come from the upset DUT FPGA. However, the frequency of this reset recovering the system
is much smaller than when the Aurora reset is applied to the DUT. There are at least three
possible explanations for this. 1) Since events recovered on the SRV side are likely the result
of upsets to the TX portion of the DUT MGT and events recovered on the DUT are likely
the result of upsets to the RX portion of the DUT MGT, this could indicate that the RX
portion of the MGT is much more susceptible to causing Aurora logic corruptions. 2) It
may be that the increased frequency of the DUT side reset is also from the fact that the
Aurora logic itself is being upset which does not occur on the SRV side. 3) It is also possible
that some errors would have been recovered by Aurora asserting RX/TX resets but were not
detected by Aurora and thus only recover once an Aurora Reset is issued, which occurs first
on the DUT side.1
1

It may be possible to improve the test architecture by asserting the RX/TX Resets as separate recovery
steps before asserting the Aurora reset. This would allow for greater visibility to identify if a tile reset
without an Aurora reset can recover these events. However, it is unclear how Aurora would respond to such
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Table 6.3 demonstrates that the CDR Reset events are far less frequent than the
DUT Aurora Reset events. This indicates that the susceptibility of any components which
affect the data transmission or reception frequency is much lower than those which affect
data path in general. This is to be expected since there are fewer components which are
associated with the data rate than all the other data handling.
The GEO error rate for GTX Reset events is similar to that for CDR Reset events.
These events are likely the results of upsets to tile components that are not reset by the
TX/RX resets or the CDR reset, such as shared resources. These shared resources are
components such as the PLL and clocking components, power control, and the DRP control.
It is possible that these events can affect only a single MGT in the tile, but if a shared
resource is involved it is likely that both MGTs will eventually be affected. Regardless, once
the GTX reset is applied, both MGTs will be reset and thus both lanes using those MGTs
will be disrupted. Thus susceptibility of the shared resources of the tile is close to that of
the clocking components for a single MGT which can be reset by the CDR reset, but is still
far lower than the susceptibility of data path components.
Events recovered with the three types of scrubs are almost certainly events caused by
upsets to the respective components being scrubbed. That is to say events recovered with a
DRP scrub are caused by upsets to the DRP component of the tile, scrub events are caused by
upsets to configuration logic, and GLUT scrub events are caused by upsets to configuration
logic that is masked by the GLUT mask (primarily memories). Of the three types of scrubs
the most commonly observed type of event were standard scrub events, which seems to
indicated that configuration bits not covered by the GLUT mask are still more susceptible
than DRP bits or those configuration bit which are covered by the GLUT mask. Those bits,
however, are still far less susceptible than any other other system component.
6.5.2

Insights from Failure Signatures
A look at the GEO error rates for events classified by failure signature signal can con-

firm some of what is revealed by the recovery step classification as well as provide additional
an action and a reset to the Aurora logic may be necessary anyway for the system to recover from the effects
of the tile reset.
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Table 6.5: Error Rates by Failure Signature.

Failure Signature
GEO Error Rate
Level
Signal
Events/Day Yrs/Event
Tile
RX 8B/10B Error
5.7E-04
4.8
Tile
RX Buffer Error
7.8E-05
35.1
Tile
RX Realign
7.6E-06
360.5
Tile
TX Buffer Error
6.3E-06
434.9
Tile
TX K Error
6.4E-06
428.1
Aurora Soft/Hard Error
2.1E-05
130.5
Aurora Frame Error
1.6E-05
171.2
Aurora Lane Down
5.6E-06
489.2
Packet Watchdog
1.4E-05
195.7
Packet CRC Failure
4.2E-04
6.5
Packet LENgth Error
6.0E-05
45.7
Packet MISSing Packet
5.7E-06
480.7
Packet CRC | LEN | MISS
3.6E-04
7.6
Event
Persistent CRC
2.8E-06
978.5
Event
Multi-lane Events
3.1E-06
883.8

insights into system susceptibility. These rates from Table 6.1 are provided again here in
Table 6.4 for convenience.
The two most common failure signature signals are 8B/10B Error and CRC Failure
which confirms the idea that the data path components of the tile are the most susceptible
components in the system. However, distinguishing between these two event classes provides
some additional insights. The 8B/10B Error events are those which are detected by the MGT
tile and thus they must be the result of upsets which take place in components before the
error detection logic in the data path on the RX side or after the 8B/10B encoding in the
data path on the TX side. This includes components such as the serial receiver/driver,
SER/DES, etc. (refer to figures 2.3 and 2.2 for more details).
On the other hand, CRC Failure events are those in which data corruption is not
detected by the tile, but is detected later down the data path by the packet checker. This
means that the data corruption must come after 8B/10B error checking in the tile on the
RX side, or before encoding on the TX side. This could include corruptions to the data path
in the reconfigurable logic, but the most likely component that is being upset is the RX/TX
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buffers which are likely composed of unhardened memory cells. For example, an upset which
corrupts a byte of data in the RX Elastic Buffer would not cause an error to be generated
from the tile but would cause the CRC check to fail.
Examining the event counts for CRC Failure events given in Table 6.1 reveals that
CRC Failure events detected on the DUT side of the test design are far more common than
those detected on the SRV side. This indicates that the RX data path components are more
susceptible than the TX data path components. Given the assumption that these events are
caused primarily by upsets in the buffers this is a reasonable result because the RX buffer is
larger than the TX buffer. Were the events cause primarily by upsets to the data path logic
in the Aurora protocol the event counts for both sides would likely be more equal.
Examining the other tile level signal event classes in Table 6.4 provides additional
insights on the susceptibility of tile data path components. Upsets which cause the RX/TX
buffers to error (i.e. overflow, underflow) are an order of magnitude or two less common than
data corruptions than may be occurring in the buffers (as potentially indicated by the rate
of the CRC Failure events). This is not unexpected since the control logic for the buffers
is much smaller than the buffers themselves and upsets to the that logic are less likely to
persist than upsets to memory cells. However, it again appears that the TX buffer is much
less susceptible than the RX buffer to upsets that cause the buffer to error.
Events indicated by the RX Realign signal are likely caused by corruptions to control
characters in the data stream, and as control characters are far less frequent than data words,
it is not surprising to see that the rate for these events is far less than that for 8B/10B Error
or CRC Failure events. The TX K Error signal is asserted by the tile when the TX 8B/10B
encoder is given a word of data and told that the word is a control character but the data
word is not in the encoders set of valid control characters. Thus these events are likely caused
by corruptions to control characters before entering the 8B/10B encoder or the signal into
the encoder which indicates that a given word is a control character. Again, given the fact
that control characters are less frequent than data words it is expected that the rate of these
events be lower than data word related events and indeed the rate of these events is lower and
is similar to those for RX Realign events which also relate to control character corruptions.
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The Aurora level failure signature signal GEO rates provide some information not
readily available from the recovery step data. The most surprising of these signals to see
as part of a failure signature are Soft/Hard Error signals. These signals are generated by
the Aurora protocol logic upon receiving tile level error signals (Soft Error is generated by
either RX Disparity Error of RX NIT Error while Hard Error is generated from RX/TX
Buffer Error, RX Realign, or too many Soft Errors in a specified interval - see [8]). Since
these signals should occur only after a tile level signal is sent into the Aurora logic, it is
surprising to see them as part of a failure signature (which indicates that they were the first
error signals seen in a given event). One possible explanation for this is upsets to the Aurora
logic or signals going into Aurora logic.
Some of these events are likely false positives in that there may not actually be any
corruption to data or system operation, but because the error signal fires the Aurora will
reset anyway. This was observed in the logging when an event had a failure signature of the
Soft Error signal, but a CRC Failure was not observed in the event (i.e. no data corruption
detected)2 . Others of the events, however, did have Soft Error followed later by a CRC Failure
which indicates that not all of these events are false positives. In either case this class of
events seems to reflect on the susceptibility of logic layer elements in the design. Based solely
on the error rate from this class of events it would appear that the susceptibility of the logic
elements as a whole is roughly as susceptible as some individual components within the tile
(such as the RX Buffer), but there may be logic level upsets that are manifest in other event
classes as well.
The Frame Error and Lane Down classification of events are more likely to be the
result of actual tile level errors rather than upsets to logic. Any upset which corrupts a frame
character (Start-of-Frame / End-of-Frame) which is not detected by the tile (for example
corruptions in the RX Elastic Buffer), would show up in this classification. Similarly the
Lane Down signal can fire if valid sync characters are sent when they are not expected (i.e.
no tile level errors, but the characters are invalid according to the protocol). This could
occur as a result of upsets to the TX Aurora logic or tile, which cause the wrong but valid
2

See Section 6.7 for more details on potential false positives discovered through an analysis on the duration
of data corruption events.
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character to be transmitted, or upsets in the RX side decoding characters. It is more likely
a TX side upset because corruptions in the RX side are more likely to be observed by other
error signals before causing the Lane Down signal. Table 6.1 indicates that this type of event
was more observed on the SRV side of the test design slightly more than twice as often as
the DUT side. This gives support to the assumption that TX side upsets are more likely
to cause this class of events. Some of these events, however, may also be false positives in
the same manner as the Soft/Hard Error events. Thus it is hard to determine precisely how
much of this error rate can reflect on the susceptibility of tile level components versus the
logic elements, but the significance of the rate is minimal compared to other event classes.
Packet level error signal event classes most often represent upsets which occur after
the tile level error detection mechanisms in the RX data path or before encoding in the TX
data path. This is particularly true of the CRC Failure events as discussed above. Length
Error and Missing Packet events are similar, but are likely corruptions to framing characters
rather than data characters (which accounts for their relative infrequency compared to CRC
Failure events). However, if the framing characters were corrupted before entering the Aurora
logic a Frame Error would be detected first before these errors. Thus these errors may be
the result of logic upsets after the frame error detection or some other failure mechanism.
Table 6.2 shows that most of these two classes of events were Data Corruption events, and
thus may very well be soft logic upsets. However, some of the events required recovery actions
to be taken and thus are likely part of more sever upsets in other places in the system. Most,
however, do appear to be only Data Corruption events and thus these events may contribute
to understanding the susceptibility of the logic elements of the system.
Events whose failure signature contained the Watchdog signal are different from other
packet level signals. In order for the Watchdog signal to be the first signal observed in an
event, time for more than four packets must go by without any other error signals firing
on either side. Thus any event which causes one of the sides to fail completely (such as a
clocking problem) would be signaled by an error on the opposite side, and not by a Watchdog
timer. This means that for these events to occur either the TX or RX mechanisms must
get stuck in such a way that they do not cause other error signals to fire, but also do not
allow for the proper reception or sending of data. This could occur as the result of a clock
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failure to only part of the system (i.e. disabling certain RX components but not affecting any
TX components since TX failure would cause error signals on the opposite side). Another
possibility would be that the TX or RX system is wedged in some way which causes data
to be sent out continuously without any frame characters. This would appear to the system
simply as one extremely large packet, but with no End-of-Frame character the packet checks
will never be performed and thus no error signals fired. Whatever the failure mechanism,
Table 6.2 reveals that in the July test most Watchdog events were observed on the DUT side,
which indicates that these events are more likely to be cause by failure of some component
on the RX side of the link.
As mentioned above in Section 6.3.1, persistent CRC events are likely the cause of
upsets to either the TX or RX 8B/10B encoding/decoding mechanism. Table 6.2, however,
reveals that all but one of these events during the July test were observed on the DUT side.
This indicates that the RX components are much more susceptible to these events than are
the TX components.
6.5.3

Susceptibility Summary
The information suggested by the recovery step and failure signature classification

data above leads to at least three higher-level conclusions about the susceptibility of various
aspects of the MGT and Protocol system.
1. Tile level components are much more susceptible to upsets than hardened configuration
logic.
2. In most cases the RX portion of the system is more susceptible than the TX portion.
3. Logic level upsets can still occur and can significantly affect the system.
The MGT system designer should consider these conclusions to aid in focusing design
effort. Due to the hard-silicon nature of the MGT tiles, the designer can do nothing about
reducing the susceptibility of components there. Instead, effort must be focused on designing
the surrounding logic in such a way to allow the system to handle corrupt output from the
tile as well issue resets into the tile when necessary. However, the designer must also not
completely ignore the possibility of upsets occurring in the logic itself.
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6.6

Upset Detection
Once an MGT system designer is aware of which aspects of the system are likely to

be upset, the next important issue to address is how the system will detect those upsets.
One of the most useful ways to identify this information from the test data is to evaluate
the effectiveness of the event detection mechanisms used in the test. Thus, analysis in this
section will focus primarily on the information gathered on event failure signature signals
as presented in Table 6.1. The most useful metric from this table for this discussion is the
total number of events detected by each signal and thus this information is provided again
here in Table 6.5 for convenience.

Table 6.6: Events Categorized by Failure Signature Signal.

Level

Failure Signature
Signal
Tile
RX 8B/10B Error
Tile
RX Buffer Error
Tile
RX Realign
Tile
TX Buffer Error
Tile
TX K Error
Aurora Soft/Hard Error
Aurora Frame Error
Aurora Lane Down
Packet Watchdog
Packet CRC Failure
Packet LENgth Error
Packet MISSing Packet
Packet CRC | LEN | MISS
Event
Persistent CRC
Event
Multi-lane Events

Event Count
24424
3489
382
361
319
634
182
342
558
13133
881
258
13548
79
377

The primary question a designer is likely to have is focused around which error signals
should be monitored in the system and which signals are not necessary. A designer using
a pre-built protocol logic block is likely to utilize the existing signals with that block but
the larger question is whether more needs to be added. As this work utilizes the the Aurora
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Protocol in the test design I will focus on distinguishing which events from the table are
detectable using the signals that are normally part of an Aurora protocol system and which
events are missed. Though this discussion is specific to the Aurora protocol, the type of
error detection mechanisms discussed are sufficiently general that evaluating other protocols
is possible.
6.6.1

Events Detected by Aurora
The Aurora protocol utilizes all of the tile level signals listed in Table 6.5 with the

exception of the TX K Error signal. The 8B/10B Error signals are used to generate the
Soft Error signal in Aurora while the RX/TX Buffer Error and RX Realign signals are used
for Aurora’s Hard Error detection. The TX K Error signal is ignored by Aurora, but any
potential problems detected with this signal will be noticed on the RX side of the lane’s
other MGT. The only advantage to monitoring this signal would be for earlier detection
of TX side errors that were in need of a reset. However, any errors requiring a reset will
require the receiving side to reset which would reset the error side anyway, so the advantage
would really only be to assert the reset some small number of cycles earlier. Thus Aurora,
in its original state already monitors the available tile level signals that are most relevant
for detecting upsets.
The information provided by the tile level signals which Aurora monitors is eventually
transmitted out of Aurora with the Soft and Hard Error signals. The additional checking
which Aurora performs is also communicated through the Frame Error and Lane Up signals.
The Lane Up signal represents when the system is operational and thus the current test
architecture monitors the inverse of that signal as an error signal and labels it Lane Down.
These four signals provide all the information that Aurora gathers on system errors and these
signals could be used exclusively as inputs to a recovery state machine which monitors and
resets the system. The only advantage to monitoring tile level signals directly is to provide
earlier detection of errors, but this only speeds up detection by a matter of a few cycles in
most cases. Thus all of the Tile and Aurora level events listed in Table 6.5 (assuming that
all of the TX K Error signals are detected by the other side in an MGT lane) are detectable
using only the four signals coming from Aurora.
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6.6.2

Events Not Detected by Aurora
There are, however, events which the Aurora protocol block will not detect on its

own. These events are represented by the Packet and Event level signals in Table 6.5. The
first of these, Watchdog errors, is the most important, but not the most frequent. Watchdog
events are those in which the system is not reporting the receipt of any packets but also does
not report any error signals. Thus without any additional error detection mechanisms the
system could be completely stalled without any indication of error given by Aurora. Thus it
is advisable to include an external mechanism which is able to detect whether they system
is still receiving data.
The other three packet level signals (CRC Failure, Length Error, and Missing Packet)
all indicate corruptions of data or framing characters which are not detected by the tile or
Aurora. These events compose a substantial amount of the total events observed during the
July test (nearly a third), but most of these events are merely data corruptions that have
no other effect on the system. Thus, determining whether or not to add additional logic
to detect these events is dependent on how sensitive a system is to data corruption. If the
system has no mechanism for requesting data to be resent, or can tolerate small amounts
of data corruption or loss, then having additional logic to detect data corruptions is likely
unnecessary. On the other hand, if the system is designed to take some action when data
corruption is detected then additional checks beyond Aurora are absolutely necessary for
nearly a third of data corruption events. Thus, the need for additional packet level checking
logic depends on the precise needs of the system.
It is interesting to note that Table 6.2 reveals some events initially detected by packet
level signals which do require substantial resets. For instance, roughly a fourth of the events
in the July test which required a GTX Reset were initially detected by packet level signals
and more than half of the events which required configuration scrubs were detected by these
signals. It is most likely, however, that other error signals were observed during these more
substantial events and thus it is unlikely that these events would go undetected without
additional packet level checking. The event logging method used in the current test architecture, however, does not provide enough visibility on observed error signals to know for
certain that this is the case.
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The final class of events which require some additional logic to handle are persistent
CRC events. These events are only detected by observing the frequency of CRC Failure
events and thus cannot be detected by the tile or Aurora. Having the packet level CRC
check alone, however, is not sufficient for identifying this special class of events. In order to
detect these events, an additional layer of checking is necessary. The simplest implementation
of this would be to monitor the number of CRC failures received in a specific time period.
If based on the expected CRC failure rate, the number observed far exceeds the number
expected, then a persistent CRC event is likely and recovery steps should be taken. Another
possible method for recovering from persistent CRC events without having to detect their
occurrence is to proactively reset the system at regular intervals. This method is discussed
more fully in Section 6.7 below.
6.6.3

Upset Detection Summary
The Aurora protocol provides mechanisms for detecting many but not all upset in-

duced event types. In order to build an MGT and Aurora system capable of detecting all
event types the following points should be considered:
1. There is no need to monitor tile level signals directly.
2. The Aurora protocol logic by itself will not detect:
Watchdog events
Some data corruption/loss events (detectable by packet level checking)
Persistent CRC events
3. Packet level checking (such as CRC checking) may not be necessary depending on the
system’s tolerance to data corruption.
It may not be necessary to detect all events that are likely to occur. If a system is not
designed to take any action upon detection of a certain class of events (such as data corruption) then adding logic to detect these events is wasted effort and may introduce additional
susceptibility to upsets. However, packet level checking may still be useful for detecting
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Persistent CRC events, which should be fixed even in a system tolerant to small amounts of
data corruption. It may also not be necessary to detect certain events if the system takes a
proactive approach to recovering from upsets. By asserting a recovery mechanism at regular
intervals a system can recover from upsets without having to detect them. Thus the system
designer should consider the entire system design before determining what additional logic
is necessary for upset detection.
6.7

Recovery Steps
Once the designer has determined what mechanisms are necessary to detect upsets,

the next step is to determine what should be done once they are detected. Some upsets
may cause events which need no action to be taken, such as Data Corruption events, while
others may cause events which require a specific recovery mechanism in order to recover.
Some recovery mechanisms are able to recover more event types, but may be more costly in
terms of system down time. Thus, in order to evaluate which recovery mechanisms are best
for a given system, two important pieces of information are necessary: 1) the effectiveness
of a given recovery mechanism, and 2) the expected time to system recovery following that
recovery mechanism. The first piece of information can be extracted from the event counts
of recovery steps given in Table 6.0 and provide here again in Table 6.6 for convenience.
Information on recovery times observed in the July test will also be presented in this section.
6.7.1

Recovery Step Effectiveness
Looking first at the event counts for the different classes of recovery steps presented

in table 6.6 reveals that the two classes of events which require no additional recovery
steps, Data Corruption and Aurora Recovered, make up more than 98% of all events. Of
the remaining less than two percent of events, almost 80% can be recovered by asserting
the Aurora Reset signal. This recovery step class represents the largest number of the
events which required external recovery but it is important to remember that this does not
necessarily mean that it is the only recovery step that would recover these events.
Due to the nature of the test architecture, it is only possible to identify when a given
recovery step early in the hierarchy is not able to recover an event, but not whether a recovery
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Table 6.7: Events Categorized by Recovery Method.

Type
Self
Self
External
External
External
External
External
External
External
External
External

Recovery
Data Corruption
Aurora Recovered
DUT Aurora Reset
SRV Aurora Reset
DUT CDR Reset
SRV CDR Reset
DUT GTX Reset
SRV GTX Reset
DRP Scrub
Scrub
GLUT Scrub

Count % Total % External
26450 60.34%
–
16661 38.01%
–
533
1.22%
73.9%
41
0.09%
5.7%
17
0.04%
2.4%
14
0.03%
1.9%
44
0.10%
6.1%
13
0.03%
1.8%
14
0.03%
1.9%
43
0.10%
6.0%
2
0.00%
0.3%

step later in the hierarchy would have been able to if tried first. However, understanding
the different recovery steps provides insights into which resets may overlap. For instance,
the GTX Reset will perform the same function as the CDR Reset along with the RX and
TX Resets which are asserted by Aurora (or when an Aurora Reset is issued). However, the
Aurora Reset also resets the Aurora logic, which the GTX Reset will not do. Thus the GTX
Reset is likely to recover all of the events that a CDR Reset or Aurora issued RX/TX Reset
will, and perhaps most of the events that an Aurora Reset will, but not necessarily all of
them. The GTX Reset, however, will affect more component than will any of those other
resets. Most particularly it will completely reset both lanes in a tile while the other resets
will affect one lane only.
Scrubbing events are likely to be independent of other recovery steps since both DRP
and configuration scrubbing do not affect components that can be reset in any other way.
However, a GLUT scrub will scrub the DRP bits and thus events recovered by a DRP scrub
could also be recovered by a GLUT scrub at the expense of resetting all other memory
components.
With this understanding of the different recovery mechanisms in mind, building a
system capable of recovery from all observed event types could be composed of only the
Aurora Reset, GTX Reset, and GLUT scrubbing. Little is to be gained from performing a
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GLUT scrub, however, over just reconfiguring the device. Further more, the events which
require a GLUT scrub are so rare that including this capability in a system is unreasonable.
DRP events which could be covered by a GLUT scrub are also rare enough that including
another mechanism is likely not necessary. Some systems may even not require the ability to
do normal configuration scrubbing with radiation hardened devices. However, this scrubbing
is extremely common in the industry and is likely to be included for the sake of the remainder
of the design on the device anyway. Thus the most reasonable configuration for most systems
would be to include the Aurora Reset, GTX Reset, and normal configuration scrubbing.
6.7.2

Event Durations and Recovery Times
Once the designer has selected the recovery mechanisms to use in the system, it must

be determined in what manner they will be applied. The primary question here is when
each recovery step should be applied after an event is detected. To answer this question a
designer must understand the requirements of the system with respect to system down time.
For example, if the system can tolerate any amount of down time then all recovery steps
could be applied as soon as any event is detected. This is extremely wasteful, however, since
most events do not require any recovery and thus the system would be down unnecessarily.
Some events do require recovery effort, however, and thus the challenge is to determine
which events will recovery without any external recovery steps and which will not. The
easiest method for accomplishing this task is to wait for some time and see if the event
recovers on its own. If after the specified interval the event has not recovered, then recovery
steps should be applied. The only challenge with this method is determining what that wait
interval should be.
The primary design trade off in determining how long to wait for events to recover
on their own is between system down time as a result of waiting and system down time as a
result of applying some recovery mechanism. For instance, waiting 10µs for an event which
does not recover may be wasteful if a recovery step is likely to only take 6µs to recover the
system. On the other hand, applying a 6µs recovery step after only waiting 1µs is wasteful
if most events recover on their own after 2µs. Thus, it is important for the system designer
to know how long it takes for most self recovering events to recover and how long a given
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recovery step will take to recover the system when successful. The same principle applies
in waiting for an event to recover after a recovery step is applied before applying another
recovery step. The remainder of this section is devoted to providing insights into the amount
of time expected for events to recover on their own as well as the amount of time to recover
after a given recovery step is applied.
The discussion in this section uses two terms to disambiguate the manner in which
timing information is reported. The term duration is used to describe the time between
the start of an event and the end of an event. This is the timing information which will
be reported for events which recovered without external intervention (Data Corruption and
Aurora Recovered). Because all other events experienced a wait time before recovery steps
were applied, the total duration of the event is not of interest. Instead the information that
will be reported is the recovery time, which represents the time from when the successful
recovery step was issued until the end of the event.
Data Corruption Event Durations
Figure 6.0 provides a histogram of the duration of all the events in the Data Corruption class of events observed in the July test. Various times of interest have been marked
on the histogram for reference and bins which go off the graph are labeled with the number
of events in that bin. The primary unit of measurement for the reference times is given in
terms of the number of packets. The reason for this is that the recovery detection mechanism
is based upon having successfully received a good packet. To review, the test architecture
waits for some interval (4,000 or 16,000 packets in this case) after seeing a good packet before determining that the system has recovered. However, the end of the event is reported
as being the time stamp of that first seen good packet. Thus the durations represented in
Figure 6.0 are from the time stamp of the first observed error signal in an event to the time
stamp of the first received good packet that was not followed by any other error signals
before declaring recovery.
The logarithmic time scale in Figure 6.0 makes it difficult to analyze the distribution
of events in the shorter time duration ranges and so Figure 6.1 is provided which uses a
linear scale focused on the lower time durations. This figure makes it clear that the event
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Figure 6.1: Histogram of Data Corruption Event Durations.

durations are fairly evenly distributed with the exception of large peaks at the durations
which correspond to the time necessary to receive a given number of packets. Upsets can
occur at any time during the transmission of a packet but recovery is only detected at the
end of packets. Additionally, packet error signals (which event classes account for roughly
one third of all data corruption events) are only reported at the end of packets. These two
factors account for the shape of the histogram. The peaks at packet boundaries represent
those events which are detected at the end of a packet (such as a CRC Failure) and then
declared recovered at the end of a succeeding packet (almost always one to three packets
later). The even distribution of events between these peaks represent events which are
reported sometime in the middle of a packet (which is expected to be randomly distributed),
and declared recovered at the end of a succeeding packet.
Table 6.7 provides more detail on the number of events recovered during specific
intervals of time. This table reveals that roughly 96% of all Data Corruption events recover
within the amount of time necessary to receive three packets. For the current test architecture
this corresponds to roughly 5 µs, but could be different for a system with different packet
lengths. It should be noted, however, that the duration of these events is governed primarily
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Figure 6.2: Focused Histogram of Data Corruption Event Durations with Linear Scale.

by the fact that recovery can only be determined after receiving a valid packet. As a result,
any events which affect only a single bit (and thus really have a duration of one cycle) will be
reported has having a duration of at least one packet length because an entire valid packet
must be received to declare recovery. Thus, it is likely that many, if not most, of the events
reported with durations between one and two packets are actually single cycle events.

Table 6.8: Data Corruption Event Counts Classified by Event Duration Bin.

Wait Interval
Interval
4,000
16,000
Bin
Packets Packets
< 1 Packet
890
2557
1-2 Packets
3965
15795
2-3 Packets
645
1624
3 Packets - Interval
61
699
> Interval
82
133
Total
5643
20808
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Total % Total
3447
13.0%
19760
74.7%
2269
8.6%
760
2.9%
215
0.8%
26451 100.0%

This recovery reporting method also reveals the interesting category of events with
durations reported as being less than the length of a packet. These events are caused by
error signals which are reported somewhere during the receiving of a packet which did not
report any data errors. These are primarily false positives, or error signals that fired when
no real error existed. For instance, a true RX Disparity Error signal indicates that a byte
was improperly received and thus a CRC Failure should follow3 . But in the case of an event
which is reported as having a duration less than a packet, a CRC failure could not have
followed, and thus the RX Disparity Error signal must have fired erroneously. These events
represent a non-trivial portion of the Data Corrupted events and could represent upsets to
any of the error signals coming from the tile or those which originate in logic.
The events which have durations much longer than three packets could be more severe
events which ultimately do not need any additional recovery effort, but likely are, at least in
part, actually multiple independent events which get recorded as a single event due to the
long wait time for recovery declaration. For example, if an upset occurs which only flips a
data bit then the event will end immediately, and an event end time stamp will be stored
at the end of the next packet. However, to be confident the system is truly recovered the
recovery is not reported until the FuncMon has seen 16,000 good packets. If at say, 15,000
packets after the event has ended another upset occurs which causes an error signal to fire,
the FuncMon’s wait timer will be reset and the event end time stamp will be reported as
15,000 packets after the error signal for the first event was observed. Thus, two single cycle
events can instead appear as one longer event if the second event occurs before the first is
declared recovered. This should be kept in mind when evaluating the possible severity of
Data Corruption events.
Aurora Recovered Event Durations
The second class of events which require no external recovery effort are those which
are recovered by the Aurora protocol block automatically. A histogram of the durations of
these events observed in the July test are provided in Figure 6.2. A linear scale version of
3

unless the error occurred on a comma character between packets, but this could cause a protocol error
that would also be signaled by other error signals.
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the histogram focused on the shorter event durations is also provided in Figure 6.3. These
figures demonstrate that most events which are recovered automatically by Aurora recover
in roughly the time for transmission of three packets after the time it takes Aurora to
reinitialize a lane after an RX/TX Reset. However, there is also a significant grouping of
events in the histogram around the duration time of 200 µs. The test data does not provide
sufficient visibility into these events to determine precisely why this group is different than
the majority of events, but Figure 6.4 demonstrates that events which are recovered after
the issuing of an Aurora Reset also have recovery times around the same duration. This
suggests that perhaps there are two types of events that are being recovered by these two
resets. Likely there are events which are only affecting the tile level components and thus are
recovered when tile level resets are asserted. The second grouping of events is likely those
which affect the Aurora logic. Most of the Aurora recovered events have short durations
which suggests that these are primarily tile level events. The second grouping of events may
represent events which affect Aurora logic that is reset at the same time that Aurora issues
the RX/TX resets. Similarly, the Aurora Reset events likely cover the same two groups.
Those with shorter recovery times are probably those which could have been recovered with
just the RX/TX resets, but which were not detected by Aurora and so the resets were never
issued. The events with longer recovery times are likely those which required the Aurora
logic to be reset in order to recover.
In both the Data Corruption events histogram and the Aurora Recovered events
histogram there is a grouping of events near the end of the 16,000 good-packet interval.
Again, the logarithmic scale tends to distort the distribution of these events which are more
evenly distributed than they appear. Due to the large good-packet interval used in the test
architecture it is possible for a new, independent event to appear as part of part of an existing
event. In these cases when the independent event occurs before the existing event reaches
the end of the 16,000 packet interval, the interval counter is reset and thus two events which
are both very short in duration can appear as an extremely long event depending on when
in the 16,000 packet interval the second event arrives.
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Figure 6.3: Histogram of Aurora Recovered Event Durations.

Recovery Durations
The number of events observed for each of the external recovery event classes results
in less interesting histogram information. Due to the small number of events in some classes
the variance in recovery times is too high to derive any meaningful information from the
distribution. However, for each class a rough order of magnitude can be provided to aid
in understanding the expected time for recovery after issuing each recovery step. This
information is provided in Table 6.8. As noted above, most Data Corruption events recover
in the time it takes to receive three packets, which correlates roughly to 5µs. The two times
reported for Aurora Recovered events and Aurora Reset events represents the two groupings
of events discussed above. Interestingly, the longer time for these two events correlates well
with CDR and GTX Reset recovery times. This may indicate that rather than relating to
Aurora logic upsets those grouping in Aurora Recovered and Aurora Reset events actually
relates tile level upsets. However, this seems unlikely because if the same failure mode could
be recovered by either an Aurora Reset or a GTX Reset the Aurora Reset will always be
issued first, and thus should always recover that particular failure mode.
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Figure 6.4: Focused Histogram of Aurora Recovered Event Durations with Linear Scale.

DRP scrubbing generally takes less time to recover than do other tile level related
recovery steps. This is not too surprising given that bits fixed by DRP scrubbing do not
necessarily require resets to be applied before the system recovers. Configuration scrubs on
the other hand, do take much longer than any other recovery step, which is not surprising
given the number of configuration bits involved in the scrub. Generally scrubbing will be
implemented as a continual operation which may reduce the amount of time from upset to
recovery on average, but depending on when the upset occurs in the scrub cycle the error
may persist for the entire time reported.
6.7.3

Recovery Steps Summary
Overall, the Aurora protocol block is able to provide recovery for most radiation

induced events. However, there are some events which do require additional recovery steps
to be available. The additional steps that are most important to include are
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Figure 6.5: Histogram of Aurora Reset Recovery Durations.

Table 6.9: Recovery Duration by Recovery Method. Due to variation in observed recovery
times, these numbers represent an order of magnitude expected time.

Type
Self
Self
External
External
External
External
External
External

Recovery
Data Corruption
Aurora Recovered
Aurora Reset
CDR Reset
GTX Reset
DRP Scrub
Scrub
GLUT Scrub

• Aurora Reset
• GTX Reset
• Configuration Scrubbing
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Expected Duration
/ Recovery Time
5µs
10µs / 150µs
10µs / 150µs
150µs
150µs
100µs
106 µs
106 µs

These three resets should provide the system sufficient ability to recover from all but
the most rare event types.
Choosing when these resets should be applied is system dependent, but in general
waiting for 5 to 10 µs should be sufficient to determine that an event is not likely going to
recover on its own. At that point the issuing of Aurora Reset and GTX Reset is dependant
on whether there are independent lanes using the same MGT tile or not. For independent
lanes it is advisable to first attempt recovery with the Aurora Reset so as not to disrupt
the other lane which would be affected by issuing a GTX Reset. For lanes that are channel
bonded, or tiles which only use one MGT, the Aurora Reset and GTX Reset should be issued
simultaneously since there is such a small difference in the expected recovery time for each
reset compared to the expected frequency of events.
6.8

Recovery Detection
The final step a designer needs to consider in building a upset tolerant system is how

to determine that the system has recovered after an upset is detected and recovery steps
applied. In order to accomplish this the system needs some indication that a connection
exists between the two sides and that data is being transmitted. The Aurora protocol block
provides the signal Lane Up to aid in identifying a connection between two sides of an MGT
link. However, this signal is insufficient for determining that the system is functional. There
are at least two instances in which this signal fails to properly report system recovery. First,
some events, most notably Persistent CRC events, continue to cause errors even though the
MGT link is up. Second, the system can become wedged in such a way that the Lane Up
signal never drops, but packets are not being received. For these reasons it is necessary to
have an additional method of identifying that the system has truly recovered and that data
is being transmitted correctly. The mechanism used in the current test architecture is to
wait for a given number of good packets before declaring recovery. The metric chosen for
this interval was set at 4,000 and 16,000 packets on different runs. This interval was set
high in an effort to catch the persistent CRC events, but even with an interval of 16,000
packets these events still occurred. Looking again at Figure 6.0 it can be seen that most
Data Corruption events recover within with the time it takes to receive 3 packets. Similarly,
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Figure 6.2 shows that most Aurora Recovered events recovered with the time necessary for
the Lane Up signal to rise (time to recover from RX Reset) plus about 3 or 4 packets.
From this information, it would seem that waiting for 4,000 or 16,000 good packets is
far more than necessary for the system to be confident that the system has recovered from
an error. It is likely that a system would identify recovery on most events by only waiting
for a single good packet, but some small number of events would be declared recovered too
early. Unfortunately, the test architecture does not provide sufficient visibility to report
how many events are missed by only waiting for a single good packet. However, from the
data that is available, it seems reasonable that a system could properly identify recovery
for nearly all events by using a good-packet interval of only a few consecutive good packets.
This mechanism would improperly identify Persistent CRC events, however, if they were
not properly recovered. So, an additional mechanism may be necessary for this special class
of events if additional research does not produce a conclusive mechanism for detecting and
recovering from this type of event.
6.9

Bit Error Rate and Packet Error Rate
One other metric that is often of interest to communication system designers is Bit

Error Rate (BER). Determining the BER from radiation upsets based on the test data,
however, is a difficult task. The most useful result for calculating the BER is the expected
error rate for Data Corruption events. All other recovery event classes require the link to
be reset and thus are relevant to system availability calculations rather than BER. The
difficulty, however, arises from the fact that Data Corruption events do not all represent
the same amount of data corruption. Some Data Corruption events result in only in a
single bit of corrupted data, while others may result in the loss of several packets. The test
architecture does not provide sufficient visibility to identify how many bits in a given packet
were corrupted. However, the duration of a given Data Corruption event does provide a
strong indication of the number of packets affected in the event. Thus a more useful number
to analyze is the Packet Error Rate (PER) which is given by

P ER =

Corrupted P ackets
.
P ackets T ransmitted
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(6.1)

It is possible, however, to provide a bound on the BER based on assumptions of data
corruption patterns. Both calculations will be considered here.
Table 6.7 provides a breakdown of Data Corruption events by duration. Events
with a duration less than one packet are likely false positives that do not actually represent
corruption of data. With a CRC check in place these events will not appear as corrupted data
and thus could be excluded from the calculation. However, since these events contributed
to the calculation of the Data Corruption class GEO error rate, and since they will appear
as errors in a system without a CRC check, they will be included here in the analysis and
will be counted as having affected one packet. Those events with durations between one and
two packets also only affect one packet since the event was discovered sometime during the
transmission of the affected packet, but reported recovered at the end of the next packet.
Similarly, those events with durations between two and three packets affect two packets.
Events with durations longer than three packets are likely composed of events in which two
or more independent events are counted as a single event (see Section 6.7.2 for a more detailed
explanation), and thus likely affect only a few packets. However, some of these events do
represent more significant events which affect more than several packets. For simplicity, the
assumption is made that these events affect on average four packets.
Using these assumptions the PER can be calculated based on the GEO error rate for
Data Corruption events as given in Table 6.0 and the relative percentage of each duration
class of these events reported in Table 6.7. The GEO error rate provides the number of
expected events per day and thus the PER can be given by

P ER =

Events/Day×P ackets Af f ected/Event
.
P ackets T ransmitted/Day

(6.2)

The number of packets affected per event varies based on the duration of the event, however,
so consideration must be given to the different duration groups. Adding the relative percentage of each group multiplied by the number of packets affected by that group provides
a total number of packets affected. Thus the final PER can be given by

P ER =

P

(Events/Day×Group P ercentage×P ackets Af f ected/Group Event)
,
P ackets T ransmitted/Day

86

(6.3)

where the number of packets transmitted per day can be found by translating the packet
transmission rate of roughly 1.67 µs per packet into roughly 5.17E10 packets per day.
Bounds for the BER can be given with some simple assumptions about the data
corruption patterns within packets. A lower bound on the BER can be found by making
the assumption that each affected packet has only a single bit error 4 . An upper bound is
provided by assuming that each affected packet is completely corrupted (i.e. all bits are
wrong). The test architecture sends 257 words per packet with 16 bits per word for 4112
bits per packet.
Given these parameters and equations the PER and BER bounds can be found as
shown in Table 6.9.

Table 6.10: PER and BER Bounds by Duration Group.

GEO Error Rate (Events/ Day) 5.70E-04
Packets Transmitted / Day
5.17E10
Bits Transmitted / Day
2.13E14
Group
Group Packets
Group
Lower
Upper
Duration
Percentage Affected
Rate
PER
BER
BER
< 1 Packet
13.0%
1 7.43E-05 1.44E-15 3.49E-19 1.43E-15
1-2 Packets
74.7%
1 4.26E-04 8.24E-15 2.00E-18 8.20E-15
2-3 Packets
8.6%
2 4.89E-05 1.89E-15 4.60E-19 1.88E-15
3 Packets - Interval
2.9%
4 1.64E-05 1.27E-15 3.08E-19 1.26E-15
> Interval
0.8%
4 4.63E-06 3.58E-16 8.72E-20 3.57E-16
Total
100.0%
1.2 5.70E-04 1.32E-14 3.21E-18 1.31E-14

Thus the PER for the system is 1.32E-14 while the BER is bounded from 3.21E-18
to 1.31E-14. In reviewing these numbers, however, it is important to consider the possible
effect that the test setup plays in the calculation. The current test architecture sends data
in fixed length packets with a fixed interval between packets. It is possible that a system
4

A single bit error per upset is unlikely for upsets that affect serial data components given the high
transmission rates and the fact that even if it were a single bit flip the decoded word is likely to have more
than one bit in error. However, for upsets which affect the buffers in the tile or other upstream logic it is
likely to see only a single bit in error. The point in this assumption is to provide a lower bound to the BER
and thus assuming a single bit in error for all upset is reasonable.
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with different packet sizes and different intervals between packets may yield different results.
With the given set of parameters, however, these results seem to indicate that the BER for
such an MGT and protocol system is within tolerable limits.
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Chapter 7
Test Conclusions
Radiation testing with the described architecture clearly shows that MGT systems are
susceptible to a variety of radiation induced upset effects. When implemented in a radiation
hardened FPGA the most susceptible portion of the system is the MGT tile. In particular
the RX portion of the MGTs is the most likely piece of the tile to produce errors from upsets.
Most of these errors, though, result only in corruption of data and do not otherwise affect
the system. The logic surrounding the MGT tiles is not completely immune to upset effects,
but compared to effects produced from tile upsets these generally have less impact and are
certainly less frequent. Some upsets to the tile and logic, however, can significantly impact
the system and require specific action to restore the system to normal operation.
The test results also demonstrate that the Xilinx Aurora protocol block provides a
good foundation for building an MGT system suitable for space-based applications. Without any additional logic the Aurora protocol system is able to effectively tolerate the vast
majority of upset induced events (though not reduce the corruption of data). However, the
events which are not tolerated can have a substantial impact on the system. Thus the Aurora protocol block provides a good foundation for a spaced-based system, but some minimal
additional logic is needed in order to make a truly robust system.
The additions recommended for an Aurora-based system are as follows:
• Additional upset detection mechanisms for
Watchdog events
Persistent CRC events
Data corruptions not reported by tile (CRC check)
• Additional recovery mechanisms
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Aurora reset
GTX reset
Configuration Scrubbing
• Additional status indicators for recovery detection
Good packet received
Event recovered (at least several consecutive good packets)
The recommendation for adding a check on received data such as a CRC check may
not be necessary for systems which do not take any action upon detecting data corruptions.
However, such a check can be used to detect Persistent CRC events, and can be helpful
in recovery detection, so such a check may be worth including for this purpose. Without
packet level checking the recovery detection could be based on any received packet rather
than only on good packets, in which case the number of packets received before declaring
recovery should be increased. Aurora’s End-of-Frame signal could be used to identify received
packets.
The additional recovery steps should be applied in a manner which allows the system
to recover on its own before any reset is attempted. This will prevent unnecessary system
down time due to resets asserted for events which did not need them. Most events which
recover on their own do so within the amount of time it takes to receive about three packets,
so this interval does not need to be excessive. Configuration scrubbing should be occurring
continuously as it does not require any system down time. Application of the Aurora Reset
and GTX Reset could be done simultaneously, or by having the Aurora Reset followed by
the GTX Reset. The difference in recovery times between the Aurora Reset and GTX Reset
is likely not substantial enough to matter for most system given the expected frequency of
events. Thus, the primary reason to attempt recovery by using the Aurora Reset first is
to prevent affecting independent lanes within a tile which would both be reset with a GTX
Reset. If the system is using channel bonded lanes in a tile or only one MGT in the tile,
there is little reason to assert the resets separately.
An alternative approach to adding additional upset detection mechanisms is to proactively reset the system. Such a method would provide means to apply the suggested recovery
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steps of Aurora Reset and GTX Reset at regular intervals. The specification for such a system, however, must allow for the persistence of any undetectable event for any duration up
to the reset interval. In such a system, detectable events can still be recovered immediately
upon detection as outlined above.
These recommended additions do not cover events which are only recoverable through
DRP scrubbing or configuration scrubbing with the GLUT mask off. GLUT scrubbing
provides no real advantage over reconfiguring the device, however, so there is no reason to
explicitly provide that functionality. DRP Scrubbing provides an effective way to recover
some events without disrupting other system components. However, the expected frequency
of these events is so small that adding the logic necessary to perform DRP scrubbing may
actually introduce more errors than it fixes. As such it is recommended not to implement
these two recovery steps unless the system designer has a compelling reason to do so. Instead,
any events not recovered by the above recommendations should be treated as unrecoverable
and the system should be reconfigured.
With these additions in place it is possible to build a robust Aurora-based system
suitable for applications in space. Such a system is capable of detecting and recovering from
all but the most rare upset events with limited impact to overall system operation.
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Chapter 8
Proposed MGT and Protocol System for Space-Based Applications
This chapter presents a proposed MGT and protocol system suitable for space-based
applications based on the test conclusions presented in Chapter 7. The purpose of this
exercise is to demonstrate how the test data results can be used to drive design decisions. I
will pose a set of hypothetical system requirements and show how the information learned
from this work can aid in designing a system to meet these qualifications. For simplification
the system requirements will be a smaller set than are likely to exist in a real system. I
will also provide a brief analysis of how to examine the expected system availability of the
proposed system.
8.1

Proposed System Requirements
For this exercise I will assume the following characteristics and requirements about

the proposed system:
• The system is tolerant to minor data corruption and some data loss.
• Data will not be resent when data corruption is detected.
• The system is intolerant to loss of link between MGTs.
• Data transmission can be bursty with some time between groups of packets.
• The longest interval between data packets is expected to be 20 ms.
• Data packets are of variable length with transmission times between 2µs and 8µs and
maximum of 1024 bytes.
• MGT tiles utilize channel bonded lanes or only a single lane.
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8.2

Designing for System Requirements
Based on the system requirements the following additions will be added to an Aurora-

based system:
• CRC check
• Good packet received signal
• 100 ms interval timer
• Counter for CRC passed and CRC failed packets
• Recovery logic to issue Aurora Reset and GTX Reset
• Continuous configuration scrubbing
The CRC check will be utilized in a variety of ways in the system. Though system
requirements do not necessitate that corrupt data be identified, the CRC check is useful
for identifying Persistent CRC events as well as reporting the number of properly received
packets which can be used for recovery detection. A counter will be provided to track the
number of passed and failed packets over a 100 ms window. Based on the expected GEO
error rate for CRC failure events reported in Table 6.1, in any given 100 ms window less than
1e − 9 events are expected. In other words, seeing more than one CRC Failure event due to
radiation effects in this window is extremely unlikely. However, if a Persistent CRC event
is to occur, it is likely that anywhere from 5 to hundreds of CRC failures will be counted
depending on the characteristics of the data stream during that interval. Thus if 5 or more
CRC failures are observed in a 100 ms window, the system will reset as described below.
The count of CRC passed packets will be used in both recovery detection as well as
detecting Watchdog events. Detecting of Watchdog events is done by ensuring that packets
are being received at the expected rate. Based on the system requirements, packets could be
received with an interval as small as every 2 µs or as large as 20 ms. The proposed system
will reuse the same 100 ms timer above to ensure that at least one packet has been received
(passed or failed) in a given 100 ms window. If not, the system will be reset as described
below.
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When the system detects errors from monitoring the Aurora error signals, the system
will first wait for 100 ms or for four good packets to be received to see if the event recovers
without extra intervention. If four packets are received the system is assumed to be recovered
and no further action is taken. If the 100 ms interval is reached without four good packets
received, both the Aurora Reset and GTX Reset signals will be asserted simultaneously in
order to recover the system. Following a 200 ms window, if four good packets are still not
received the event is declared unrecoverable and the system is reconfigured. The initial 100
ms window could be shorter if the system requirements ensured that four packets should
be received in a shorter window. However, with a possible 20 ms gap between packets
the longer window is necessary. This also allows us to reuse the same interval timer, thus
reducing additional logic that could add to error rates.
8.3

System Availability
Based on the description of the proposed system it is possible to provide some calcu-

lations on expected system availability. Table 6.0 will be utilized in this analysis to provide
the expected error rate of different classes of events. Data Corruption events do not have
any affect on the system beyond the corruption of data (which is considered in PER/BER)
and thus do not need to be considered in this discussion. Each of the remaining classes of
events, however, do require the link to go down and thus must be considered. Based on
the proposed system description above, whenever any of these events occur, the system will
wait 100 ms before attempting to reset the system. This time will be considered system
down time. Table 6.8 shows that once the resets are asserted, the expected time for recovery
following a GTX Reset is on the order of 150 ms. Many events will recover faster than this,
especially those for which a GTX Reset is a much stronger reset than is necessary, but using
this duration for all events presents a pessimistic bound for availability1 . If the event is still
not recovered following 200 ms the system is reconfigured. For this system we will suppose
that reconfiguring takes 10 seconds. Configuration scrubbing is continuous with about 2
seconds necessary to perform a full configuration scrub on the proposed system. Thus any
1

In reality it is not a true bound since the expected time for recovery is not the worst case time.
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upsets affecting the system which are recovered with a configuration scrub can result in a
full two seconds of system down time. Again this is a pessimistic bound.
Given these parameters, all that remains for the calculation is to multiply the expected
error rate for the given type of events by the down time experienced when these events occur.
Based on Table 6.8, the combined GEO error rate for all events recoverable by Aurora and
GTX resets is 2.11E-04 events per day. The down time for these events is the 100 ms wait
interval followed by the 150 ms recovery time, and thus is 250 ms. This results in an expected
down time of 5.28E-2 ms per day. The rate for upsets recovered with a configuration scrub
is 6.2E-08 events per day. With a down time of 2 seconds per event, this results in 1.24E-04
ms of down time per day. Finally, the event rate for those events requiring reconfiguration
is 9.20E-08 events per day. With 10 seconds of downtime per events the expected down
time per day is 9.20E-04 ms. These numbers combined result in an expected down time of
5.39E-02 ms per day and thus an availability of 0.999999994. These results are summarized
in Table 8.0.

Table 8.1: Down Time and Availability for Proposed Recovery Steps.

Event
Aurora/GTX Reset
Scrub
Reconfigure
Total

Events
Down Time Down Time
/ Day / Event (ms) / Day (ms)
2.11E-04
250
5,28E-02
6.20E-08
2000
1.24E-04
9.20E-08
10000
9.20E-04
2.11E-04
254.7
5.39E-02
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Availability
0.999999994
0.999999999985
0.99999999989
0.999999994

Chapter 9
Future Work
This work has been able to provide a great deal of information needed by system
designers in order to build a robust MGT and protocol system and has proposed one possible
implementation of such a system. However, there yet remains work to be done in this area.
This chapter briefly reviews some of the areas which deserve further investigation.
9.1

Radiation Testing of Proposed System
One of the primary tasks that needs to be performed to further this work is radiation

testing of actual implementations of robust MGT and protocol systems. The proposed system
from Chapter 8 is one such system that should be tested. However, other implementations
are possible and deserve consideration for different system requirements. The other most
notable system design which should be tested is the proactive reset system which proactively
resets the system at regular intervals to recover from some events without the need to detect
them.
For each tested system the primary areas of interest should be on system availability
and how well the system recovers from all upsets. Of particular notice should be the number
of events which are not recovered by the selected set of resets in order to compare the
measured value with the expected value derived from this work. Also, the amount of time
necessary to recover following the chosen resets should be monitored to ensure this time does
not exceed system requirements and to improve the timing in future system designs.
9.2

Persistent CRC
Another area that is in need of further investigation is Persistent CRC events. The

results of this test only just discovered this type of events, but did little to provide additional
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details into the causes and effects of these events. It is possible that more information can be
derived from a more thorough analysis of already gathered test data (including tests outside
this work), but likely there is more to be gained from testing specifically geared toward
understanding these events.
One way to gain better insights into this class of events is to use a very specifically
tailored set of data for transmitting packets. For instance, if the data used for packets
contained a set of each possible byte combination it would be easy to identify any byte value
dependent effects that occur in testing. This is likely to reveal very consistent CRC failure
intervals for Persistent CRC events. Additional visibility should also be given by allowing
for the reporting of exactly how many words in a packet were corrupted by checking each
word in the packet.
Another way to gain insights into this event is to provide the test architecture with
a mechanism for issuing the RX/TX Reset signals independently before issuing an Aurora
Reset. This method provides greater visibility into precisely which mechanism recovers the
Persistent CRC events, and thus what components may be the cause of such events.
9.3

Watchdog Events
Though Watchdog events were expected in the testing performed in this work, test

results still did not determine the precise cause or best method for detecting this type
of events. Additional work could be done in order to better understand precisely what
components of the system are being upset to cause the system to freeze up and the least
costly way to implement a detection mechanism for such events.
9.4

Channel Bonding
To date no testing has been reported on Virtex 5 MGT and Aurora protocol systems

which use channel bonding. This is a feature extremely likely to be used in advanced systems
and thus it deserves research to discover if there exist any special failure modes associated
with a channel bonded system. One particular concern with these systems is the manner
in which channel bonding is performed in the tile which could allow for a single upset to
disrupt transmission on all other tiles that are bonded with the upset tile.
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9.5

Flow Control
In addition to channel bonding, User Flow Control (UFC) and Native Flow Control

(NFC) are features of the Aurora Protocol that are likely to be utilized in real systems.
These features deserve consideration in testing to discover any new failure modes associated
with them. These features could also provide additional capability for a system in terms of
recovery or error detection and effort could be given to investigating possible uses there.
9.6

DRP Scrubbing
Though the results from this work seem to discourage the implementation of DRP

Scrubbing it may yet deserve further investigation. For some systems which focuses heavily
on the use of MGTs over other portions of the FPGA, DRP scrubbing could be of more
value than configuration scrubbing and easier to implement. Of particular interest on this
topic is the relationship between configuration scrubbing and DRP scrubbing. For instance,
the current test architecture did not allow for the discovery of whether a configuration scrub
is able to recover events which can also be recovered by a DRP scrub.
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Appendix A
March Radiation Test Results
As part of this work radiation testing was performed during March of 2011. This
testing did provide some significant results but was even more significant in helping to guide
the development of the test architecture described in Chapter 5. This appendix will provide
some of the results from the March test, however, it should be remembered that this test
primarily served to improve the test architecture and the test data was not given as much
detailed attention as was the July test results. For a description of changes to the test
architecture which came as a result of the March test refer to Section B.1.
A.1

March Test Architecture Parameters

Table A.0 provides a brief listing of test parameters for the March test. Unlike the
test architecture for the July test, the test architecture used in March logged each signal that
was observed from the test design. This method provides greater visibility into precise timing
of events, but is difficult to implement due to the tremendous amount of data to capture.
There were many instances in the March test which resulted in lost data due to overflowing
the UART buffer. This is what motivated the change in logging to focus on events instead of
individual signals. Another motivation was the fact that before being able to make sense of
the tremendous amount of test data from the March test all of the signals had to be packaged
into events during post-test analysis anyway. Thus, having the test architecture do this work
eliminated that UART overflow problem as well as saved effort on post-test data processing.
Another impact of the limited UART bandwidth was that it was not possible to signal the
every single received packet. As a result, the test architecture contained a Receiving Packets
signal which was asserted after every 216 good packets. This signal allowed the test operated
to observe that a given lane was still functional during testing.
A.2

March Test Information

The March test took place between March 22nd and March 26th 2011 at Texas A&M
University’s Cyclotron. Table A.2 provides additional details on the test runs for that test
as reported at the time of the test. Table A.2 provides a summary of the final fluence values
used in data analysis by LET value. Due to logging and implementation errors none of the
data collected from the first set of runs (Kr LET - 22.6) were used in test data results.
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Table A.1: March Test Design Parameters.

Parameter
Value
MGT Line Rate
3.125 Gbs
MGT Ref Clock Rate
156.25 MHz
Logic Clock Rate
78.125 MHz
PLL in Logic
Yes
MGT Tiles in design
3
Lanes in design
5
Tiles used in data
2
Lanes used in data
2
Aurora - MGT Interface
4-byte
Packet Size (words)
257
Packet Size (bytes)
1028
CRC - hard block
32 bit
16
Receiving Packet Filter
2 Packets
UART rate
115200 Kbs

A.3

March Test Results

As stated above, less time was put into data analysis for the March test than for the
July test. More effort was placed into changing the test architecture in preparation for the
July test than solidifying results from March test data. However, some results were compiled
and they will be presented here. Table A.3 shows the distribution of events categorized
broadly by recovery type as well as counts broken down by LET while Table A.4 provides
results on the relative percent of external recovery events. Table A.5 shows the event counts
for events categorized by failure signature signal and Table A.6 has counts provided for
events classified first by failure signature signal and then by successful recovery step.
One important item to note is that these results did not factor in Persistent CRC
events as this event class was not fully realized until the July test. Some quick analysis was
done on the March test data to identify Persistent CRC events but due to the difference
in data logging between the March and July tests it was not possible to utilize the same
techniques to count and remove them. Thus some of the CRC Failure events listed in the
results tables may be part of Persistent CRC events.
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Table A.2: Test Run Details for March Test.
Run Energy Energy
Eff.
Run
Dose
# (Mev/u) (MeV) Ion LET Range Degrader Angle
Time
Flux Fluence
(Rad)
14
25
1540 Kr 22.9 221.1 NONE
0
43.5 2.21E+04 9.63E+05 3.53E+02
15
25
1540 Kr 22.9 221.1 NONE
0
737.4 7.27E+04 2.00E+06 7.35E+02
16
25
1540 Kr 22.9 221.1 NONE
0
312.2 5.99E+03 1.87E+06 6.86E+02
17
25
1540 Kr 22.9 221.1 NONE
0
761.5 5.94E+03 4.53E+06 1.66E+03
18
25
1540 Kr 22.9 221.1 NONE
0
341.6 6.64E+03 2.27E+06 8.32E+02
19
25
1540 Kr 22.9 221.1 NONE
0 352.35 6.57E+03 2.32E+06 8.50E+02
20
25
1540 Kr 22.9 221.1 NONE
0
784.3 6.64E+03 5.21E+06 1.91E+03
21
25
1540 Kr 22.9 221.1 NONE
0 614.383 6.58E+03 4.04E+06 1.48E+03
30
25
2069 Xe 46.1 169.1 NONE
0
1205 1.07E+03 3.70E+06 2.73E+03
31
25
2069 Xe 46.1 169.1 NONE
0
197 2.65E+03 5.24E+05 3.87E+02
32
25
2069 Xe 46.1 169.1 NONE
0
365 2.41E+03 8.79E+05 6.49E+02
33
25
738 Xe
60
59.6 3@7.225
0
82.85 1.97E+03 1.63E+05 1.57E+02
34
25
738 Xe
60
59.6 3@7.225
0
152.3 7.90E+02 1.20E+05 1.16E+02
35
25
738 Xe
60
59.6 3@7.225
0
164 1.45E+03 2.38E+05 2.29E+02
95
15
370 Ar 10.2 116.3 none
0 225.85 5.18E+03 1.17E+06 1.91E+02
96
15
370 Ar 10.2 116.3 none
0 630.63 1.21E+04 7.58E+06 1.24E+03
97
15
370 Ar 10.2 116.3 none
0
968.7 3.21E+04 3.10E+07 5.09E+03
100
15
227 Ne
3.1
204 none
0
131.8 1.12E+05 1.47E+07 7.36E+02
101
15
227 Ne
3.1
204 none
0 857.183 1.10E+05 9.36E+07 4.68E+03
102
15
227 Ne
3.1
204 none
0 135.25 1.22E+05 1.65E+06 8.23E+02
103
15
227 Ne
3.1
204 none
0 686.117 1.07E+05 7.32E+07 3.66E+03
104
15
227 Ne
3.1
204 none
0 339.733 1.03E+05 3.47E+07 1.73E+03

Table A.3: March Test Fluence Summary by LET.

LET Ion
3.1 Ne
10.2 Ar
46.1 Xe
60 Xe

Fluence
1.45E08
3.97E07
5.10E06
5.22E06

Table A.4: March Test Events Categorized by Recovery Method.

Recovery
3.1 10.2 46.1 60
Data Corruption
1148 719 448 68
Aurora Recovered
258 251 265 49
External Recovery
28
9
39 9
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Total
%
Count Total
2383 72.4%
823 25.0%
85 2.6%

Table A.5: March Test Percentages of External Recovery Events.

Recovery
Percent
Aurora Reset
28.4%
Aurora Logic PLL Reset
28.4%
CDR Reset
0%
GTX Reset
12.3%
Scrub
21.0%
GLUT Scrub
9.9%

Table A.6: March Test Events Categorized by Failure Signature Signal.

Level
Tile
Tile
Tile
Tile
Aurora
Aurora
Packet

Failure Signature
Signal
RX 8B/10B Error
RX Buffer Error
RX Realign
TX Buffer Error
Soft/Hard Error
Frame Error
CRC | MISS Frame

Event Count
DUT SRV Total
592 630 1222
15
4
19
12
0
12
103
0
103
12
0
12
9
5
14
929 409 1338

Table A.7: March Test Event Counts by Failure Signature Signal and Recovery Step.
Recovery Step
Failure Signature
Data Aurora Aurora PLL GTX
GLUT
Level Signal
Total Crpt. Recov. Reset Reset Reset Scrub Scrub
All
All Events
2724 1935
713
21
13
11
22
9
Tile
RX 8B/10B Error
1222 713
480
11
7
3
4
4
Tile
RX Buffer Error
19
0
13
1
1
2
1
1
Tile
RX Realign
12
0
12
0
0
0
0
0
Tile
TX Buffer Error
103
0
96
0
2
3
1
1
Aurora Soft/Hard Error
12
11
0
0
0
1
0
0
Aurora Frame Error
14
10
4
0
0
0
0
0
Packet CRC | MISS Frame 1338 1201
104
9
3
2
16
3
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Appendix B
July Radiation Test Details
This appendix is meant to supplement the information provided in Chapters 5 and 6
with additional details on the July test.
B.1

Differences Between March and July Tests

The radiation testing for this work performed in March of 2011 served as a great
learning experience and provided guidance for test architecture improvements for the July
test. The following items where changed from the March test architecture to the July test
architecture:
• Test Design
Changed from 4-byte to 2-byte interface between Aurora and MGT tile
Logic running at 156.25 MHz due to interface change instead of 78.125MHz
Able to remove PLL from Aurora logic due to clock rate change
CRC block changed to 16 bit CRC in logic (not hard silicon block)
Removed two of three loopback control signals from user access to lower I/O count
Logged one more Tile signal - TXERRSIG
Added DRP Router in logic for DRP Scrubbing
• FuncMon
Moved from logging every signal individually to Event Start/End logging
Added DRP Controller for DRP Scrubbing
Removed Receiving Packet monitoring
Added Good-Packet Interval counter for recovery detection
Added Watchdog error signal
• User Interface Layer
Added Automated recovery state machine
Logged both sides together in same program
Added signal to alert need for scrub, but still issued manually
• Different ConfigMon version (supplied by XRTC)
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B.2

Tile Placement

Table B.0 represents the MGT tiles used in the test design as well as the source of the
reference clock for the design. A single reference clock from an on-board oscillator is shared
among all three tiles used in the test architecture.

Table B.1: Placement of MGT Tiles Used in Test Architecture.

Placement
X0Y2
X0Y3
X0Y4

B.3

Tile
122
118
114

Reference Clock
From tile 118
156.25 MHz Oscillator
From tile 118

Data Generation

The following listing represents the code used to generate the pseudo-random data
for transmitted packets with an LFSR algorithm. The LFSR polynomial is the same for all
lanes in the test design.
LFSR POLYNOMIAL

: s t d l o g i c v e c t o r := X”B401 ” ;

−− LFSR
LFSR : p r o c e s s ( c l k )
v a r i a b l e tap : s t d l o g i c ;
begin
i f ( r i s i n g e d g e ( c l k ) ) then
−− l o a d data with t h e frame number f o r s t a r t o f frame
i f ( l o a d s e e d = ’ 1 ’ ) then
l f s r r e g <= ( o t h e r s => ’ 0 ’ ) ;
l f s r r e g (FRAME NUM WIDTH USED−1 downto 0 ) <=
s t d l o g i c v e c t o r ( frame num ) ;
−− c a l c u l a t e next v a l u e
e l s i f ( s h i f t s e e d = ’ 1 ’ ) then
−− c a l c u l a t e v a l u e u s i n g LFSR
i f ( r a n d o m d a t a r = ’ 1 ’ ) then
tap := ’ 1 ’ ;
f o r i i n LFSR POLYNOMIAL’ l e n g t h −1 downto 0 l o o p
i f (LFSR POLYNOMIAL( i ) = ’ 1 ’ ) then
tap := tap xnor l f s r r e g ( i ) ;
end i f ;
end l o o p ;
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l f s r r e g <= l f s r r e g (DATA WIDTH−2 downto 0 ) & tap ;
−− i n c r e m e n t t h e v a l u e f o r d e t e r m i n i s t i c data
else
l f s r r e g <= s t d l o g i c v e c t o r ( u n s i g n e d ( l f s r r e g ) + 1 ) ;
end i f ;
end i f ;
end i f ;
end p r o c e s s ;

B.4

FuncMon Parameters

Table B.1 provides a listing of parameters which relate to the FuncMon used in the
test architecture. The DRP clock phase shift refers to the phase shift applied to the DRP
clock prior to be sent into the test design to aid with proper synchronization across the two
boards.

Table B.2: FuncMon Design Parameters.

Parameter
PowerPC clock
Test design signal sampling
DRP clock
DRP clock phase shift
UART
Time stamp
Time stamp width
Time stamp sync
Watchdog interval

B.5

Value/Rate
300 MHz
160 MHz
33 MHz
180◦
115200 Kbs
100 MHz
40 bits
10 seconds
8µs

Test Run Detail

Table B.2 supplies a summary of the test run settings organized by blocks of test
runs. Table B.3 provides a more thorough breakdown information from each test run. This
table also includes information on the settings for SET Filters for each run. The difference
between the two types of runs was achieved by having two different configuration files for
the DUT FPGA, one which was compiled with the SET Filters setting turned on and one
compiled with the setting turned off. After analyzing the data from these two different
classes of test runs I determined that the difference for almost all categories of data was
insignificant enough to warrant expanding the discussion to include the two different classes.
Thus for all the test result discussions the two run types were considered as equal, though
a more thorough analysis can reveal some minor differences. The fluence numbers listed
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represent those originally measured by the test facility and the adjusted fluence number
represents the truncated fluence based on the truncation of logged data due to SEFI events
(see Section C.2.2 for a more detailed explanation on fluence adjustments).

Table B.3: Summary of Testing Parameters by Run Number.

Runs
29-33
50-58
81-89
90-91
157-158
194-207
401-412
413-417

B.6

Energy
24.8
24.8
24.8
24.8
40.0
15.0
15.0
15.0

Ion
Ne
Kr
Xe
Xe
N
Cu
Ar
Ar

Degrader
none
none
none
3@0deg
none
none
none
2@56deg

LET-eff
1.85
22.7
45.2
59.1
0.597
25.2
10.0
18.1

Range-eff
691.6
225.7
179.2
65.2
2227.6
65.0
121.6
19.8

MGT Tile Instantiation

Below is a listing of the test design VHDL for instantiating a single MGT Tile. The
test architecture connected two independent Aurora lanes to a single tile, and thus the name
of the tile is GTX DUAL. Similarly, the names of many signals are appended with numbers
0 and 1 such as GTX RXBUFRESET0 IN and GTX RXBUFRESET1 IN which represent
signals coming from the two different Aurora logic blocks.
g t x t i l e i : GTX DUAL
g e n e r i c map (
−−

S i m u l a t i o n −Only A t t r i b u t e s

SIM RECEIVER DETECT PASS 0 => TRUE,
SIM RECEIVER DETECT PASS 1 => TRUE,
=> TILE SIM MODE ,
SIM MODE
SIM GTXRESET SPEEDUP => TILE SIM GTXRESET SPEEDUP ,
SIM PLL PERDIV2
=> TILE SIM PLL PERDIV2 ,
−−

Shared A t t r i b u t e s

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− T i l e and PLL A t t r i b u t e s
CLK25 DIVIDER
CLKINDC B
CLKRCV TRST
OOB CLK DIVIDER
OVERSAMPLE MODE
PLL COM CFG
PLL CP CFG
PLL DIVSEL FB
PLL DIVSEL REF
PLL FB DCCEN
PLL LKDET CFG
PLL TDCC CFG
PMA COM CFG
−−

=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

10 ,
TRUE,
TRUE,
6,
FALSE ,
x ”21680 a ” ,
x ”00” ,
4,
1,
FALSE ,
”101” ,
”000” ,
x ”000000000000000000” ,
T ra n s mi t

Interface

Attributes

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− TX B u f f e r i n g and Phase A l i g n m e n t
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−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

Table B.4: Test Parameters and Information by Run Number.
Run SET
Packet
#
Run Trun- Adj Run Adjusted End
# Filters Interval Lanes Ion LET
Flux
Fluence
time cated
time Fluence Reason
29
OFF
4000
4
Ne 1.85 9.92E+04 9.49E+07 956.717
0
956.7 9.49E+07 Change Flux, etc.
30
OFF
4000
4
Ne 1.85 5.00E+05 6.19E+07 123.78
69.9
53.9 2.70E+07 Logging Issue
31
OFF
4000
4
Ne 1.85 4.64E+05 1.15E+08 247.017
153
94.0 4.36E+07 POR SEFI
32
OFF
4000
4
Ne 1.85 4.37E+05 4.00E+07 91.5833
8.7
82.9 3.62E+07 POR SEFI
33
OFF
4000
4
Ne 1.85 3.88E+05 9.85E+07 253.95
50.5
203.5 7.89E+07 POR SEFI
50
OFF
4000
4
Kr 22.7 4.30E+03 1.73E+06 402.65
0
402.7 1.73E+06 Change Flux, etc.
51
OFF
4000
4
Kr 22.7 4.09E+04 4.58E+06
95.33
13.8
81.5 3.33E+06 POR SEFI
52
OFF
4000
4
Kr 22.7 4.59E+04 4.28E+06
93.3
17
76.3 3.50E+06 Logging Issue
53
ON
4000
4
Kr 22.7 5.22E+04 1.11E+07 212.75
62.9
149.9 7.83E+06 SMAP SEFI
54
ON
4000
4
Kr 22.7 3.78E+04 1.18E+06
31.28
5.5
25.8 9.75E+05 POR SEFI
55
ON
4000
4
Kr 22.7 3.56E+04 2.76E+06
77.75
13.7
64.1 2.28E+06 POR SEFI
56
ON
4000
4
Kr 22.7 4.07E+04 8.61E+06
211.6
3.6
208.0 8.47E+06 POR SEFI
57
ON
4000
4
Kr 22.7 3.90E+04 1.06E+07 270.95
3.7
267.3 1.04E+07 POR SEFI
58
ON
4000
4
Kr 22.7 3.89E+04 6.02E+06
154.6
66.8
87.8 3.42E+06 SU Runaway
81
OFF
16000
5
Xe 45.2 2.24E+03 4.28E+05 190.917
0
190.9 4.28E+05 Beam died
82
OFF
16000
5
Xe 45.2 2.24E+03 1.13E+06 506.283
16.4
489.9 1.10E+06 POR SEFI
83
OFF
16000
5
Xe 45.2 7.89E+03 7.28E+05
92.25
11.5
80.8 6.37E+05 POR SEFI
84
OFF
16000
5
Xe 45.2 8.45E+03 2.67E+06 315.617
141
174.6 1.47E+06 CFGMON Died
85
ON
16000
5
Xe 45.2 7.46E+03 4.06E+06 544.333
0
544.3 4.06E+06 Change Flux, etc.
86
ON
16000
5
Xe 45.2 2.95E+04 2.31E+06 78.1833
0
78.2 2.31E+06 CFGMON Died
87
ON
16000
5
Xe 45.2 3.11E+04 1.45E+06
46.5
30.3
16.2 5.03E+05 POR SEFI
88
ON
16000
5
Xe 45.2 2.95E+04 1.55E+06 52.533
7.6
44.9 1.33E+06 POR SEFI
89
ON
16000
5
Xe 45.2 2.97E+04 5.51E+06 185.167
0
185.2 5.51E+06 CFGMON Died
90
ON
16000
5
Xe 59.1 2.50E+04 2.26E+06 90.1167
31.8
58.3 1.46E+06 SEFI
91
ON
16000
5
Xe 59.1 1.00E+04 1.40E+06 140.233
0
140.2 1.40E+06 Perst RB errors
157 OFF
16000
5
N 0.597 7.72E+04 8.47E+07
1098
0
1098.0 8.47E+07 Beam went off
158
ON
16000
5
N 0.597 1.25E+05 1.02E+08
815.4
0
815.4 1.02E+08 Beam died
194 OFF
16000
5
Cu 25.2 9.00E+03 8.12E+06
902
23
879.0 7.91E+06 Logging Issue
195 OFF
16000
5
Cu 25.2 2.35E+04 6.94E+06
296
23.4
272.6 6.40E+06 SMAP SEFI
196 OFF
16000
5
Cu 25.2 2.29E+04 9.94E+05
43.4
8.6
34.8 7.98E+05 POR SEFI
197 OFF
16000
5
Cu 25.2 2.47E+04 2.01E+06
81.38
13.7
67.7 1.67E+06 POR SEFI
198 OFF
16000
5
Cu 25.2 2.38E+04 7.19E+06 301.86
7.1
294.8 7.02E+06 POR SEFI
199 OFF
16000
5
Cu 25.2 2.52E+04 7.64E+06
302.7
7.2
295.5 7.46E+06 SU Runaway
200
ON
16000
5
Cu 25.2 2.31E+04 7.40E+06
320
0
320.0 7.40E+06 Change Flux, etc.
201
ON
16000
5
Cu 25.2 1.99E+05 1.09E+07
54.6
30
24.6 4.91E+06 POR SEFI
202
ON
16000
5
Cu 25.2 2.00E+05 5.44E+06
27.3
15.1
12.2 2.43E+06 POR SEFI
203
ON
16000
5
Cu 25.2 1.91E+05 7.96E+06
41.7
5
36.7 7.01E+06 POR SEFI
204
ON
16000
5
Cu 25.2 9.87E+04 1.93E+06
19.5
6.8
12.7 1.25E+06 POR SEFI
401 OFF
16000
5
Ar 10.0 1.02E+05 2.70E+06
26.33
0
26.3 2.70E+06 Time Over
402 OFF
16000
5
Ar 10.0 9.96E+04 1.02E+07 102.167
13.4
88.8 8.84E+06 SU Runaway
403 OFF
16000
5
Ar 10.0 1.07E+05 4.11E+07 384.033
11.1
372.9 3.99E+07 SU Runaway
404 OFF
16000
5
Ar 10.0 1.09E+05 1.65E+07 152.317 30.75
121.6 1.32E+07 GSIG SEFI
405 OFF
16000
5
Ar 10.0 1.09E+05 2.25E+07 206.467
8.8
197.7 2.15E+07 SU Runaway
406
ON
16000
5
Ar 10.0 1.07E+05 6.55E+06
61
8.8
52.2 5.60E+06 POR SEFI
408
ON
16000
5
Ar 10.0 1.05E+05 9.95E+05 9.46667
5.7
3.8 3.96E+05 POR SEFI
409
ON
16000
5
Ar 10.0 1.09E+05 4.84E+07
442.5
6.3
436.2 4.77E+07 POR SEFI
410
ON
16000
5
Ar 10.0 1.12E+05 1.95E+07 174.317
11.8
162.5 1.82E+07 POR SEFI
411
ON
16000
5
Ar 10.0 4.64E+03 2.89E+07 257.783
11.1
246.7 1.15E+06 POR SEFI
415 OFF
16000
5
Ar 18.1 1.07E+05 1.72E+07 161.617
0
161.6 1.72E+07 Time Over
416
ON
16000
5
Ar 18.1 1.09E+05 3.19E+06 29.3167
5
24.3 2.64E+06 POR SEFI
417
ON
16000
5
Ar 18.1 1.10E+05 6.20E+06
56.6
9.8
46.8 5.12E+06 SU Runaway
418
ON
16000
5
Ar 18.1 1.10E+05 9.66E+06
87.95
6.8
81.2 8.91E+06 POR SEFI
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TX BUFFER USE 0 => TRUE,
=> ”TXOUT” ,
TX XCLK SEL 0
TXRX INVERT 0
=> ” 0 1 1 ” ,
TX BUFFER USE 1 => TRUE,
TX XCLK SEL 1
=> ”TXOUT” ,
TXRX INVERT 1
=> ” 0 1 1 ” ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− TX Gearbox S e t t i n g s

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

GEARBOX ENDEC 0 => ” 0 0 0 ” ,
TXGEARBOX USE 0 => FALSE ,
GEARBOX ENDEC 1 => ” 0 0 0 ” ,
TXGEARBOX USE 1 => FALSE ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− TX S e r i a l

L i n e Rate

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

settings

PLL TXDIVSEL OUT 0 => 2 ,
PLL TXDIVSEL OUT 1 => 2 ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− TX D r i v e r and OOB s i g n a l l i n g
CM TRIM 0
=>
PMA TX CFG 0
=>
TX DETECT RX CFG 0 =>
TX IDLE DELAY 0
=>

”10” ,
x ”80082” ,
x ”1832” ,
”010” ,

CM TRIM 1
=>
PMA TX CFG 1
=>
TX DETECT RX CFG 1 =>
TX IDLE DELAY 1
=>

”10” ,
x ”80082” ,
x ”1832” ,
”010” ,

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− TX P i p e C o n t r o l

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

f o r PCI E x p r e s s /SATA

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

COM BURST VAL 0 => ” 1 1 1 1 ” ,
COM BURST VAL 1 => ” 1 1 1 1 ” ,
−−
Receive

Interface

Attributes

−−−−−−−−−−−− RX D r i v e r ,OOB s i g n a l l i n g , C o u p l i n g and Eq ,CDR
AC CAP DIS 0
OOBDETECT THRESHOLD 0
PMA CDR SCAN 0
PMA RX CFG 0
RCV TERM GND 0
RCV TERM VTTRX 0
TERMINATION IMP 0

=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>

F a l s e , −−TRUE,
”111” ,
x ”6404035” ,
x ”0 f 4 4 0 8 8 ” ,
FALSE ,
FALSE ,
50 ,

AC CAP DIS 1
OOBDETECT THRESHOLD 1
PMA CDR SCAN 1
PMA RX CFG 1
RCV TERM GND 1
RCV TERM VTTRX 1
TERMINATION IMP 1

=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>

F a l s e , −−TRUE,
”111” ,
x ”6404035” ,
x ”0 f 4 4 0 8 8 ” ,
FALSE ,
FALSE ,
50 ,

−−−−−−−−−−−−−

TERMINATION CTRL => ” 1 0 1 0 0 ” ,
TERMINATION OVRD => FALSE ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− RX D e c i s i o n Feedback E q u a l i z e r (DFE)

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

DFE CFG 0 => ” 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 ” ,
DFE CFG 1 => ” 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 ” ,
DFE CAL TIME => ” 0 0 1 1 0 ” ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− RX S e r i a l

L i n e Rate A t t r i b u t e s

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

PLL RXDIVSEL OUT 0 => 2 ,
PLL SATA 0
=> FALSE ,
PLL RXDIVSEL OUT 1 => 2 ,
PLL SATA 1
=> FALSE ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− PRBS D e t e c t i o n

Attributes

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

PRBS ERR THRESHOLD 0 => x ” 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ” ,
PRBS ERR THRESHOLD 1 => x ” 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ” ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Comma D e t e c t i o n and A l i gn m e n t A t t r i b u t e s
ALIGN COMMA WORD 0
COMMA 10B ENABLE 0
COMMA DOUBLE 0
DEC MCOMMA DETECT 0
DEC PCOMMA DETECT 0

=>
=>
=>
=>
=>

2,
”1111111111” ,
FALSE ,
TRUE,
TRUE,
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−−−−−−−−−−−−−

DEC VALID COMMA ONLY 0 =>
=>
MCOMMA 10B VALUE 0
MCOMMA DETECT 0
=>
=>
PCOMMA 10B VALUE 0
PCOMMA DETECT 0
=>
RX SLIDE MODE 0
=>

FALSE ,
”1010000011” ,
TRUE,
”0101111100” ,
TRUE,
”PCS” ,

ALIGN COMMA WORD 1
=>
COMMA 10B ENABLE 1
=>
=>
COMMA DOUBLE 1
DEC MCOMMA DETECT 1
=>
=>
DEC PCOMMA DETECT 1
DEC VALID COMMA ONLY 1 =>
=>
MCOMMA 10B VALUE 1
MCOMMA DETECT 1
=>
PCOMMA 10B VALUE 1
=>
=>
PCOMMA DETECT 1
=>
RX SLIDE MODE 1

2,
”1111111111” ,
FALSE ,
TRUE,
TRUE,
FALSE ,
”1010000011” ,
TRUE,
”0101111100” ,
TRUE,
”PCS” ,

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− RX Loss−o f −s y n c S t a t e Machine A t t r i b u t e s

−−−−−−−−−−−

RX LOSS OF SYNC FSM 0 => FALSE ,
RX LOS INVALID INCR 0 => 8 ,
RX LOS THRESHOLD 0
=> 1 2 8 ,
RX LOSS OF SYNC FSM 1 => FALSE ,
RX LOS INVALID INCR 1 => 8 ,
RX LOS THRESHOLD 1
=> 1 2 8 ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− RX Gearbox S e t t i n g s

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

RXGEARBOX USE 0 => FALSE ,
RXGEARBOX USE 1 => FALSE ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−− RX E l a s t i c

B u f f e r and Phase a l i g n m e n t

Attributes

−−−−−−−

PMA RXSYNC CFG 0 => x ” 0 0 ” ,
RX BUFFER USE 0 => TRUE,
RX XCLK SEL 0
=> ”RXREC” ,
PMA RXSYNC CFG 1 => x ” 0 0 ” ,
RX BUFFER USE 1 => TRUE,
RX XCLK SEL 1
=> ”RXREC” ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− C l o c k C o r r e c t i o n

Attributes

CLK CORRECT USE 0
=>
CLK COR ADJ LEN 0
=>
CLK COR DET LEN 0
=>
CLK COR INSERT IDLE FLAG 0 =>
CLK COR KEEP IDLE 0
=>
CLK COR MAX LAT 0
=>
CLK COR MIN LAT 0
=>
=>
CLK COR PRECEDENCE 0
CLK COR REPEAT WAIT 0
=>
=>
CLK COR SEQ 1 1 0
CLK COR SEQ 1 2 0
=>
=>
CLK COR SEQ 1 3 0
CLK COR SEQ 1 4 0
=>
=>
CLK COR SEQ 1 ENABLE 0
CLK COR SEQ 2 1 0
=>
CLK COR SEQ 2 2 0
=>
CLK COR SEQ 2 3 0
=>
CLK COR SEQ 2 4 0
=>
CLK COR SEQ 2 ENABLE 0
=>
CLK COR SEQ 2 USE 0
=>
RX DECODE SEQ MATCH 0
=>

TRUE,
2,
2,
FALSE ,
FALSE ,
32 ,
28 ,
TRUE,
0,
”0111110111” ,
”0111110111” ,
”0100000000” ,
”0100000000” ,
”1111” ,
”0100000000” ,
”0100000000” ,
”0100000000” ,
”0100000000” ,
”1111” ,
FALSE ,
TRUE,

CLK CORRECT USE 1
=>
CLK COR ADJ LEN 1
=>
CLK COR DET LEN 1
=>
CLK COR INSERT IDLE FLAG 1 =>
CLK COR KEEP IDLE 1
=>
CLK COR MAX LAT 1
=>
CLK COR MIN LAT 1
=>
CLK COR PRECEDENCE 1
=>
CLK COR REPEAT WAIT 1
=>
CLK COR SEQ 1 1 1
=>
CLK COR SEQ 1 2 1
=>
CLK COR SEQ 1 3 1
=>
CLK COR SEQ 1 4 1
=>
CLK COR SEQ 1 ENABLE 1
=>
CLK COR SEQ 2 1 1
=>
CLK COR SEQ 2 2 1
=>
CLK COR SEQ 2 3 1
=>
CLK COR SEQ 2 4 1
=>
CLK COR SEQ 2 ENABLE 1
=>
CLK COR SEQ 2 USE 1
=>
RX DECODE SEQ MATCH 1
=>

TRUE,
2,
2,
FALSE ,
FALSE ,
32 ,
28 ,
TRUE,
0,
”0111110111” ,
”0111110111” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0011” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0000” ,
FALSE ,
TRUE,

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Channel Bonding A t t r i b u t e s
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−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

CB2 INH CC PERIOD 0
=>
CHAN BOND 1 MAX SKEW 0
=>
=>
CHAN BOND 2 MAX SKEW 0
CHAN BOND KEEP ALIGN 0
=>
CHAN BOND LEVEL 0
=>
CHAN BOND MODE 0
=>
=>
CHAN BOND SEQ 1 1 0
CHAN BOND SEQ 1 2 0
=>
=>
CHAN BOND SEQ 1 3 0
CHAN BOND SEQ 1 4 0
=>
CHAN BOND SEQ 1 ENABLE 0 =>
CHAN BOND SEQ 2 1 0
=>
=>
CHAN BOND SEQ 2 2 0
CHAN BOND SEQ 2 3 0
=>
CHAN BOND SEQ 2 4 0
=>
CHAN BOND SEQ 2 ENABLE 0 =>
=>
CHAN BOND SEQ 2 USE 0
CHAN BOND SEQ LEN 0
=>
PCI EXPRESS MODE 0
=>

8,
7,
7,
FALSE ,
TILE CHAN BOND LEVEL 0 ,
TILE CHAN BOND MODE 0 ,
”0101111100” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0001” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0000” ,
FALSE ,
1,
FALSE ,

=>
CB2 INH CC PERIOD 1
CHAN BOND 1 MAX SKEW 1
=>
CHAN BOND 2 MAX SKEW 1
=>
=>
CHAN BOND KEEP ALIGN 1
CHAN BOND LEVEL 1
=>
CHAN BOND MODE 1
=>
CHAN BOND SEQ 1 1 1
=>
=>
CHAN BOND SEQ 1 2 1
CHAN BOND SEQ 1 3 1
=>
CHAN BOND SEQ 1 4 1
=>
CHAN BOND SEQ 1 ENABLE 1 =>
CHAN BOND SEQ 2 1 1
=>
CHAN BOND SEQ 2 2 1
=>
CHAN BOND SEQ 2 3 1
=>
CHAN BOND SEQ 2 4 1
=>
CHAN BOND SEQ 2 ENABLE 1 =>
=>
CHAN BOND SEQ 2 USE 1
CHAN BOND SEQ LEN 1
=>
PCI EXPRESS MODE 1
=>

8,
7,
7,
FALSE ,
TILE CHAN BOND LEVEL 1 ,
TILE CHAN BOND MODE 1 ,
”0101111100” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0001” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0000000000” ,
”0000” ,
FALSE ,
1,
FALSE ,

−−−−−−−− RX A t t r i b u t e s

to Control Reset

RX
RX
RX
RX

EN IDLE
EN IDLE
IDLE HI
IDLE LO

HOLD DFE 0
RESET BUF 0
CNT 0
CNT 0

=>
=>
=>
=>

TRUE,
TRUE,
”1000” ,
”0000” ,

RX
RX
RX
RX

EN IDLE
EN IDLE
IDLE HI
IDLE LO

HOLD DFE 1
RESET BUF 1
CNT 1
CNT 1

=>
=>
=>
=>

TRUE,
TRUE,
”1000” ,
”0000” ,

CDR PH ADJ TIME
RX EN IDLE RESET FR
RX EN IDLE HOLD CDR
RX EN IDLE RESET PH

=>
=>
=>
=>

after

Electrical

Idle

−−−−−−

”01010” ,
TRUE,
FALSE ,
TRUE,

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− RX A t t r i b u t e s
RX STATUS FMT 0
SATA BURST VAL 0
SATA IDLE VAL 0
SATA MAX BURST 0
SATA MAX INIT 0
SATA MAX WAKE 0
SATA MIN BURST 0
SATA MIN INIT 0
SATA MIN WAKE 0
TRANS TIME FROM P2 0
TRANS TIME NON P2 0
TRANS TIME TO P2 0

=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>

”PCIE ” ,
”100” ,
”100” ,
7,
22 ,
7,
4,
12 ,
4,
x ”003 c ” ,
x ”0019” ,
x ”0064” ,

RX STATUS FMT 1
SATA BURST VAL 1
SATA IDLE VAL 1
SATA MAX BURST 1
SATA MAX INIT 1
SATA MAX WAKE 1
SATA MIN BURST 1
SATA MIN INIT 1
SATA MIN WAKE 1
TRANS TIME FROM P2 1
TRANS TIME NON P2 1
TRANS TIME TO P2 1

=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>

”PCIE ” ,
”100” ,
”100” ,
7,
22 ,
7,
4,
12 ,
4,
x ”003 c ” ,
x ”0019” ,
x ”0064”

f o r PCI E x p r e s s /SATA

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

)
p o r t map (
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Loopback and Powerdown P o r t s −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
LOOPBACK0
=> GTX LOOPBACK0 IN ,
LOOPBACK1
=> GTX LOOPBACK1 IN ,
RXPOWERDOWN0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 1 downto 0 ) ,
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RXPOWERDOWN1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 1 downto 0 ) ,
TXPOWERDOWN0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 1 downto 0 ) ,
TXPOWERDOWN1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 1 downto 0 ) ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−− R e c e i v e P o r t s − 64 b66b and 64 b67b Gearbox P o r t s −−−−−−−−−−−−−
RXDATAVALID0
=> open ,
RXDATAVALID1
=> open ,
RXGEARBOXSLIP0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
RXGEARBOXSLIP1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
RXHEADER0
=> open ,
RXHEADER1
=> open ,
RXHEADERVALID0
=> open ,
RXHEADERVALID1
=> open ,
RXSTARTOFSEQ0
=> open ,
RXSTARTOFSEQ1
=> open ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− R e c e i v e P o r t s − 8 b10b D e c o d e r −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
RXCHARISCOMMA0( 3 downto 2 ) => r x c h a r i s c o m m a 0 f l o a t ,
RXCHARISCOMMA0( 1 downto 0 ) => GTX RXCHARISCOMMA0 OUT,
RXCHARISCOMMA1( 3 downto 2 ) => r x c h a r i s c o m m a 1 f l o a t ,
RXCHARISCOMMA1( 1 downto 0 ) => GTX RXCHARISCOMMA1 OUT,
RXCHARISK0( 3 downto 2 )
=> r x c h a r i s k 0 f l o a t ,
RXCHARISK0( 1 downto 0 )
=> GTX RXCHARISK0 OUT,
RXCHARISK1( 3 downto 2 )
=> r x c h a r i s k 1 f l o a t ,
RXCHARISK1( 1 downto 0 )
=> GTX RXCHARISK1 OUT,
RXDEC8B10BUSE0
=> t i e d t o v c c i ,
RXDEC8B10BUSE1
=> t i e d t o v c c i ,
RXDISPERR0( 3 downto 2 )
=> r x d i s p e r r 0 f l o a t ,
RXDISPERR0( 1 downto 0 )
=> GTX RXDISPERR0 OUT,
RXDISPERR1( 3 downto 2 )
=> r x d i s p e r r 1 f l o a t ,
RXDISPERR1( 1 downto 0 )
=> GTX RXDISPERR1 OUT,
RXNOTINTABLE0( 3 downto 2 ) => r x n o t i n t a b l e 0 f l o a t ,
RXNOTINTABLE0( 1 downto 0 ) => GTX RXNOTINTABLE0 OUT,
RXNOTINTABLE1( 3 downto 2 ) => r x n o t i n t a b l e 1 f l o a t ,
RXNOTINTABLE1( 1 downto 0 ) => GTX RXNOTINTABLE1 OUT,
RXRUNDISP0
=> open ,
RXRUNDISP1
=> open ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− R e c e i v e P o r t s − Channel Bonding P o r t s −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
RXCHANBONDSEQ0
=> open ,
RXCHANBONDSEQ1
=> open ,
RXCHBONDI0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 3 downto 0 ) ,
RXCHBONDI1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 3 downto 0 ) ,
RXCHBONDO0
=> open ,
RXCHBONDO1
=> open ,
RXENCHANSYNC0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
RXENCHANSYNC1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− R e c e i v e P o r t s − C l o c k C o r r e c t i o n P o r t s −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
RXCLKCORCNT0
=> open ,
RXCLKCORCNT1
=> open ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− R e c e i v e P o r t s − Comma D e t e c t i o n and Al i g n m e n t −−−−−−−−−−−−−−
RXBYTEISALIGNED0
=> open ,
RXBYTEISALIGNED1
=> open ,
RXBYTEREALIGN0
=> GTX RXBYTEREALIGN0 OUT,
RXBYTEREALIGN1
=> GTX RXBYTEREALIGN1 OUT,
RXCOMMADET0
=> open ,
RXCOMMADET1
=> open ,
RXCOMMADETUSE0
=> t i e d t o v c c i ,
RXCOMMADETUSE1
=> t i e d t o v c c i ,
RXENMCOMMAALIGN0
=> GTX RXENMCOMMAALIGN0 IN,
RXENMCOMMAALIGN1
=> GTX RXENMCOMMAALIGN1 IN,
RXENPCOMMAALIGN0
=> GTX RXENPCOMMAALIGN0 IN,
RXENPCOMMAALIGN1
=> GTX RXENPCOMMAALIGN1 IN,
RXSLIDE0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
RXSLIDE1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− R e c e i v e P o r t s − PRBS D e t e c t i o n −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
PRBSCNTRESET0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
PRBSCNTRESET1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
RXENPRBSTST0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 1 downto 0 ) ,
RXENPRBSTST1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 1 downto 0 ) ,
RXPRBSERR0
=> open ,
RXPRBSERR1
=> open ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− R e c e i v e P o r t s − RX Data Path i n t e r f a c e −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
RXDATA0( 3 1 downto 1 6 ) => r x d a t a 0 f l o a t ,
RXDATA0( 1 5 downto 0 ) => GTX RXDATA0 OUT,
RXDATA1( 3 1 downto 1 6 ) => r x d a t a 1 f l o a t ,
RXDATA1( 1 5 downto 0 ) => GTX RXDATA1 OUT,
RXDATAWIDTH0
=> ” 0 1 ” ,
RXDATAWIDTH1
=> ” 0 1 ” ,
RXRECCLK0
=> open ,
RXRECCLK1
=> open ,
RXRESET0
=> GTX RXRESET0 IN ,
RXRESET1
=> GTX RXRESET1 IN ,
RXUSRCLK0
=> GTX RXUSRCLK0 IN ,
RXUSRCLK1
=> GTX RXUSRCLK1 IN ,
RXUSRCLK20
=> GTX RXUSRCLK20 IN ,
RXUSRCLK21
=> GTX RXUSRCLK21 IN ,
−−−−−−−−−−−− R e c e i v e P o r t s − RX D e c i s i o n Feedback E q u a l i z e r (DFE) −−−−−−−−−−−
DFECLKDLYADJ0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 5 downto 0 ) ,
DFECLKDLYADJ1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 5 downto 0 ) ,
DFECLKDLYADJMONITOR0 => open ,
DFECLKDLYADJMONITOR1 => open ,
DFEEYEDACMONITOR0
=> open ,
DFEEYEDACMONITOR1
=> open ,
DFESENSCAL0
=> open ,
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DFESENSCAL1
=> open ,
DFETAP10
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 4 downto 0 ) ,
DFETAP11
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 4 downto 0 ) ,
DFETAP1MONITOR0
=> open ,
DFETAP1MONITOR1
=> open ,
DFETAP20
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 4 downto 0 ) ,
DFETAP21
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 4 downto 0 ) ,
DFETAP2MONITOR0
=> open ,
DFETAP2MONITOR1
=> open ,
DFETAP30
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 3 downto 0 ) ,
DFETAP31
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 3 downto 0 ) ,
DFETAP3MONITOR0
=> open ,
DFETAP3MONITOR1
=> open ,
DFETAP40
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 3 downto 0 ) ,
DFETAP41
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 3 downto 0 ) ,
DFETAP4MONITOR0
=> open ,
DFETAP4MONITOR1
=> open ,
−−−−−−− R e c e i v e P o r t s − RX D r i v e r ,OOB s i g n a l l i n g , C o u p l i n g and Eq . ,CDR −−−−−−
RXCDRRESET0
=> GTX RXCDRRESET0 IN ,
RXCDRRESET1
=> GTX RXCDRRESET1 IN ,
RXELECIDLE0
=> open ,
RXELECIDLE1
=> open ,
RXENEQB0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
RXENEQB1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
RXEQMIX0
=> ” 1 1 ” ,
RXEQMIX1
=> ” 1 1 ” ,
RXEQPOLE0
=> ” 0 0 0 0 ” ,
RXEQPOLE1
=> ” 0 0 0 0 ” ,
RXN0
=> GTX RXN0 IN ,
RXN1
=> GTX RXN1 IN ,
RXP0
=> GTX RXP0 IN ,
RXP1
=> GTX RXP1 IN ,
−−−−−−−− R e c e i v e P o r t s − RX E l a s t i c B u f f e r and Phase A l i g n m e nt P o r t s −−−−−−−
RXBUFRESET0
=> GTX RXBUFRESET0 IN ,
RXBUFRESET1
=> GTX RXBUFRESET1 IN ,
RXBUFSTATUS0
=> GTX RXBUFSTATUS0 OUT,
RXBUFSTATUS1
=> GTX RXBUFSTATUS1 OUT,
RXCHANISALIGNED0
=> GTX RXCHANISALIGNED0 OUT,
RXCHANISALIGNED1
=> GTX RXCHANISALIGNED1 OUT,
RXCHANREALIGN0
=> open ,
RXCHANREALIGN1
=> open ,
RXENPMAPHASEALIGN0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
RXENPMAPHASEALIGN1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
RXPMASETPHASE0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
RXPMASETPHASE1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
RXSTATUS0
=> open ,
RXSTATUS1
=> open ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− R e c e i v e P o r t s − RX Loss−o f −s y n c S t a t e Machine −−−−−−−−−−−−−−
RXLOSSOFSYNC0
=> open ,
RXLOSSOFSYNC1
=> open ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− R e c e i v e P o r t s − RX O v e r s a m p l i n g −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
RXENSAMPLEALIGN0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
RXENSAMPLEALIGN1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
RXOVERSAMPLEERR0
=> open ,
RXOVERSAMPLEERR1
=> open ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−− R e c e i v e P o r t s − RX P i p e C o n t r o l f o r PCI E x p r e s s −−−−−−−−−−−−−
PHYSTATUS0
=> open ,
PHYSTATUS1
=> open ,
RXVALID0
=> open ,
RXVALID1
=> open ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− R e c e i v e P o r t s − RX P o l a r i t y C o n t r o l P o r t s −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
RXPOLARITY0
=> GTX RXPOLARITY0 IN ,
RXPOLARITY1
=> GTX RXPOLARITY1 IN ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−− S h a r e d P o r t s − Dynamic R e c o n f i g u r a t i o n P o r t (DRP) −−−−−−−−−−−−
DADDR
=> DADDR,
DCLK
=> DCLK,
DEN
=> DEN,
DI
=> DI ,
DO
=> DO,
DRDY
=> DRDY,
DWE
=> DWE,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− S h a r e d P o r t s − T i l e and PLL P o r t s −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
CLKIN
=> GTX CLKIN IN ,
GTXRESET
=> GTX GTXRESET IN ,
GTXTEST
=> ” 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ” ,
INTDATAWIDTH
=> t i e d t o v c c i ,
PLLLKDET
=> GTX PLLLKDET OUT,
PLLLKDETEN
=> t i e d t o v c c i ,
PLLPOWERDOWN
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
REFCLKOUT
=> open , −− was i n i t i a l l y mapped but l e f t u n c o n n e c t e d
REFCLKPWRDNB
=> t i e d t o v c c i ,
RESETDONE0
=> open , −− was i n i t i a l l y mapped but l e f t u n c o n n e c t e d
RESETDONE1
=> open , −− was i n i t i a l l y mapped but l e f t u n c o n n e c t e d
−−−−−−−−−−−−−− T ra n sm i t P o r t s − 64 b66b and 64 b67b Gearbox P o r t s −−−−−−−−−−−−
TXGEARBOXREADY0
=> open ,
TXGEARBOXREADY1
=> open ,
TXHEADER0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 2 downto 0 ) ,
TXHEADER1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 2 downto 0 ) ,
TXSEQUENCE0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 6 downto 0 ) ,
TXSEQUENCE1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 6 downto 0 ) ,
TXSTARTSEQ0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
TXSTARTSEQ1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
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−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− T ra n s mi t P o r t s − 8 b10b Encoder C o n t r o l P o r t s −−−−−−−−−−−−−−
TXBYPASS8B10B0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 3 downto 0 ) ,
TXBYPASS8B10B1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 3 downto 0 ) ,
TXCHARDISPMODE0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 3 downto 0 ) ,
TXCHARDISPMODE1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 3 downto 0 ) ,
TXCHARDISPVAL0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 3 downto 0 ) ,
TXCHARDISPVAL1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 3 downto 0 ) ,
TXCHARISK0( 3 downto 2 ) => t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 1 downto 0 ) ,
TXCHARISK0( 1 downto 0 ) => GTX TXCHARISK0 IN ,
TXCHARISK1( 3 downto 2 ) => t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 1 downto 0 ) ,
TXCHARISK1( 1 downto 0 ) => GTX TXCHARISK1 IN ,
TXENC8B10BUSE0
=> t i e d t o v c c i ,
TXENC8B10BUSE1
=> t i e d t o v c c i ,
TXKERR0
=> TXKERR0,
TXKERR1
=> TXKERR1,
TXRUNDISP0
=> open ,
TXRUNDISP1
=> open ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−− T ra n s mi t P o r t s − TX B u f f e r i n g and Phase A l i g n m e n t −−−−−−−−−−−−
TXBUFSTATUS0
=> GTX TXBUFSTATUS0 OUT,
TXBUFSTATUS1
=> GTX TXBUFSTATUS1 OUT,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− T ra n s mi t P o r t s − TX Data Path i n t e r f a c e −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
TXDATA0( 3 1 downto 1 6 ) => t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 1 5 downto 0 ) ,
TXDATA0( 1 5 downto 0 ) => GTX TXDATA0 IN ,
TXDATA1( 3 1 downto 1 6 ) => t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 1 5 downto 0 ) ,
TXDATA1( 1 5 downto 0 ) => GTX TXDATA1 IN ,
TXDATAWIDTH0
=> ” 0 1 ” ,
TXDATAWIDTH1
=> ” 0 1 ” ,
TXOUTCLK0
=> GTX TXOUTCLK0 OUT,
TXOUTCLK1
=> GTX TXOUTCLK1 OUT,
TXRESET0
=> GTX TXRESET0 IN ,
TXRESET1
=> GTX TXRESET1 IN ,
TXUSRCLK0
=> GTX TXUSRCLK0 IN ,
TXUSRCLK1
=> GTX TXUSRCLK1 IN ,
TXUSRCLK20
=> GTX TXUSRCLK20 IN ,
TXUSRCLK21
=> GTX TXUSRCLK21 IN ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− T ra n s mi t P o r t s − TX D r i v e r and OOB s i g n a l l i n g −−−−−−−−−−−−−−
TXBUFDIFFCTRL0
=> ” 1 0 1 ” ,
TXBUFDIFFCTRL1
=> ” 1 0 1 ” ,
TXDIFFCTRL0
=> ” 1 0 0 ” , −−”101”,
TXDIFFCTRL1
=> ” 1 0 0 ” , −−”101”,
TXINHIBIT0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
TXINHIBIT1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
TXN0
=> GTX TXN0 OUT,
TXN1
=> GTX TXN1 OUT,
TXP0
=> GTX TXP0 OUT,
TXP1
=> GTX TXP1 OUT,
TXPREEMPHASIS0
=> ” 0 1 0 0 ” , − −”0000” ,
TXPREEMPHASIS1
=> ” 0 1 0 0 ” , − −”0000” ,
−−−−−−−− T ra n s mi t P o r t s − TX E l a s t i c B u f f e r and Phase Al i g n m e n t P o r t s −−−−−−
TXENPMAPHASEALIGN0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
TXENPMAPHASEALIGN1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
TXPMASETPHASE0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
TXPMASETPHASE1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− T ra n sm i t P o r t s − TX PRBS G e n e r a t o r −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
TXENPRBSTST0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 1 downto 0 ) ,
TXENPRBSTST1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d v e c i ( 1 downto 0 ) ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− T ra n s mi t P o r t s − TX P o l a r i t y C o n t r o l −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
TXPOLARITY0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
TXPOLARITY1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− T ra n s mi t P o r t s − TX P o r t s f o r PCI E x p r e s s −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
TXDETECTRX0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
TXDETECTRX1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
TXELECIDLE0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
TXELECIDLE1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− T ra n sm i t P o r t s − TX P o r t s f o r SATA −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
TXCOMSTART0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
TXCOMSTART1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
TXCOMTYPE0
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i ,
TXCOMTYPE1
=> t i e d t o g r o u n d i
);
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Appendix C
Error Rate Calculations and Data
A commonly used metric for providing space error rate estimations is the geosynchronous orbit error rate or GEO error rate. This is the metric I used in reporting of test
results in order to more easily compare the severity of different event classes. This appendix
provides additional information on how I derived the error rates presented in Chapter 6 as
well as a full set of data for deriving the error rates. Some background is provided on error
rate calculations in general for those less familiar with the practice, but this is not intended
to be a comprehensive discussion on the topic.
C.1

Background

The first step in generating error rate data is to determine what is referred to as crosssection information for various event classes at different energy levels. The cross-section
number essentially represents the susceptibility of the system to that particular event, or
conceptually how ’large’ the area is that makes the system susceptible to that event. For
radiation test data this involves three pieces of data:
1. The number of observed events
2. The amount of radiation applied to the DUT (fluence)
3. The energy level of the radiation elements (LET)
The fluence represents, in essence, the total amount of radiation applied during a
given test or set of tests. The energy of the radiation elements is measured in terms of
a Linear Energy Transfer (LET), or in other words how much energy a given particle can
transfer when passing through a certain distance of a given material. The unit for this
measurement is MeV-cm2 /mg. The cross-section number for a given LET is derived by
taking the number of events observed during testing divided by the fluence applied during
that period.
The cross-section values at each LET then serve as data points in a graph which
conform well to a special class of Weibull curve. A curve is found that fits the data well and
the parameters for this Weibull curve are then used as inputs into special tools which can
provide error rate information for different space orbits. This is ultimately how the GEO
error rates are derived.
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C.2

Method

The background section provides the general steps taken to determine an orbit error
rate. In this section I will provide some additional details on the method used in this work
to perform those calculations mentioned above.
C.2.1

Event Counts

The event counts used for cross-section calculations are obtained from test data with
each system event of a given category counting once for that category. The error bar calculations for these event counts are given by a Poisson distribution table commonly used by
the XRTC. This table provides upper and lower error bounds on the expected actual count
based on the measured count. This method is described more fully in [10].
C.2.2

Fluence Adjustments

Fluence information is recorded by the facility where the testing is performed (Texas
A&M Cyclotron) for each test run. However, the fluence number recorded for each run may
require some adjustments before being used in the final error rate calculations. There are
two primary reasons for fluence adjustments. The first reason is that for some test runs not
all the data collected during the run is usable to derive the event count information. The
primary reason for this is runs in which a SEFI terminates proper operation of the system
before the radiation beam, and thus fluence measuring, is turned off. Adjusting for this
discrepancy is not difficult, however, with the current test architecture because the timing
of SEFI events is recorded in the test data and thus the amount of fluence can be trimmed
based on the test run time. The accuracy of this adjustment method is dependant on the
flow of radiation during the test (termed flux) being consistent throughout the run. All
test runs in the July test for which this fluence adjustment was made seemed to have such
consistency of flux to make this adjustment valid.

Table C.1: Equivalent Fluence (Adjusted Fluence Multiplied by Number of Lanes) by LET.

LET Truncated Adjusted Lanes Fluence
LET
Fluence
Fluence Used × Lanes
0.597
1.87E08 1.83E08
5 9.15E08
1.85
2.81E08 2.77E08
4 1.11E09
10.0
1.59E08 1.46E08
5 7.30E08
18.1
3.39E07 3.16E07
5 1.58E08
22.7
4.20E07 3.57E07
4 1.43E08
25.2
5.43E07 4.65E07
5 2.33E08
45.2
1.73E07 8.53E06
5 4.27E07
59.1
2.86E06 1.38E06
51 4.22E06
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The second reason the fluence number needs to be adjusted is due to the periods
of testing time in which the test architecture is unable to detect events. Once an event is
detected, the test architecture will not detect a new event on the same lane until the first
event is recovered. Thus, any fluence which occurs between the event start and the event
end should be subtracted from the overall fluence measurement in order to compensate for
the inability to detect new events. This adjustment is also fairly straight forward since the
duration of each event is known. The amount of fluence removed due to being inside events is
generally minimal compared to the overall fluence, but for some runs with many events it can
be significant. Finally, the fluence number is multiplied by the number of lanes in operation
for a given test in order to provide an error rate number that is per lane and consistent across
all test runs. The fluence adjustments made for the July test are represented in Table C.0.
C.2.3

Weibull Curve Fitting

Once fluence adjustments are made, the new fluence number along with event count
statistics are used to calculate cross-section data for each LET value. These LET, crosssection pairs are used as data points in a graph with the hopes of being able to match a
well-fitting Weibull curve to the points. For this work a special tool was developed in Matlab
for the purpose of automatically fitting a curve to the supplied data points for each event
category. The Weibull curve has four parameters which defines the curve,
• LET Threshold
• Width
• Exponent
• XSigma
with the relationship given by the equation
Y

= (1 − e−(

X−LET T hreshold Exponent
)
W idth

) × XSigma,

(C.1)

where X is an LET value and Y is the calculated cross-section value for that LET value.
The algorithm for fitting the curve to the data points is fairly simplistic with the
tool allowing for hand modifications of the derived parameters after the automatic fit is
determined. In essence the algorithm searches through various combinations of the four
parameters and determines which set of parameters provides a curve which best fits the data
set. A good fit is determined by average distance to the curve from the data points with
more weight being given to the data points with smaller LET values and smaller error bars
as well as extra weight being given to points which fall below rather than above the curve.
The points with smaller LET values are given more weight in the calculation because these
points have a stronger impact on the GEO Error rate calculations (because those are closer
to the expected LET values for this orbit). The data points with smaller error bars are given
more weight in the calculation because there is higher confidence in that measured value
and thus a greater need to have the curve fit to that point. Data points which fall below
the curve are given more weight in order for the end result to error on the side of an upper
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bound on the error rate. Better algorithms are possible for fitting the Weibull curve to the
data points, but this algorithm is meant to provide a fast way to arrive at a starting point
for by-hand optimizations to the curve fit. Figure C.0 shows an example of the interface for
this tool.

Figure C.1: Example of Interface for Weibull Curve Fitting Tool.

C.2.4

Error Rate Calculation

The parameters from the Weibull curve fit for a given set of data then serves as
the input to various tools in order to determine the estimated GEO error rate. One such
tool was developed by Larry Edmonds at NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratories. This tool is
integrated into the Weibull curve fitting tool mentioned above to provide a quick estimated
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rate for a given set of Weibull parameters. A more accurate tool is provided by Vanderbilt
University called CREME-MC. This web-based software tool is used to provide a large variety
of calculations on radiation test data, including event rates generated for this work. Using
the tool consists of a number of steps with the output of one step serving as the input to
the next step. For those familiar with the tool, Table C.1 details the settings that were
utilized to generate event rates for this work. These settings were chosen in part to allow
the error rates to be more easily compared to the results of other testing done in this area,
most particularly that done by Monreal on Virtex 5 MGTs ([1]).

Table C.2: Settings for CREME-MC Tool.

Function
TRP
GTRN
FLUX
FLUX
FLUX
FLUX
FLUX
FLUX
TRANS
TRANS
TRANS
LETSPEC
LETSPEC
LETSPEC
LETSPEC
HUP
HUP
HUP
HUP

C.3

Setting
Value
–
Not Used
–
Not Used
Atomic # of lightest element included
7
Atomic # of heaviest element included
54
GCR Version
CREME96
Solar Conditions
Solar Minimum
Spacecraft Location
Near-Earth GEO
Include Trapped Protons
No
Shielding material
Aluminum
Shield thickness
0.150 inches
Transport Code
Creme96 TRANS/UPROP
Atomic # of lightest element included
7
Atomic # of heaviest element included
54
Minimum Energy value
0.1 MeV/nuc
Device material
Silicon
X
0
Y
0
Z
1.0µm
Funnel Depth
0

Test Data

Tables C.2 and C.3 represent the event counts during the July test for recovery events
and failure signature events respectively broken down by LET. These counts represent the
total number of events on all lanes throughout the test. Also included with this information
is the count for SEFIs which were observed during testing. SEFI error rate data is readily
available from other research and the inclusion of the data here is merely for reference against
other generated error rate information. Event count information can be used along with the
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fluence information found in Table C.0 to regenerate the data points used in Weibull curve
fitting. The Truncated Fluence in the table refers to the total fluence for that LET after
the fluence had been adjusted for SEFI events or other reasons which truncated a test run.
The Adjusted Fluence represents the adjustments made to compensate for time inside events
where the test architecture is unable to detect new events. The number of lanes represents
the number of functional lanes that were tested at a given LET. The test architecture has
the capability to disable logging on any given lane and thus any indication that a lane is not
behaving properly before a given test will be cause to disable logging on that lane. All of the
final event rate numbers are given in terms of events per lane and thus the fluence numbers
must be adjusted to take into consideration the number of lanes used during testing. This
fluence is represented in the last column in the table. Thus the cross-section points per lane
are found by taking the event count from Table C.2 or C.3 and dividing by the last column
in Table C.0. The section following this section contains images of the curves that were
generated using this information and the method described above.

Table C.3: Recovery Event Counts by LET.

Event Class
.0597 1.85 10.0
Data Corruption
77 2664 8514
Aurora Recovered
14 729 5152
DUT Aurora Reset
2
46 184
SRV Aurora Reset
0
1
17
DUT CDR Reset
0
0
10
SRV CDR Reset
0
0
7
DUT GT Reset
0
2
14
SRV GT Reset
0
0
7
DRP Scrub
0
0
4
Scrub
0
0
2
GLUT Scrub
0
0
0

C.4

LET
18.1 22.7 25.2 45.2 59.1
2292 3079 6584 2877 463
2887 1823 3061 2126 869
32
67 140
48
14
14
0
7
1
1
3
0
3
0
1
3
0
1
2
1
5
2
16
3
2
4
0
1
1
0
1
1
3
3
2
0
2
4
24
11
0
0
0
1
1

Weibull Curves and Parameters

Figures C.1 through C.5 represent the fitted Weibull curves from the data above. The
quality of these fits is not a perfect science, which is why all of the data used to generate
these curves is provided here should a different curve fit be desired. Most of the curves here
are direct outputs from the curve fitting tool mentioned above, but some have been edited
by hand for a better fit. The resulting Weibull parameters, along with the estimated rate
given by Larry Edmond’s program and the rate generated from the CREME-MS tool are
provided in Tables C.4 and C.5.
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Table C.4: Failure Signature Event Counts by
LET
Event
.0597 1.85 10.0 18.1 22.7
RX 8B 10B Error SRV
16
702 2470
782 1110
RX 8B 10B Error DUT
29
826 5196 2264 1770
RX 8B 10B Error
45 1528 7666 3046 2880
RX Buffer Error SRV
0
0 1006
739
245
RX Buffer Error DUT
2
242
158
36
52
RX Buffer Error
2
242 1164
775
297
RX Realign DUT
0
37
149
37
48
RX Realign
0
37
149
37
48
TX Buffer Error DUT
0
24
103
31
45
TX Buffer Error
0
24
103
31
45
TX K Error DUT
0
21
110
32
32
TX K Error
0
21
110
32
32
Soft and Hard Error SRV
0
14
84
26
31
Soft and Hard Error DUT
0
20
133
34
35
SOFT and Hard Error
0
34
217
60
66
Frame Error SRV
0
1
7
1
5
Frame Error DUT
14
13
40
11
13
Frame Error
14
14
47
12
18
Lane Down SRV
0
0
97
67
7
Lane Down DUT
0
11
26
8
8
Lane Down
0
11
123
75
15
Watchdog SRV
0
2
16
6
6
Watchdog DUT
2
43
158
35
58
Watchdog
2
45
174
41
64
Packet Errors SRV
4
150
783
280
328
Packet Errors DUT
26 1350 3488
927 1192
Packet Errors
30 1500 4271 1207 1520
CRC Failure SRV
4
149
750
264
316
CRC Failure DUT
26 1225 3476
920 1107
CRC Failure
30 1374 4226 1184 1423
Length Error SRV
0
18
83
41
27
Length Error DUT
0
263
0
0
270
Length Error
0
281
83
41
297
Missing Packet SRV
0
5
21
11
8
Missing Packet DUT
1
13
35
16
28
Missing Packet
1
18
56
27
36
MultiLane Events
1
2
73
32
62
Persistent CRC
2
7
22
7
9
SEFI
0
3
6
2
6
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LET.
25.2
2120
3270
5390
191
112
303
70
70
98
98
87
87
66
85
151
17
30
47
9
34
43
27
143
170
908
2580
3488
861
2556
3417
110
1
111
34
35
69
120
20
8

45.2
1248
1792
3040
225
232
457
35
35
47
47
35
35
30
48
78
2
18
20
27
25
52
12
42
54
415
902
1417
388
891
1279
56
2
58
22
11
33
71
9
4

59.1
203
300
503
57
10
67
5
5
12
12
2
2
9
15
24
0
11
11
0
3
3
3
8
11
57
138
195
55
135
190
9
0
9
10
7
17
16
3
0

Figure C.2: Weibull Curves Fitted to Test Data for Recovery Events (1 of 2).

122

Figure C.3: Weibull Curves Fitted to Test Data for Recovery Events (2 of 2).
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Figure C.4: Weibull Curves Fitted to Test Data for Failure Signature Signal Events (1 of 3).
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Figure C.5: Weibull Curves Fitted to Test Data for Failure Signature Signal Events (2 of 3).
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Figure C.6: Weibull Curves Fitted to Test Data for Failure Signature Signal Events (3 of 3).
Table C.5: Recovery Event Weibull Parameters.
CREME-MC
Tool
LET
Event
Rate
Rate Threshold Width Exponent
Data Corruption
9.0E-04 9.6E-04
0.1
98.7
1.077
Aurora Recovered
3.5E-04 2.9E-04
0.1
500.0
1.454
DUT Aurora Reset
1.1E-05 1.1E-05
0.1
333.4
1.235
SRV Aurora Reset
3.7E-07 5.5E-07
0.1
11.2
2.228
DUT CDR Reset
9.0E-08 1.8E-07
0.1
11.2
2.872
SRV CDR Reset
3.1E-07 2.8E-07
0.1
401.3
1.583
DUT GT Reset
7.9E-07 8.2E-07
0.1
282.9
1.325
SRV GT Reset
1.1E-07 1.9E-07
0.1
16.7
1.970
DRP Scrub
1.7E-07 1.3E-07
0.1
322.4
1.841
Scrub
1.0E-07 6.0E-08
0.1
400.3
2.099
GLUT Scrub
2.2E-08 1.6E-08
0.1
63.2
5.328
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XSigma
1.78E-04
2.52E-03
1.75E-05
5.97E-08
3.07E-08
3.26E-06
1.67E-06
3.07E-08
3.26E-06
6.35E-06
4.70E-07

Table C.6: Failure Signature Signal Event Weibull Parameters.
CREME-MC
Tool
LET
Event
Rate
Rate Threshold Width Exponent
RX 8B/10B Error
5.7E-04 5.7E-04
0.1
322.4
1.186
RX Buffer Error
7.8E-05 8.1E-05
0.1
8.4
1.712
RX Realign
7.6E-06 9.0E-06
0.1
6.7
1.583
TX Buffer Error
6.3E-06 6.9E-06
0.1
33.0
1.325
TX K Error
6.4E-06 6.9E-06
0.1
33.0
1.325
Soft/Hard Error
2.1E-05 2.3E-05
0.1
394.2
1.013
Frame Error
1.6E-05 1.8E-05
0.1
22.3
0.534
Lane Down
5.6E-06 4.8E-06
0.1
77.6
1.712
Watchdog
1.4E-05 1.5E-05
0.1
138.2
1.186
CRC Failure
4.2E-04 4.6E-04
0.1
31.2
1.088
LENgth Error
6.0E-05 6.8E-05
0.1
2.9
2.163
MISSing Packet
5.7E-06 6.0E-06
0.1
500.0
1.077
CRC | LEN | MISS
3.6E-04 3.8E-04
0.1
55.6
1.186
Persistent CRC
2.8E-06 3.2E-06
0.1
165.6
0.963
MultiLane Events
3.1E-06 2.5E-06
0.1
190.6
1.841
SEFI
9.7E-07 1.1E-06
0.1
230.3
1.121

127

XSigma
6.74E-04
3.26E-06
2.27E-07
8.59E-07
8.59E-07
1.32E-05
1.16E-07
6.35E-06
6.35E-06
2.64E-05
8.59E-07
6.35E-06
5.65E-05
5.80E-07
2.41E-05
6.24E-07

Appendix D
Comparison of Results with Monreal Results
One of the contributions of this work is to provide additional support to the research
which has already been performed in this area. Most importantly is to provide support for
the MGT characterization which was performed by Monreal as reported in [1]. His work
provided the catalyst for this work and thus deserves special consideration. This appendix
provides a brief comparison of the results of that work compared to that of this work.
D.1

Test Comparison

There are some significant differences between the test setups between Monreal’s work
and that of this work, though not enough to make the results completely incomparable.
Monreal’s work was more focused on the characterization of the the raw MGTs while the
work reported here is focused more on characterization of a system which contains MGTs.
For clarity I will refer to the two different tests as Monreal’s test and the Aurora test.
D.1.1

Test Architecture

Monreal’s test architecture was composed of the MGTs and a very small custom
protocol. This protocol had a limited set of control characters and transmitted a repeating
sequence of pseudo-random data with no packetization and no gaps between transmissions.
The protocol logic was housed almost exclusively in the SRV FPGA with the DUT FPGA
simply looping data from one MGT to another through a FIFO. The impact of this architecture is that it is more difficult to identify TX vs. RX errors in some cases. For instance
an upset to the RX elastic buffer may appear as a TX bit error by the time it is received
on the SRV FPGA because there is no visibility between the RX MGT and the TX MGT
on the DUT. The benefit of this architecture, though, is that the DUT is composed almost
exclusively of MGTs thus nearly eliminated the possibility of upsets to protocol logic.
The Aurora testing utilizes the full Aurora protocol which makes use of more control
characters, and has a much larger fabric footprint. The Aurora test also transmits data in
packets with a small (single cycle) gap between packets and clock compensation is used.
The test architecture also includes an additional layer above the Aurora protocol for frame
generation and checking (with a CRC). This allows greater visibility into distinguishing RX
and TX errors since errors could be detected in both the DUT and SRV FPGAs. The
ultimate result of this is that the Aurora system is much more complex than that which was
in Monreal’s test and thus presents more ways in which the system can be upset.
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D.1.2

Hardware and Test Setup

The hardware setup for Monreal’s test was fairly different from the Aurora test. The
same XRTC motherboard was used, but the daughter card used has two FPGAs on the same
card with PCB trace lines connecting the MGTs of the two FPGAs. Thus, unlike the Aurora
test only a single XRTC motherboard is necessary for testing, therefore greatly simplifying
the hardware setup. The PCB trace lines also provide for a more ideal transmission medium
than the CX4 cables used in the Aurora testing. Another impact of the single board setup is
that a single oscillator is able to drive the clocking for MGTs in both FPGAs. This removes
the need for clock compensation and in general makes the system less susceptible to some
clock related errors.
The most significant difference in test setup is the fact that Monreal’s testing utilized
shielding to expose only the MGTs to the radiation beam. This isolated the radiation effects
to upsets in the MGT tiles and not the surrounding logic or distributed RAM used as FIFOs
on the DUT. This allowed for greater focus on the particular error modes of the MGT tiles
themselves. The Aurora test setup does not use any shielding and thus exposes the entire
system to radiation. This allows the Aurora testing to see events caused by upsets to any
part of the system.
Another distinction between the test setups is that Monreal’s testing employed continuous configuration scrubbing rather than explicitly scrubbing to identify configuration
upsets. Given the low fabric footprint of the custom protocol and the use of shielding on
the chip, the number of configuration upsets would be expected to be extremely low and
thus there was likely little to be gained by including scrubbing as a specific recovery step.
In the Aurora testing, however, it is important to identify any upsets to the logic portion
of the design explicitly to gain greater insight into the susceptibility of the protocol portion
compared to the MGT tiles themselves.
D.2
D.2.1

Results Comparison
Category Comparisons

The primary findings of Monreal’s work are given in Figure D.0 while those from the
Aurora test are found in Chapter 6. The primary categories given in Monreal’s results are Bit
Error (BE) events and Loss Of Link (LOL) events. Bit error events are roughly analogous
to Data Corruption events in the Aurora test. These categories are the easiest to compare
since in both cases the implemented protocol or recovery logic has less influence with these
events. The next class of events (LOL) in Monreal’s test cover any events in which some
recovery step was taken. The re-sync events are specified by the custom protocol and are
somewhat analogous to the Aurora Recovered events in the Aurora testing. However, the
re-sync process in Monreal’s testing does not employ the RX and TX resets, as those steps
are included in the re-init category, while the Aurora Recovered events in the Aurora testing
always includes events which experienced both RX and TX resets. Thus, to truly compare
categories, a number of event categories from Monreal’s results must be combined to equate
to the Aurora test. In this way Monreal’s results offer a more detailed understanding of
the failure mechanisms for the tile alone, with a higher level of detail available than the
Aurora results. The focus of the Aurora test, however, was on providing information that
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is in control of the system designer, and thus, more emphasis is placed on the higher level
recovery options.

Figure D.1: Monreal MGT Testing Results from [1].

The higher level recovery steps employed by both tests are generally directly comparable with the primary exception being the Aurora Reset events. Since Monreal’s test did
not use the Aurora protocol there is no real comparison between his test and the Aurora test
for this recovery step beyond the fact that part of the Aurora Reset also issues the RX/TX
reset and does a re-synchronization. Thus some of these events may be the same as those in
Monreal’s testing which were recovered by these resets, but otherwise they are likely events
specific to the Aurora protocol or FPGA fabric that are unrelated to Monreal’s test.
Another important distinction, as mentioned above, is that Monreal’s test employed
continuous scrubbing and thus did not extract configuration upset data in the same way as
the Aurora test. Also, the category of events labeled as DRP Scrub in Monreal’s testing are
actually events which recovered from the application of a GLUT scrub since DRP Scrubbing
was not actually used in Monreal’s test. The assumption was made that these events were
DRP related, though it is possible that some other memory was in error. The Aurora testing
used two different recovery steps to gain visibility on DRP events and those which required a
GLUT scrub. All DRP events should also be recovered by a GLUT scrub, however, and thus
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combining the two Aurora test categories should equate to the single DRP scrub category
of Monreal’s testing.
D.2.2

Error Rate Comparison

Table D.0 shows the comparison between reported GEO error rates between the two
sets of test results with categories being matched based on the discussion above. It is
important to note that the manner in which Weibull curves are fit to test data and the
resulting Weibull parameters have a significant influence on reported error rate. Despite
that fact, and the differences in the test setups, the results from the two tests show a high
level of agreement in most categories. The largest difference between results is found in the
TX reset categories. Interestingly, in the TX CDR Reset category Monreal reports a much
higher error rate than the Aurora testing, yet the other TX reset categories are reported as
negligibly low for Monreal’s results. It may be that some difference in the test setup allowed
for a greater number of events to be recovered by different TX resets in the Aurora testing
(and thus the results are more distributed) while Monreal’s test setup allowed more events
to recover only with the CDR Reset. However, even this explanation is insufficient, for the
sum of all three Aurora TX categories is still lower than that reported from Monreal for TX
CDR resets. Thus, there must be some other difference in the test setup contributing to this
difference in error rates.

Table D.1: Test Result Comparison. A ’—’ represents a negligible measurement.

Results Category
Error Rate(Events/Day)
Monreal
Aurora
Monreal
Aurora
RX/TX BE
Data Corruption
7.7E-04
9.0E-04
RX/TX Resets
Aurora Recovered
1.7E-04
3.5E-04
RX Buffer, RX Reset
DUT Aurora Reset
1.2E-05
1.1E-05
TX Reset
SRV Aurora Reset
—
3.7E-07
RX CDR Reset
DUT CDR Reset
8.4E-08
9.0E-08
TX CDR Reset (RE-INIT) SRV CDR Reset
6.2E-06
3.1E-07
RX GTX Reset
DUT GTX Reset
2.1E-06
7.9E-07
TX GTX Reset
SRV GTX Reset
—
1.1E-07
DRP Scrub
DRP Scrub, GLUT Scrub 1.7E-07
1.9E-07
Not Extracted
Scrub
N/A
1.0E-07

Another difference between the two sets of results is in the GTX reset categories with
Monreal’s results slightly more than twice the Aurora results. One possible explanation
of this increased rate could be related to the manner in which Monreal’s testing handled
configuration scrubbing. Since scrubbing was continuous, configuration errors could be fixed
at any time during an event, but the system may not recover until after a GTX reset
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occurred. This would lead to an increase in the number of GTX recovered events since
most or all configuration related events would appear in this category. It is also possible,
though, that this difference is at least partially related to the way the Weibull parameters
were generated. The Aurora testing also reports more than double the error rate for Aurora
Recovered events but this is more expected due to the increased complexity of the Aurora
protocol and the additional possibilities for Aurora-related upsets.
Overall, the results from the two tests seem to correlate well and support each other
in providing understanding on the susceptibility of MGTs. Despite the differences in test
architectures and hardware setups, similar results were achieved for the MGT error rates.
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